Kintner v. Atlantic Communication Co.

230 F. 829, 1916 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1009
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 7, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 230 F. 829 (Kintner v. Atlantic Communication Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kintner v. Atlantic Communication Co., 230 F. 829, 1916 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).

Opinion

MAYER, District Judge.

This voluminous record is not so formidable as it looks, and while the questions under consideration are highly- interesting, yet many important facts are either uncontro-verted or not seriously in dispute. The extensive record is due partly [830]*830to the introduction of testimony as to prior use, either not presented at all or only passingly and inconclusively in a previous litigation, and partly to the desire of the court and counsel that this record shall contain all there is — in the hope that the final determination in this suit may end the controversy.

Before undertaking the technical discussion here involved, it is desirable to outline the mental attitude with which the subject must be approached, eyen though such outline suggests observations, more or less trite, to those familiar with the law of patents. The radio art (as wireless telegraphy is now called) is, at the outset, so mysterious to the layman that even its fundamentals still seem wonderful, and what to the scientist may appear to be but natural progress may carry an exaggerated importance to an unskilled mind. It is therefore vital to have a clear understanding of the state of the art, and at least to endeavor to perform that difficult feat of mental gymnastics whereby a lay mind presumes to understand, first what was known to that much referred to person “the man skilled in the art,” and next whether what was done went beyond the ken of that same person.

Fortunately, in this case, we have an extraordinary array of men of super-scientific attainments, some of whom have spoken through their writings and others in the flesh, and, with the court transformed into a university classroom, it has been a liberal education to listen to the noted scientists who have appeared, either as experts or as fact witnesses, as well as to the many fine upstanding men whom the government’ and >the wireless' telegraph .companies are fortunate enough to have in their service from officers to operators. From hearing what these men have said and reading what they and others have written, the case must be approached with the realization that “the man skilled in the art” possessed a high order of knowledge and attainment and that something profoundly abstruse to men less qualified may have been the noninventive, although useful, step forward.

[1] It is also important to remember that in the early stages of an art of this kind discoveries are being made rapidly and constantly, and therefore the file wrapper assumes an importance which is often absent in many cases; for when the date of an invention and the clarity of disclosure are in serious controversy the courts must be vigilant to prevent a result by which after-acquired knowledge, in a • swiftly developing art, gives to a patentee that valuable control which would not have been his but for a later, or, if not later, a newly expressed, thought which he seeks to antedate.

[2] Finally, although at times, in some patent cases, much concern is expressed in argument about the rights of the public in regard to some alleged invention, without, which, up to that time, the public had lived with philosophic complacency, yet in cases where advances in respect of health, safety, and comfort of living are concerned, the public has a real as well as a theoretical interest. On the one hand, it is essential to the welfare of the country that'inventors shall not be discouraged by narrow attitudes and interpretations when they have made a worth-while contribution; but, on the other, the public is not to be deprived of the full enjoyment of what be[831]*831comes rightly theirs because the advance is a mere .improvement, or, if more than that, because, through no fault of theirs, the inventor has not made full and clear disclosure, or has failed to obtain a contract with the government which defines what he may later claim.

[3] With these views in mind, I take up the discussion of the patents in suit. In the early history of the art, signaling by wireless was much embarrassed by atmospheric disturbances, or “static,” as it is called. To the overcoming of this difficulty the two patents in suit, one for a “method of wireless signaling” and the other “for apparatus for wireless signaling,” are directed.

The method patent was applied for on July 1, 1907, and was issued April 13, 1909. The apparatus patent (divisional) was applied for August 25, 1908, and -was issued also on April 13, 1909.

“Great difficulty,” said Fessenden, “has been experienced in wireless signaling on account of electric disturbances, more particularly atmospheric disturbances. In the tropics, for example, stations equipped with the usual typo of apparatus as a rule are unable to work at all for months at a time, except at brief intervals, and oven in the more northern climates tho same difficulties occur during the summer months. By my apparatus and method herein described I succeed in annulling the effects of disturbances, and more particularly such atmospheric disturbances.”

In the method patent there were four claims, two of which are here in issue as follows:

“1. In tho art of wireless signaling, tho method of eliminating disturbing impulses which comprises generating waves having a definite frequency, in groups having a definite group frequency above 250 per second, but within the limits of audibility, and receiving the same with an indicator resonantly unresponsive to said group frequency.”
“o. In the art of wireless signaling, the method of eliminating disturbing impulses which comprises generating waves having a definite frequency, in groups having a definite group frequency of approximately 1,000 per second, and receiving the samo with an indicator which is unresponsive, resonantly, to said group frequency.”

In the art, there must be a transmitting instrumentality and a receiving apparatus; for wireless telegraphy consists in sending through the ether the electro-magnetic wave known as the Hertzian wave, which is heard at the receiving end. Translated into plain English, “an indicator resonantly unresponsive” to the group frequency transmitted means an ordinary telephone. “Group [or spark] frequency” means the number of times per second that the ether is agitated, such as by means of recurrent sparks, and is not to he confused with “wave frequency.” A “wave train” means the electric waves radiated during one set of oscillations. If more than one, the wave trains radiated during one-half cycle of the charging current arc called a group of wave trains. What Fessenden claimed, according to plaintiffs, may therefore be colloquially stated thus:

“If you watch my method, you will learn that the electric spark recurs at regularly spaced or definite intervals, that I produce over 250 sparks per second in this definite or regular manner, and that at the other end the sound roaches a human being who has a telephone receiver held to his ear. I never generate so many sparks per second as to produce a sound beyond the limits of audibility, and I further inform you, among other things, that when I produce approximately 1,000 sparks per second, regularly spaced, I am simply [832]*832particularizing in respect of one of tibe group frequencies which. I use, and which you will find effective in overcoming static.”

An elaborate description of the details of the transmitting and receiving apparatus need not be here given.

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Related

Fessenden v. Radio Corp. of America
22 F. Supp. 777 (D. Delaware, 1938)
Hazeltine Corporation v. Abrams
7 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. New York, 1934)
Technidyne Corp. v. McPhilben-Keator, Inc.
72 F.2d 242 (Second Circuit, 1934)
Kintner v. Atlantic Communication Co.
249 F. 73 (S.D. New York, 1917)

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Bluebook (online)
230 F. 829, 1916 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1009, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kintner-v-atlantic-communication-co-nysd-1916.