Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Scofield

89 F. Supp. 102, 39 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 240, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3934
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedFebruary 7, 1950
DocketCivil Action No. 1266
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 89 F. Supp. 102 (Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Scofield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Scofield, 89 F. Supp. 102, 39 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 240, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3934 (W.D. Tex. 1950).

Opinion

RICE, District Judge.

Findings of Fact

I. This, is an action against Defendant for Thirty-Six Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Six Dollars and Forty-Six Cents ($36,266.46) collected by him from plaintiff as for taxes and interest claimed to be due the United States of America, with interest, and arises under Section 117 (j) (2) of Title 26 United States Code Annotated.

2. Plaintiff (herein called “Kirby”) is a Delaware Corporation, successor, after Bankruptcy Section 77B proceedings concluded in 1936, to the property and business of Kirby Lumber Company, a Texas corporation chartered in 1901. It is authorized, by its permit to do business in Texas, to manufacture and sell timber products and to buy and lease properties and facilities necessary to this purpose.

3. Frank Scofield, at all times material and at all times hereinafter mentioned, was, and is now, the duly appointed, qualified and acting United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the First District of the State of Texas.

4. Plaintiff has been since 1936, in the business of manufacturing and selling lumber and other timber products. It operates five sawmills in East Texas, and owns timber-lands and growing timber as a source of raw materials for its operations. It also owns houses for the use of its employees, and mules and trucks which it uses in its operations. Its executive offices and sales and accounting forces are in Houston, Texas. One Superintendent is over all mills. The Company also has a Tie Department. The Company owns more than a half-million acres of land and timber rights. Its timber lands, timber, houses, mules and trucks are, and have been, at all times herein mentioned, all used in connection with Plaintiff’s business of building and maintaining a timber reserve and converting timber to lumber and other manufactured products for sale.

5. During the years 1942 and 1943, Plaintiff sold certain of its properties described in Paragraph 4, all held for a period of more than six (6) months prior to sale, and from said sales derived profits, which it returned as capital gain, in its income tax returns for the calendar years 1942 and 1943, respectively, under the provisions of Section 117(j) of Title 26, United States Code Annotated. Thereafter, the Treasury Department of the United States through the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and persons acting for him issued proposed deficiency notice for 1942 and 1943, proposing deficiency assessments in the sums of Seventeen Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Three Dollars and Forty Cents ($17,443.40) for 1942, and Sixteen Thousand Four Dollars and Twenty Cents ($16,004.20) for the year 1943, proposing among other things to deny capital gains treatment to said profits and to treat them as ordinary income; whereupon Plaintiff filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue protests against said proposed deficiencies, respectively; but said Commissioner issued ninety (90) day deficiency notices for said years in said [104]*104sums respectively, determining that One Hundred Ten Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Seven Dollars and Forty-Nine Cents ($110,927.49) received by plaintiff in the year 1942, and Eighty-Five Thousand One Hundred Eighty-Five Dollars and Seventy-One Cents ($85,185.71) received by Plaintiff in the year 1943, as profits from the sale of certain of its assets in such years, respectively, described in Paragraph 4, should be denied capital gain treatment under Section 117(j) of Title 26, United States Code Annotated, and should be taxed as ordinary income. Said action of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue resulted in increasing the taxes demanded of Plaintiff by the sum of Sixteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Dollars and Twelve Cents ($16,639.12) for 1942 and Twelve Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy-Seven Dollars and Eighty-Six Cents ($12,777.86) for 1943. The details of the transaction herein involved are as follows:

YEAR 1942
Feet Cost Sales Price Gain
Standing Timber Sales 9,948,615 $40,960.73 $144,607.78 $103,647.05
Acres
Timber Land Sales 5,190.43 17.022.64 24,303.08 7,280.44
$110,927.49
Tax assessed by the Government — 40% 44,370.99
As should have been assessed —25% 27,731.87
Over Assessment $ 16,639.12
YEAR 1943
Feet Cost Sales Price Gain
Standing Timber Sales 7,585,753 $31,570.55 $113,140.08 $ 81,569.53
Acres
Timber Land Sales. 3,422.65 11,223.42 14,002.90 2,779.48
$ 84,349.01
DEPRECIATION
25 Tenant Houses 4,669.26 5,609.40 1,895.00 954.86
1 Log Truck 21.84 1,200.00 1,000.00 (red) 178.16
4 Mules 840.00 900.00 60.00
$ 85,185.71
Tax assessed by the Government — 40% 34,074.28
As should have been assessed —25% 21,296.42
Over Assessment $ 12,777.86

[105]*1056. Kirby’s policy has been to discourage and seek to avoid sales of land and timber, as distinguished from sale of manufactured products. It has no sales force for sale of land or timber, does not advertise its lands or timber for sale, and has never solicited a sale thereof.

Its regular customers are wholesale lumber firms, retail yards, railroads and industries. These are customers for sales of manufactured products. The larger sales of timber and land in question in 1942 and 1943 were to competitors. Land and timber sales were by deeds, and sales of timber for posts and piling were by an arrangement under which invoices were rendered to purchaser as purchaser cut and removed the agreed timber. The purchasers of the standing timber cut it and Kirby received the price and had nothing further to do with the timber, and its further manufacture, if any, and sales, if any.

7. Kirby’s revenues received from the land and timber sales in question are small in relation to the gross revenues received from its total activities, as appears from the following figures:

1942 1943
Total Revenues $6,447,851.76 6,957,262.23
Total Costs and Expenses 5,890,535.68 6,131,740.38
Standing Timber Sales 144,607.78 113,140.08
Land Sales 24,303.08 14,002.90

More than a third of the gross, and about one-half of the net income in issue for 1942 comes from sales of standing timber for poles and piling. Approximately the same relation exists in 1943. There were no pole and piling timber sales prior to 1942. The 1942 sales were in two transactions only, were from timber that had been held for many years, principally since 1902, and were made to competitors under pressures originating with the Government. Poles and piling, being necessarily from large and choice trees, trees sold for their manufacture were selected trees taken from wide expanses of forest; and care was exercised to see that the purchasers, in their removal, did not do any damage to the forest. The purchaser in each instance cut and removed the trees, paying plaintiff for them.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Gould v. Department of Revenue
4 Or. Tax 604 (Oregon Tax Court, 1971)
McCollum v. State Tax Commission
2 Or. Tax 486 (Oregon Tax Court, 1967)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
89 F. Supp. 102, 39 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 240, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3934, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kirby-lumber-corp-v-scofield-txwd-1950.