Kings County Raisin & Fruit Co. v. United States Consol. Seeded Raisin Co.

182 F. 59, 104 C.C.A. 499, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 4917
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 3, 1910
DocketNo. 1,835
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 182 F. 59 (Kings County Raisin & Fruit Co. v. United States Consol. Seeded Raisin Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kings County Raisin & Fruit Co. v. United States Consol. Seeded Raisin Co., 182 F. 59, 104 C.C.A. 499, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 4917 (9th Cir. 1910).

Opinion

GILBERT, Circuit Judge.

The appeal in this case is taken from an order granting a preliminary injunction. The appellee brought a suit against the appellants to restrain the infringement of letters patent No. 619,693, issued February 14, 1899, for “fruit seeding machine,” designated in the record “the Pettit patent.” The bill, among other things, alleges the prior adjudication of the validity of the Pettit patent in numerous suits instituted by the appellee in the court below. The application for the preliminary injunction came on to be heard upon .the bill, the affidavits of the president and secretary of the ap-pellee, and a notice that the appellee would rely also upon the records in three other mentioned suits for the infringement of the patent in the lower court, in each of which, on final hearing, the Pettit patent had been adjudged valid. In opposing the application the appellants relied on an affidavit of W. C. Anderson, president of the Anderson Barngrover Manufacturing Company, the corporation which had manufactured the raisin seeding machines which were alleged to infringe the Pettit patent, and they opposed the granting of the injunction solely upon the ground of noninfringement.

The granting or refusing of a preliminary injunction in such a suit ordinarily rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the review thereof by an appellate court is limited to the inquiry whether there was abuse of discretion in granting the writ. This rule has been so often applied by this court, and is so well established by precedent, as to require the citation of no authorities. It is sufficient to refer to the language of Judge Jackson in Blount v. Societe Anonyme du Filtre Chamberland Systeme Pasteur et al., 53 Fed. 98, 3 C. C. A. 455:

“The object and purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the existing state of things until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully investigated and determined upon strictly legal proofs and according to the course and principles of courts of equity. The prerequisites to the allowance and issuance of such injunction are that the party applying for the same must generally present a clear title, or one free from reasonable doubt, and set forth acts done or threatened by the defendant which will seriously or irreparably injure his rights under such title unless restrained.”

See, also, the decision of this court in Jensen Can-Filling Machine Co. v. Norton, 64 Fed. 662, 12 C. C. A. 608, and Southern Pacific Co. v. Earl, 82 Fed. 690, 27 C. C. A. 185.

[61]*61It is held that, to entitle the complainant to a preliminary injunction in a suit for the infringement of a patent prior to a trial on the merits, he must show three things: First, a clear title to the patent; second, its presumptive validity; and, third, threatened infringement by the defendant. Edison Electric Light Co. v. Beacon Vacuum Pump & Electrical Co. (C. C.) 54 Fed. 679, and Norton v. Eagle Automatic Can Co. (C. C.) 57 Fed. 929. In the case last cited, Judge Hawley said:

“I understand the rule to be well settled that where the validity of a patent has been sustained, as in this case, by prior adjudication in the same circuit, the only question open before the court on motion for a preliminary injunction, in a subsequent suit against other parties, is the question of infringement, and that the consideration of all other questions should be postponed until all of the testimony is taken in the case and the case is presented upon final hearing. There is, perhaps, an exception to this rule— that in cases where new evidence is presented that is itself of such a conclusive character that, if it had been presented in the former case, it would probably have led to a different conclusion. The burden, however, of showing this, is upon the respondent.”

In the present case the bill alleged that the validity of the Pettit patent had been sustained by the court below in three certain suits, in each of which the whole prior art was considered and expert witnesses were examined. There was no new evidence affecting the validity of the patent presented on the hearing of the application for the injunction. The sole question before this court, therefore, is whether the evidence as to infringement was such that the court below abused discretion in granting the injunction.

The appellants contend that, in view of the prior art, the claims and specifications of the Pettit patent, and the marked difference between their machine and that which is described therein, there was no' infringement. Claim 17 of the Pettit patent, which was held by the lower court to have been infringed by the appellants, reads as follows:

“A machine for seeding fruit, comprising a cylindrical carrier composed of thin plates of two constructions arranged alternately, the plates of one construction having long teeth spaced apart circumferentially so as to exclude the seeds of the fruit, and the plates of the other construction being of smaller diameter and smooth circular contour and of such thickness as to exclude the seeds of the raisins, pressing means for impaling the fruit on such teeth, a - seed stripping device, and a fruit stripping device, substantially as set forth.”

The elements of the claim are a built-up cylinder, with its rows of impaling teeth, a rubber pressure roll or cylinder turning toward the same at the same surface velocity, a seed stripping device, and a fruit stripping device. Its operation is as follows: The raisins are fed to the top of the toothed cylinder. As the cylinder rotates, the raisins come against the rubber roll and are impaled on the points of the impaling teeth. These teeth are so spaced as to exclude the seeds of the raisins. The pulp of the raisin is pres.sed down below the points of the teeth, and the seeds are forced to the opposite side and through the skin of the raisin, so that, after passing the rubber roll, the pulp of the raisins is imbedded below the points of the teeth, while the seeds are left on the points thereof. The seed stripper removes the seeds from the points, and then the fruit strippers, consisting of long, slender steel blades extending between the rows of the impaling teeth, remove the [62]*62raisins from the teeth. In the appellant’s machine the elements of the combination are the same as in the Pettit, but there js a difference in the construction of the built-up impaling roll. The construction of the Pe'ttit roll is described-in claim 17 above quoted. The appellant’s cylinder is built up on a cylinder core, with sets of corrugated annular plates mounted thereon, with two plates of each set forming between them when pressed together recesses for the impaling teeth, into which the teeth are inserted and held in place. Each set of two plates, together with the teeth held between them, forms the tooth disk or plate, and is equivalent in function to the disk or plate of the Pettit patent. Interposed between each two adjacent sets of said plates, to space them apart, is a corrugated annular plate of smooth circular contour, the diameter of which is smaller than that of the two plates which hold the teeth. In brief, the difference between the Pettit built-up cylinder and that of the appellants is that in the former the disk is stamped out of a single piece of metal, whereas in the latter it is constructed of three parts.

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Bluebook (online)
182 F. 59, 104 C.C.A. 499, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 4917, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kings-county-raisin-fruit-co-v-united-states-consol-seeded-raisin-co-ca9-1910.