Kinsey v. Dutton

100 S.W.2d 1025
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 11, 1936
DocketNo. 13470
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 100 S.W.2d 1025 (Kinsey v. Dutton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kinsey v. Dutton, 100 S.W.2d 1025 (Tex. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinion

BROWN, Justice.

Mrs. G. W. Kinsey, a widow, brought suit in the district court of Wise county against G. A. Dutton and wife, A. E. Dut-ton, alleging that on March 16, 1915, the Duttons executed a warranty deed to one J. E. Hampton, whereby they conveyed to Hampton a certain tract of land of about 56 acres, in Wise county, a part of the consideration therefor being a promissory note in the sum of $500, made payable to the order of said Duttons, on January 1, 1920, bearing interest at the rate of 10 per cent., and providing for the usual 10 per cent, attorneys’ fee, which note is secured by a vendor’s lien retained in the land so conveyed; that on June 5, 1915, the Dut-tons repurchased the said land from their vendee, J. E. Hampton, and assumed the payment of such promissory note; that on April 3, 1915, such note was, for a valuable consideration, transferred to appellant, and plaintiff below, Mrs. G. W. Kinsey.

She further alleged that the note had been extended from time to time; that same had matured and she prayed for judgment on such note with her interest and attorneys’ fee, and foreclosure of the vendor’s lien.

Mrs. A. E. Dutton, wife of G. A. Dut-ton, alone answered. She denied that Hampton ever executed or delivered to her any such promissory note as is sued upon, or that she ever transferred any such note to Mrs. Kinsey, or that she ever transferred any vendor’s lien on the property in controversy to Mrs. Kinsey, or that she ever delivered any such deed as mentioned in plaintiff’s petition to J. E. Hampton, or that she ever agreed or consented for same to be delivered to Hampton, or that she ever repurchased the said real estate from Hampton. And she alleged that she is the owner in her own right of the lands in controversy, and denied that the plaintiff below is entitled to assert any right or lien against the same, and alleged that any pretended lien sued upon is void, in that the lands were purchased by her father and mother, J. K. and Mary Mathews, and that after the death of her father and mother ’a partition decree was rendered on or about May 26, 1914, in the district court of Wise county, under and by virtue of which the 56 acres of land in controversy were awarded to her, and that immediately after the judgment was rendered she entered into actual, open, and visible possession of such tract of land, and has continuously since such time so used and occupied it; and alleged that appellant has had both actual and constructive notice that the land was her separate property.

She alleged that she was in no manner a party to the transaction relied upon by the appellant, and that she has never in any manner ratified or confirmed the same, and that all such should be canceled and held for naught.

She alleged that she and her husband executed the said deed to Hampton in consideration of $1,460, to be paid by Hampton to her, and the execution and delivery by Hampton to her of the promissory note in controversy, and that no part of the $1,-460 was ever paid, and Hampton has never executed and delivered to her the note provided for in the deed; that the attempted sale was never carried out; that the deed was never delivered to Hampton, but was retained by her and kept in her possession, and that she never authorized Hampton to execute and deliver to G. A. Dutton any note payable' to him pretending to be a vendor’s lien against her property; and that she never authorized G. A. Dutton to transfer the note to Mrs. Kinsey; that she never assented to or intended to deliver the deed to Hampton without the payment of the money specified therein and the delivery to her of the note provided for therein; and that, if Mrs. Kinsey acquired any such note, the same was acquired without her knowledge or consent.

She alleged that, if the deed to Hampton was ever filed for record, same was taken clandestinely from her possession and was “recorded long after such transfer without her knowledge or consent.’!

She alleged that, if Hampton and his wife attempted to convey the lands to G. A. Dutton, such attempted conveyance was made when they had no title to the lands, and was made without her knowledge or consent, and such pretended conveyance is void.

[1027]*1027She further' alleged that, if Mrs. Kinsey had any cause of action against her, the same was barred by the four-year statute of limitation, in that the extension agreements pretending to defer the time of payment of the note were not executed by her and were made without her knowledge and consent, and that same are wholly void.

She prayed that plaintiff below and appellant here take nothing as against her, and that the clouds cast upon the title of her lands be removed.

In reply to this pleading, Mrs. Kinsey alleged that J. E. Hampton was Mrs. Dut-ton's brother-in-law, and that all parties conspired in the execution of the warranty deed to Hampton, for the purpose of bringing into existence the $500 note, and that, after such note was sold by the Duttons and the money procured thereon, the Hamp-tons would reconvey the property to G. A. Dutton, who was to assume the payment of the $500 note; that all this was for the purpose of giving an outward appearance of validity to the notes and the lien securing the same; that in carrying out such plan for the purpose of raising the sum of $500 Mrs. Dutton authorized her husband and J. E. Hampton to consummate the deal.

Mrs. Kinsey alleged that she was an innocent purchaser for value before maturity and without notice of any of the matters relied upon by Mrs. Dutton; and that both Mr. and Mrs. Dutton, at the -time she purchased the note, had ample opportunity to inform her of the matters now relied upon by Mrs. A. E. Dutton, and failed and refused to so do, and that the Duttons are estopped from raising the defense against her rights.

Mrs. A. E. Dutton answered this pleading by a general demurrer and a general denial.

The case was tried to a jury. After all evidence and testimony had been received, the plaintiff below and appellant here moved for an instructed verdict in her behalf, which motion was overruled.

Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of Mrs. A. E. Dutton, and the following language was used: “And a jury being duly empaneled and sworn, and after the reading of the pleading, and all the evidence had been adduced, the court concluded that the evidence offered by all parties was not in conflict upon any material question, and that there was no issue to be submitted to the jury, and thereupon the court discharged the jury, and rendered judgment, as follows.”

This judgment awarded Mrs. Kinsey a personal recovery against defendant G. A. Dutton for $1,339.80,' being the amount of principal, interest, and attorneys' fees due at the date of such judgment, December 11, 1935, but that Mrs. G. W. Kinsey take nothing as against Mrs. A. E. Dutton, and that Mrs. A. E. Dutton have and recover on her cross-action over against Mrs. Kinsey and G. A. Dutton title to and possession of the tract of land in controversy, and “that all clouds, claims or liens asserted to or against said lands by reason of the matters involved in this suit be in all things can-celled and removed, and that the said defendant, Mrs. A. E. Dutton, be quieted in her title to said lands hereinabove described.”

Due exception to such judgment and notice of appeal was taken by Mrs. G. W. Kinsey, appellant here.

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Bluebook (online)
100 S.W.2d 1025, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kinsey-v-dutton-texapp-1936.