Pee Cueiam
: This case was referred pursuant to former Eule 45(a), now 57(a), to Trial Commissioner Paul H. Mc-Murray with directions to make findings of fact and recommendation for a conclusion of law. The commissioner has done so in an opinion and report filed July 22, 1964. The plaintiff has excepted to the opinion and certain of the findings of fact. The parties have filed briefs and the case has been orally argued. Since the court agrees with the commissioner’s findings, his opinion, and his recommended conclusion of law, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby adopts the same as the basis for its judgment in this case. Plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled to recover and the petition is dismissed.
OPINION OF THE COMMISSIONER
The plaintiff sues for the retired pay of an officer retired for disability incurred in military service. The plaintiff [551] served as a Captain in the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Reserve, on active duty during World War I from August 15,1917, until his discharge on June 10,1919. Plaintiff remained in the Army as a member of the Officers Reserve Corps, and with the advent of World War II was directed to be examined physically for extended active duty. Plaintiff was found permanently disqualified for active duty by reason of arterial hypertension, moderate and cardiac hypertrophy, severe on December 31,1941; and on October 19,1942, he was again found permanently incapacitated for active duty by reason of hypertension, mild, persistent. On November 13, 1942, a Medical Appeal Board, after reviewing the applicant’s medical history and examining him, determined that there was no evidence of cardiac pathology and recommended his acceptance for general military duty. On December 16, 1942, plaintiff entered extended active duty as a Lieutenant Colonel and served in Europe as a commander of a combat engineer battalion and later a regiment.1 On February 21, 1946, plaintiff was relieved from active duty (not by reason of physical, disability) in the grade of Colonel, on the basis ■of a final type physical examination given him on December .5,1945. It was determined, on the basis of the. examination, that plaintiff was not permanently incapacitated for general or limited service but there is no evidence in plaintiff’s military record that he was given an electrocardiogram at the time of his release from active duty.
• On July 15,1946, plaintiff applied for extended active duty in the grade of Colonel. On August 26,1946, he was ordered to report for active duty but in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel instead of the grade of Colonel, as he had requested. The orders were canceled upon plaintiff’s statement that he could not, for business reasons, afford to serve at a lower rank than -Colonel.
On February 10,1956, plaintiff applied to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records requesting that his records be corrected to show retirement for physical disability. In support of his application, plaintiff submitted photostatic [552] copies of bis physical examinations accomplished by two private physicians, dated December 19, 1955. He also produced letters from his former commanding officers regarding his participation in the European theatre of operations during World War II. On the basis of an examination of plaintiff’s medical records, made during his tour of extended active duty during World War II, the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army expressed the opinion that at the time plaintiff was released from active duty he was not suffering from any disabilities of such nature or degree as would warrant his retirement under the applicable rules, regulations, laws or policies then in effect. On June 26,1956, the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records concurred in the opinion expressed by the Office of the Surgeon General and plaintiff’s application for correction of his military records was denied.
On February 5,1957, plaintiff applied to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records for reconsideration of the original application of February 10,1956, to have his military records show entitlement to retirement by reason of physical disability. On May 21, 1957, plaintiff was informed that, after a review of all evidence submitted with his origina,! application, it had been determined by the Board that its prior denial of plaintiff’s application should be affirmed.
Plaintiff again applied to the Correction Board for reconsideration of his prior applications for correction of his military records to show retirement for physical disability, and on February 18, 1959, a hearing was held before the Board at which plaintiff was represented by counsel. Affidavits and other evidence were presented on plaintiff’s behalf and a transcript, comprising 46 pages, taken of statements made at the hearing. On the basis of the application for correction,, case summary, transcript of the hearing, the officer’s AG 201 File and Medical Records, the Correction Board concluded that, at the time of his release from active duty, plaintiff did not have any disability of such nature or degree as to warrant his retirement by reason of physical disability, and recommended denial of plaintiff’s application. On March 10,1959, the Assistant Secretary of the Army approved the recommendation of the Correction Board and denied plaintiff’s: application for retirement.
[553] On May 28, 1959, plaintiff filed Ms petition in this court alleging that the decision of the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the record.
The first issue which must be considered is whether the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. 2501 provides that “Every claim of which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”
In the present case, the date on which the claim accrued is either February 21,1946, the date plaintiff was relieved from active duty, or March 10,1959, the date on which the Assistant Secretary of the Army approved the recommendation of the Correction Board and denied plaintiff’s application for retirement.
