Kinney v. Clark

43 U.S. 76, 11 L. Ed. 185, 2 How. 76, 1844 U.S. LEXIS 322
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 15, 1844
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 43 U.S. 76 (Kinney v. Clark) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kinney v. Clark, 43 U.S. 76, 11 L. Ed. 185, 2 How. 76, 1844 U.S. LEXIS 322 (1844).

Opinion

Mr. Justice CATRON

delivered the opinion of the court.

For the principal facts, we refer to the statement of the reporter.

The first question in order presented by the bill depends on the validity of the complainant’s title. But as that of the defendants is the elder, and Clark’s entries not objected to on the ground that they are void for want of specialty; and the survey and patent founded, on them being in conformity to the locations, we will at once proceed *107 to the .main question presented by the bill; that is, whether Clark’s entries were made in the Cherokee coüntry or limits, and therefore void for this reason as against Porterfield’s subsequent entries: The first being on Treasury warrants, and the last on military warrants. The act of 1779, by virtue of .'which Clark’s entries were made, excepted the Cherokee lands from location; arid if the land in dispute, (in October, 17.80,) was such, then Clark’s entries' are void, if not, they are valid; and this fact being found either way, will end the controversy. We are called on to find the fact; and as it has been agitated in regard to this title, for nearly sixty years, uncommon care has been- -bestowed on the question, and a second argument been ordered.

. The defendant’s title came before- this court in Clark w, Smith, 13-Peters, 200, when the entries of Clark were pronounced -special; and the survey and patent declared to Conform to the entries: And in which case it was also-held, that it was .immaterial whether the entry was made on the lands claimed by the Ghickasaws- or not; it could only be obnoxious to the provisions of the statute of 1779, if made on lands reserved from location by that act; and the lands of the Chickasaws were not thus reserved. So it had been decided by the Court of Appeals of Virginia in Marshall and others v. George R. Clark in 1791, Hughes’s R. 40, and which was affirmed in Rollirs v. Clark, by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in 1839, 8 Dana’s Rep. 26.

The reservation is, “No entry or location of land, shall be admitted within the country and limits of the Cherokee.Indians.” The bill alleges the entry of Clark to be within the excepted lands.

The first inquiry we will make is, how far the contest stands affected by former.decisions, made by the Court of Appeals of Virginia, by this -court, and by the Court' of Appeals of Kentucky.

As to patents made by Kentucky, on warrants issued by that-state after--the Chickasaw tide was extinguished, for lands west of Tennessee river, the case of Clark v. Smith as an adjudication is direct to the point, that Clark’s patent is superior to such titles. This may be true,-and yet Clark’s entry be void; as Kentucky, in 1794, “ not only authorized, but made it the imperative duty of the register to issue a patent on the certificate of survey; as he seems to have done in obedienee to the act. We cannot admit that a patent thus issued pursuant to the authority^ and mandate of the law,-can he deemed void, merely because the entry of the patentee was invalid.” We *108 use the language of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Rollins v. Clark, 8 Dana, 28.

If Clark’s entry was made, however, on lands reserved from location by the act of 1779, then it is void, because the act did not open the land-office for such purpose, nor extend to the excepted lands: and whether the exception .reserving the Cherokee country, included the lands west of Tennessee river, was in 1779,’ and iá now, a matter of fact, as already stated, for the. court to ascertain. This fact is not concluded by the case of Clark v. Smith, although materially influenced by it. That adjudication, so -far as this question was involved in it, is founded mainly on the case of Thomas Marshall, George Mater, and others, superintendents of the Virginia state line, v. George Rogers Clark, Hughes’s Rep. 39, in a suit by caveat, to restrain Clark from obtaining a patent on the survey founded on his entries; two entries having ,been included in it. The cause was tried before the'Court of-Appeals of Virginia in 1791, on the caveat, filed in 1786. The first fact agreed by the parties, and submitted to the court, was whether the locations-of Clark could be made west of the Tennessee river, on Treasury warrants ; or, in other words; whether that country was reserved from location, as being the country an'd limits of the Cherokee Indians. The court held, “ the solution of the question to depend on a matter of fact, to be decided on evidence; and none such appearing, or being supplied by any law, charter, or treaty, produced or suggested, which ascertained what the country or limits of .the Cherokees was in 1779, no solution of' the question could be given, except that it was the opinion of the court, that the party whose interest it was .to extend the exception to the. land in dispute, must prove -the land to be within the description, of ffiat exception.” All the other questions were also decided against the caveators, and-the caveat- ordered to be dismissed. The judgment in effect ordered that a patent should issue to Clark on his survey; and, in fact, adjudged the better right to be in him. A suit by caveat was the ordinary' mode of trying titles in Virginia, before a patent issued, and was' equally conclusive on the parties, as if it had. been by bill in equity; this is the settled doctrine of Kentucky, and also Tennessee; and must be so from the nature of the suit. The power and jurisdiction of the courts to try titles in this manner, are conferred by statute, which are very similar in the states named; the practice as to the mode of proceeding, and the.effect of the judgment being the same in each. For evidence of this, we refer to the many *109 cases reported by Hughes; and to the cases of Peck v. Eddington, 2 Tennessee Rep. 331; Bugg v. Norris, 4 Yerg. R. 326, and Peeler and Campbell v. Norris, 4 Yerg. 331. "The powers of the courts, (it is said in Bugg v. Norris,) will be found co-extensive with any conflicting rights two claimants may have, where the defendant is attempting to pérfect his entry into a grant by survey.” Each party had the. privilege in the case óf the superintendents against Clarke to submit such facts as were material to sustain his right; if not agreed, an issue could be asked, and a jury empannelled, to find on the contested facts. They were all agreed. On these the court pronounced on the law of the case, and determined who had the better claim to the land, and awarded to him the patent.

The plaintiff or defendant' may introduce more or less evidence.to sustain his claim; but if he fail, he cannot be heard to say, in a second suit, his principal evidence of title was not introduced in the first, and therefore he will try the same issue again in another form, of proceeding on different and better evidence, 4 Yerg. 337-8; Outram v. Morewood, 3 East’s R. 357.

The patent being awarded to Clark, it was adjudged that he should take the land in fee; and the whole legal estate and seisin of the commonwealth in the lands.

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Bluebook (online)
43 U.S. 76, 11 L. Ed. 185, 2 How. 76, 1844 U.S. LEXIS 322, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kinney-v-clark-scotus-1844.