KINGREY v. MCLAUGHLIN

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedMay 14, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-00238
StatusUnknown

This text of KINGREY v. MCLAUGHLIN (KINGREY v. MCLAUGHLIN) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KINGREY v. MCLAUGHLIN, (S.D. Ind. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

JOSEPH T. KINGREY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:20-cv-00238-JPH-MJD ) MCLAUGHLIN Ms., Case Manager, ) K. INDA Mental Health, ) K. GILMORE Warden, ) LITTLEJOHN Deputy Warden, ) ) Defendants. )

Order Concerning Filing Fee, Screening and Dismissing Complaint, and Directing Plaintiff to Show Cause

Indiana Department of Correction inmate Joseph T. Kingrey filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on May 4, 2020, against officials at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility in Carlisle, Indiana. The Court makes the following rulings and orders. I. Filing Fee

No later than June 5, 2020, Mr. Kingrey shall pay the $400 filing fee to the clerk of the district court. Alternatively, Mr. Kingrey may move for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee on a form furnished by the clerk. The motion must be accompanied by a certified statement of the last six-months of financial transactions in Mr. Kingrey's inmate trust account. The clerk is directed to send Mr. Kingrey, with his copy of this Order, a blank form motion for seeking leave to proceed with prepayment of the filing fee. II. Screening Standard Because Mr. Kingrey is a prisoner, his complaint is subject to the screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This statute directs that the court shall dismiss a complaint or any claim within a complaint which “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. To satisfy the notice-pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief,” which is sufficient to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and its basis. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). The Court construes pro se pleadings liberally and holds pro se pleadings to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015). III. Plaintiff's Claims In his complaint, Mr. Kingrey names as defendants Case Manager Ms. McLaughlin, Mental Health Provider K. Inda, Warden K. Gilmore, and Deputy Warden Littlejohn. He alleges that on January 5, 2020, he overdosed and was placed in a watch cell and then a different cell,

Q102. Cell Q102 did not have a call button. He informed K. Inda and Ms. McLaughlin that his cell did not have a call button, and he wrote to Warden K. Gilmore and Deputy Warden Littlejohn about the lack of a call button, and told them he had just overdosed, his "thinking isn't always right," and the "cell alone was getting to me." Dkt. 1 at 2. Other than the Deputy Warden notifying the "MH treatment" and "CCV treatment" teams, none of the defendants did anything to remove Mr. Kingrey from cell Q102 until he was removed from the cell on March 11, 2020. Mr. Kingrey also alleges that the prison grievance specialist refused to submit his grievance so that his being placed in cell Q102 without a "help button will be on file." Id. He also alleges that the defendants wanted him to die, because he and his family wrote or contacted them every week and they did not take action. Because of this, he alleges, he "suffered every night trying to sleep knowing that [the defendants] wanted him to die." Id. In relief, Mr. Kingrey asks for $20,000 for his pain and suffering. IV. Discussion

Giving Mr. Kingrey's pro se complaint a liberal interpretation, the Court construes it to raise Eighth Amendment claims for (a) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and (b) failure to provide constitutional conditions of confinement. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim has two elements: (1) the plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) the defendant knew about the plaintiff's condition and the substantial risk of harm it posed but disregarded that risk); id. at 834 (“[a] prison official’s act or omission [that] result[s] in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” violates the Eighth Amendment). “According to the Supreme Court, . . . ‘extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.’” Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1051 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9

(1992)). Applying the foregoing screening standard to these authorities, Mr. Kingrey's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A prison cell's lack of a call button, even the lack of a working call button, does not by itself violate the constitution. Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 684-85 (7th Cir. 2016) (no constitutional violation where officials were not aware of a substantial risk of harm posed by the lack of a call button). Mr. Kingrey has pled no injury other than a vague "suffering" while trying to sleep, which in turn was because of his fear that officials wanted him to die. He pleads no facts to suggest that officials wanted him to die. Additionally, officials were not deliberately indifferent to Mr. Kingrey's serious medical needs when Kingrey notified them that "the cell alone was getting to me." Dkt. 1 at 2. Mr. Kingrey's allegations that he feared officials wanted him to die and his cell "was getting to him" do not allege a serious medical condition. Finally, Mr. Kingrey's allegations that the grievance specialist refused to submit his

grievances so that his placement in a cell without a call button could be on file does not state a constitutional claim. There is no federal constitutional right to a prison grievance system. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2008). A prison official's act of not following prison rules or regulations does not violate the constitution. McGee v. Mayo, 211 F. App'x 492, 494 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Maust v. Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992)). And there is no federal constitutional right to have certain conditions "on file" or documented.

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Related

Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Owens v. Hinsley
635 F.3d 950 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Tamayo v. Blagojevich
526 F.3d 1074 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Grieveson v. Anderson
538 F.3d 763 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
McGee, Edward v. Mayo, Edward
211 F. App'x 492 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Jocelyn Chatham v. Randy Davis
839 F.3d 679 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Bruce Giles v. Salvador Godinez
914 F.3d 1040 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Maust v. Headley
959 F.2d 644 (Seventh Circuit, 1992)

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KINGREY v. MCLAUGHLIN, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kingrey-v-mclaughlin-insd-2020.