In Friedman v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 1, 17, 310 F. 2d 381, 391 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932 (1963), the court’s statement, in discussing the statute of limitations when there has been no application for Retiring Board proceedings and the issue is whether a claim accrued upon final action of the Correction Board, was as follows:
In Patterson v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 435, 438, the plaintiff was released without a Retiring Board in March 1946 and did not seek relief until he applied to the Correction Board in January 1953; suit was begun in 1958. The court held broadly that the rule was “that where a plaintiff has received no determination of Ms eligibility for disability retirement pay by any board until the correction- board has acted, his cause of action accrues not at the time of his separation from the service, but at the time of the alleged wrongful action of the correction board, approved by the Secretary, in wrongfully refusing to correct the records and grant the plaintiff disability retirement with pay.” There was no suggestion that Patterson had good justification for failing to apply to the Retiring Board.
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Pee Cueiam
: This case was referred pursuant to former Eule 45(a), now 57(a), to Trial Commissioner Paul H. Mc-Murray with directions to make findings of fact and recommendation for a conclusion of law. The commissioner has done so in an opinion and report filed July 22, 1964. The plaintiff has excepted to the opinion and certain of the findings of fact. The parties have filed briefs and the case has been orally argued. Since the court agrees with the commissioner’s findings, his opinion, and his recommended conclusion of law, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby adopts the same as the basis for its judgment in this case. Plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled to recover and the petition is dismissed.
OPINION OF THE COMMISSIONER
The plaintiff sues for the retired pay of an officer retired for disability incurred in military service. The plaintiff [551] served as a Captain in the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Reserve, on active duty during World War I from August 15,1917, until his discharge on June 10,1919. Plaintiff remained in the Army as a member of the Officers Reserve Corps, and with the advent of World War II was directed to be examined physically for extended active duty. Plaintiff was found permanently disqualified for active duty by reason of arterial hypertension, moderate and cardiac hypertrophy, severe on December 31,1941; and on October 19,1942, he was again found permanently incapacitated for active duty by reason of hypertension, mild, persistent. On November 13, 1942, a Medical Appeal Board, after reviewing the applicant’s medical history and examining him, determined that there was no evidence of cardiac pathology and recommended his acceptance for general military duty. On December 16, 1942, plaintiff entered extended active duty as a Lieutenant Colonel and served in Europe as a commander of a combat engineer battalion and later a regiment.1 On February 21, 1946, plaintiff was relieved from active duty (not by reason of physical, disability) in the grade of Colonel, on the basis ■of a final type physical examination given him on December .5,1945. It was determined, on the basis of the. examination, that plaintiff was not permanently incapacitated for general or limited service but there is no evidence in plaintiff’s military record that he was given an electrocardiogram at the time of his release from active duty.
• On July 15,1946, plaintiff applied for extended active duty in the grade of Colonel. On August 26,1946, he was ordered to report for active duty but in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel instead of the grade of Colonel, as he had requested. The orders were canceled upon plaintiff’s statement that he could not, for business reasons, afford to serve at a lower rank than -Colonel.
On February 10,1956, plaintiff applied to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records requesting that his records be corrected to show retirement for physical disability. In support of his application, plaintiff submitted photostatic [552] copies of bis physical examinations accomplished by two private physicians, dated December 19, 1955. He also produced letters from his former commanding officers regarding his participation in the European theatre of operations during World War II. On the basis of an examination of plaintiff’s medical records, made during his tour of extended active duty during World War II, the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army expressed the opinion that at the time plaintiff was released from active duty he was not suffering from any disabilities of such nature or degree as would warrant his retirement under the applicable rules, regulations, laws or policies then in effect. On June 26,1956, the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records concurred in the opinion expressed by the Office of the Surgeon General and plaintiff’s application for correction of his military records was denied.
On February 5,1957, plaintiff applied to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records for reconsideration of the original application of February 10,1956, to have his military records show entitlement to retirement by reason of physical disability. On May 21, 1957, plaintiff was informed that, after a review of all evidence submitted with his origina,! application, it had been determined by the Board that its prior denial of plaintiff’s application should be affirmed.
Plaintiff again applied to the Correction Board for reconsideration of his prior applications for correction of his military records to show retirement for physical disability, and on February 18, 1959, a hearing was held before the Board at which plaintiff was represented by counsel. Affidavits and other evidence were presented on plaintiff’s behalf and a transcript, comprising 46 pages, taken of statements made at the hearing. On the basis of the application for correction,, case summary, transcript of the hearing, the officer’s AG 201 File and Medical Records, the Correction Board concluded that, at the time of his release from active duty, plaintiff did not have any disability of such nature or degree as to warrant his retirement by reason of physical disability, and recommended denial of plaintiff’s application. On March 10,1959, the Assistant Secretary of the Army approved the recommendation of the Correction Board and denied plaintiff’s: application for retirement.
