Kingsley v. United States

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedDecember 8, 1993
Docket93-1250
StatusPublished

This text of Kingsley v. United States (Kingsley v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kingsley v. United States, (1st Cir. 1993).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


September 22, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 93-1250

MICHAEL J. KINGSLEY,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

___________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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___________________

Michael J. Kingsley on brief pro se.
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A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Kevin
____________________ _____
O'Regan, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
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__________________

__________________

-2-

Per Curiam. Petitioner Michael Kingsley challenges the
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legality of special parole terms imposed as part of his

sentence for multiple drug violations. He argues that,

because such sanctions were abolished between the time of his

offenses and the time of his sentencing, the district court

should have applied the law in effect on the latter date. We

disagree and therefore affirm the denial of his motion to

correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and/or Fed. R. Crim.

P. 35(a).

From March 1977 to May 1985, petitioner was the leader

of a twenty-three member organization engaged in distributing

cocaine and marijuana in western Massachusetts. In January

1987, he pled guilty to 22 separate offenses as follows: one

count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846,

one count of conspiracy to distribute marijuana, id., ten
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counts of cocaine distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), three

counts of marijuana distribution, id., one count of
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conducting a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. 848,

and six related tax offenses. Sentencing occurred on

February 17, 1987. At the government's recommendation

pursuant to a plea bargain, the district court imposed twelve

ten-year prison terms (for the continuing criminal enterprise

offense and each of the cocaine offenses) and ten five-year

prison terms (for each of the marijuana and tax offenses)--

all to be served concurrently. The court also imposed three

-3-

years of special parole for each of the eleven cocaine

offenses (the conspiracy count and ten substantive counts)

and two years of special parole for each of the three

substantive marijuana offenses.

In October 1992, petitioner filed the instant motion

seeking to vacate the special parole terms. From his reading

of various amendments to 21 U.S.C. 841(b) that occurred in

the mid-1980s, he argued that the statute in its 1987

configuration imposed no type of post-confinement monitoring

for the offenses at issue here. He further contended that

the district court was required to impose this allegedly more

"lenient" penalty provision, rather than the one in effect at

the time the offenses occurred. The district court properly

rejected this analysis.1 Contrary to petitioner's view, the

1987 version of 841(b) actually contained more stringent

penalties, including enhanced prison sentences and terms of

supervised release. Applying that provision at sentencing

thus would have violated the ex post facto clause. We
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explain briefly.

The various modifications that 841(b) underwent

between 1984 and 1987 have been exhaustively detailed

elsewhere, see, e.g., Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498
___ ____ _____________ _____________

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1. The district court did modify one aspect of the judgment
sua sponte. Pursuant to Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S.
__________ _______ ______________
381 (1980), it vacated the special parole term imposed for
the cocaine conspiracy count.

-4-

U.S. 395, 399-403 (1991); Padilla Palacios v. United States,
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932 F.2d 31, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam); United
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States v. Ocasio Figueroa, 898 F.2d 825, 826-28 (1st Cir.
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1990), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1001 (1993); United States v.
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Ferryman, 897 F.2d 584, 586-88 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498
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U.S. 830 (1990), and so need only be summarized here. Prior

to October 12, 1984, 841(b) mandated a three-year term of

special parole for cocaine offenses and a two-year term for

marijuana offenses. Between that date and October 27, 1986,

an anomalous situation existed. The statute imposed no

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