[553] On May 28, 1959, plaintiff filed Ms petition in this court alleging that the decision of the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the record.
The first issue which must be considered is whether the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. 2501 provides that “Every claim of which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”
In the present case, the date on which the claim accrued is either February 21,1946, the date plaintiff was relieved from active duty, or March 10,1959, the date on which the Assistant Secretary of the Army approved the recommendation of the Correction Board and denied plaintiff’s application for retirement.
In Friedman v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 1, 17, 310 F. 2d 381, 391 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932 (1963), the court’s statement, in discussing the statute of limitations when there has been no application for Retiring Board proceedings and the issue is whether a claim accrued upon final action of the Correction Board, was as follows:
In Patterson v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 435, 438, the plaintiff was released without a Retiring Board in March 1946 and did not seek relief until he applied to the Correction Board in January 1953; suit was begun in 1958. The court held broadly that the rule was “that where a plaintiff has received no determination of Ms eligibility for disability retirement pay by any board until the correction- board has acted, his cause of action accrues not at the time of his separation from the service, but at the time of the alleged wrongful action of the correction board, approved by the Secretary, in wrongfully refusing to correct the records and grant the plaintiff disability retirement with pay.” There was no suggestion that Patterson had good justification for failing to apply to the Retiring Board.
Although they hold that limitations does not defeat the suit of an officer who first brings his claim for disability retirement to the Correction Board, the Proper and Patterson cases are not incompatible with the other decisions holding that the claim arises upon the final action of the Retiring Board. The rationale of all the cases, taken together, is that Congress has given the [554] function of deciding entitlement to disability retirement to tbe Secretary, acting with, or through a statutory board, and that the claim does.not accrue until final action on the basis of the determination of the first competent board to decide. As this court has said, “All of these boards, the Eetiring Board, the Disability Review Board, and the Board for Correction of Military Records act only in an advisory capacity to the Secretary of War. If his decision on the retirement rights of an officer is alleged to have been arbitrary, then the officer’s right to come to the court for redress accrues as soon as the arbitrary decision is rendered.” Girault v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 135, 144, quoted in Lipp, supra, 157 Ct. Cl. at 201, n. 2. Either the Retiring Board or the Correction Board is a proper 'board to perform this function of advising the Secretary;12 and where a Retiring Board has not been had or requested, the officer’s application to the Correction Board together with the action of that Board take the place of the Retiring Board’s function in triggering the statute of limitations. The Correction Board becomes the first proper board to act (or to be asked to act) on the matter, and the claim does not ripen until that Board’s action is final.
Since plaintiff’s cause of action in this casé is based upon the allegation that the action taken by the Secretary of the Army was arbitrary or capricious, contrary to law, or not supported by substantial evidence, it would logically follow that the claim did not accrue until the Secretary denied entitlement to retirement benefits. Defendant presents no authority for its position that the cause of action accrued on February 21, 1946, other than the citation of MacFarlane v. United States, 134 Ct. Cl. 755 (1956), which is distinguishable since plaintiff in that case appeared before an Army retiring board for consideration of his disability status prior to his release from active duty.
In the present case, an application of legal standards to the facts presents no bar based on the statute of limitations to the determination of the suit by this court. The first authorized board to which plaintiff made application was the Army Board for Correction of Military Records and the claim accrued on March 10, 1959, when the Assistant Secretary of the Army approved the recommendation of the Correction Board and denied plaintiff’s application to have [555] bis records corrected to allow retirement for physical disability.
The jurisdiction to determine an officer’s eligibility for retirement for physical disability is conferred on the Secretary of the Army, acting through boards set up by the Secretary to review the application, and, finally, by the Secretary himself. This court has no jurisdiction in the matter unless the Secretary’s action was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or not supported by substantial evidence. Nichols v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 412. In Hoen v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 235, 240 (1962), tMs court said:
This court has repeatedly made it clear that it will not review the decision of an authorized board of the Armed Services in a disability retirement case to determine when or whether a service man is fit or unfit for military service. The burden of proof is on plaintiff in all such cases to establish that the denial of retirement rights was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. * * *
Thus, before a decision can be made as to whether the plaintiff was in fact physically disabled at the time of his release to inactive duty, there must be a determination that the Board did act arbitrarily, capriciously, or without foundation in fact. The evidence which the Board considered and the Secretary of the Army reviewed consisted of the application for correction of military records, a case summary by a Correction Board examiner, the transcript of the Correction Board hearing, the officer’s AG 201 file and the medical records. For reasons involving some facet of this evidence or the Board’s consideration of it must come a decision as to whether the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence.
The application by plaintiff for the correction of his military records included copies of the two records made at the physical examinations of December 31,1941, and October 12, 1942, on the basis of which plaintiff was rejected for active duty, and the record of the physical examination of a Medical Appeal Board on October 27, 28, and 29,1942, at which time plaintiff was found physically qualified for general military , duty. No contention is made by plaintiff as to any unfairness or defects in these examinations, but he does assert, and rightfully, that these records should have alerted [556] the authorities at the later time when the final physical examination was given to plaintiff prior to his release from active duty to thoroughly examine his heart, including the taking of an electrocardiogram. This appears to be a major thesis upon which plaintiff’s case rests with respect to the Board’s decision being arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence.
On first analysis, it appears that an error was made at the time of plaintiff’s final examination in failing to obtain an electrocardiographic report in plaintiff’s case. Obviously, this is a very important phase of a final type examination. The failure to obtain an electrocardiogram at the time of plaintiff’s final physical examination was a serious oversight in view of the complete medical history in the case, and does not appear to be proper medical practice, but that failure, alone, does not discredit the record made at the physical examination of December 1945. The medical findings of that examination are evidence to be considered by a Correction Board. A determination as to whether the Board’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence, requires a careful analysis of all the evidence which might tend to refute such action.
The evidence to be considered consists of three report letters from three doctors who have treated plaintiff since his release from active duty. The letters do not refer to plaintiff’s medical condition as of the date of his separation from active duty, nor can any implication be reasonably made from the letters to the effect that plaintiff was seriously disabled at the time of release from active duty on February 21, 1946. As evidence, those letters are not pertinent to the principal issues raised in this case, since they relate to periods subsequent to active service, except to reflect permanency of certain existing conditions.
At the hearing before the Correction Board, plaintiff was represented by counsel consisting of an attorney and a medical doctor. The import of their presentation to the-Board was that the type of military service performed overseas by plaintiff was rigorous, physically demanding, and accomplished under combat conditions. These circumstances would tend to support the conclusion that plaintiff’s present disabil[557] ity was service-incurred or aggravated. A critical review of the physical examinations given plaintiff and the resulting military medical records was presented by plaintiff. Consideration of the transcript of the hearing before the Board does not warrant a conclusion that the Board was arbitrary in its final decision with respect to Department of the Army records.
At the trial in this court before the trial commissioner, the only witness presented was Dr. Angelo May, an expert medical witness on behalf of plaintiff. Dr. May had examined plaintiff but once, on May 7, 1962, the day prior to the trial. Defendant objected to the testimony of Dr. May on the ground that it was immaterial and irrelevant to the issue as to whether or not the Board’s decision was arbitrary, or capricious, or not supported in law, citing Furlong v. United States, 153 Ct. Cl. 557, 566 (1961), where this court said:
Plaintiff introduced before our Trial Commissioner the testimony of certain doctors who gave their opinions of what plaintiff’s condition had been thirteen years before the date of their examination of him. When we weigh such testimony against the testimony of the Army doctors who gave their opinions of plaintiff’s condition based upon examinations just made, the scales are weighted heavily in favor of the latter testimony.
The admissibility of such testimony is doubtful, anyway ; but we suppose it is competent to show that the evidence before the board was so incredible that no one undertaking to arrive at a fair and impartial decision could have given it credence. * * *
The testimony of Dr. May was admitted but its weight and probative value are diminished by the principle stated in Furlong. The contention of plaintiff is that, based on plaintiff’s condition at the time he entered the service in 1942, the type of military service in which he was thereafter engaged necessarily aggravated his previously existing heart condition. If plaintiff has been successful in showing that his strenuous combat service aggravated a preexisting heart condition, it still remains necessary to establish that plaintiff’s disability was in fact aggravated during military service to the requisite degree before he is eligible for disability retirement. The contention is incompatible with the medical findings sup[558] ported by tbe physical examinations that determined plaintiff was fit for military duty on December 16,1942, and again in December 1945. if- plaintiff was physically fit when he began his active duty,- then a majes premise of his eententie»; •with respeet te aggravation; is nfissingr ffer plaintiff te establish this premise he weald have te dew he was net existence of a disabling eend-itien at that thner