King v. United States

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-3512
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LYNN GISELE KING,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23 - 3512 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lynn Gisele King served as a registered nurse at the Washington, D.C. Veterans Affairs

Medical Center (DCVAMC) for three years. During her time there, two other DCVAMC

employees touched or grabbed her without her consent. She sued them for assault and battery in

the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The United States removed the case to this Court

and filed a Westfall Act certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), substituting itself as the

defendant for all claims against both of the employees. The United States now moves to dismiss

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, invoking the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Although the

Court recognizes the real harms alleged by Ms. King, it has no authority to hear this lawsuit or

grant relief. The Court thus grants the Defendant’s motion and dismisses the case.

BACKGROUND

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Wright v.

Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

Ms. King began working at DCVAMC as a registered nurse on March 1, 2021.

Am. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 5. In early 2023, Tanya Chapman, the Patient Safety Manager at

DCVAMC, submitted a report to the Nursing Professional Standards Board (NPSB) about Ms. King that caused Ms. King to be denied a promotion. Id. In response, Ms. King filed a

grievance against Ms. Chapman with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See id. On

May 18, 2023, Ms. Chapman hit Ms. King on her left shoulder. Id. Ms. King told Ms. Chapman

to not touch her. Id. On June 12, 2023, Dr. Patricia Crawford, who was the NPSB Chairperson and

the Chief Nurse of Mental Health at DCVAMC, squeezed the back of Ms. King’s neck and shook

her head. Am. Compl. at 2. Then, on June 27, 2023, Ms. Chapman hit Ms. King on her left wrist.

Id.

On October 25, 2023, Ms. King filed a complaint against Ms. Chapman in the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia. ECF No. 1-2. On November 22, 2023, the United States

submitted a certification substituting itself as the defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d).

ECF No. 1 & 1-3. On that same day, the United States removed the case to federal court.

ECF No. 1. On September 12, 2024, Ms. King filed an Amended Complaint, which named

Ms. Chapman, Dr. Crawford, and the United States as defendants. Am. Compl. at 2–3. On

December 17, 2024, the United States submitted another certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679(d), this time substituting itself as the defendant for Dr. Crawford. ECF No. 12. On March

21, 2025, the United States moved to dismiss Ms. King’s Amended Complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Def.’s Mot. Dismiss,

ECF No. 16. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 18; Def.’s

Reply, ECF No. 19.

LEGAL STANDARD

“When a defendant brings a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must demonstrate

that the court indeed has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear [her] claims.” Hill v. U.S. Dep’t of

Interior, 699 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2023) (first citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

561 (1992); and then citing U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir.

2 2000)). And “[b]ecause the court may not address the plaintiff’s claims without subject-matter

jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) [also] imposes an affirmative obligation on

the court to ensure that jurisdiction is proper.” Himex Co. v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 3d 77, 79

(D.D.C. 2014). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), courts “construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of

all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

The United States contends that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case

because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 3. “Under the doctrine of

sovereign immunity, the United States is immune to suit unless Congress has expressly waived the

defense of sovereign immunity by statute.” Stone v. HUD, 959 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62–63 (D.D.C.

2012). “Sovereign immunity ‘goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.’” Kemper v. U.S.

Dep’t of Educ., 285 F. Supp. 3d 145, 148 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Delta Foods Inc. v. Republic of

Ghana, 265 F.3d 1068, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). The Court agrees that the doctrine of sovereign

immunity prevents the Court from exercising jurisdiction over this case.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., “allows those injured by

federal employees to sue the United States for damages.” Martin v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1689,

1695 (2025). “The statute achieves that end by waiving, in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the federal

government’s sovereign immunity for ‘certain torts committed by federal employees acting within

the scope of their employment.’” Id. (quoting Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 212 (2021)). But

that waiver “is subject to 13 exceptions that claw back the government’s immunity in certain

circumstances,” including, as relevant here, the so-called intentional-tort exception. Id. “Located

3 in subsection (h) of [28 U.S.C.] § 2680, it prohibits claims alleging any of 11 enumerated torts.”

Id. And “assault” and “battery” are two of those enumerated torts. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

Here, because Ms. King’s claims are against the United States, she must demonstrate that

the Court may hear this suit despite the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Her Amended Complaint,

however, alleges straightforward common-law battery claims. Am. Compl. at 1 (alleging that

Ms. King was subject to three instances of “intentional offensive and unwelcome assaultive

touching”). The FTCA’s intentional-tort exception expressly names “[a]ny claims arising out

of . . . battery” as a claim that may not proceed against the United States. 1 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

Thus, insofar as they are asserted against the United States, Ms. King’s claims are barred by the

doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Ms. King does not appear to disagree that sovereign immunity shields the United States,

but she argues that immunity does not protect Ms. Chapman and Dr. Crawford because they were

not acting within the scope of their employment when they allegedly touched her. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1.

Ms. King correctly assesses that Ms. Chapman and Dr. Crawford’s relationship to their employer,

the federal government, is important to the question of whether they can be sued separately from

the United States. The Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679, provides that a lawsuit against the United

States is the “exclusive” remedy for injury from any “negligent or wrongful act or omission of any

employee of the Government.” But the Westfall Act only shields government employees if the

1 The intentional-tort exception is itself subject to an exception, the so-called law enforcement proviso. Martin v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1689, 1695 (2025). “That proviso countermands the [intentional-tort] exception with respect to six intentional torts (including assault, battery, false imprisonment, and false arrest) against ‘investigative or law enforcement officers.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)). Nothing in the Amended Complaint, however, indicates that Ms. Chapman or Dr. Crawford were investigative or law enforcement officers, which the statute defines as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

4 employee acted “within the scope of his office or employment” when committing the allegedly

tortious conduct. Id.

In this case, the United States has submitted certifications pursuant to the Westfall Act—

one in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, ECF No. 1-3, and one in this Court,

ECF No. 12-1—which express the Department of Justice’s view that Ms. Chapman and

Dr. Crawford were acting within the scope of their employment when committing the acts alleged

in Ms. King’s Amended Complaint. The Westfall Act provides that when the Attorney General

certifies that a defendant employee “was acting within the scope of his office or employment at

the time of the incident out of which the claim arose,” the “United States shall be substituted as

the party defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). These certifications carry “a rebuttable presumption

that the employee has absolute immunity from the lawsuit and that the United States is to be

substituted as the defendant.” Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

“A plaintiff may request judicial review of the Attorney General’s scope-of-employment

determination,” as Ms. King did in this case. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 246 (2007); see Pl.’s

Opp’n at 1. “To rebut the certification, the plaintiff must allege, in either the complaint or a

subsequent filing, specific facts that, taken as true, would establish that the defendant’s actions

exceeded the scope of his employment.” Jacobs v. Vrobel, 724 F.3d 217, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

(cleaned up). “To determine whether an employee was acting within the scope of employment

under the Westfall Act,” the Court must “apply the respondeat superior law [of] the state in which

the alleged tort occurred.” Wilson, 535 F.3d at 711. The applicable law here is District of Columbia

law, which “defines the scope of employment in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of

Agency (1958) (‘Restatement’).” Id. Accordingly, an employee’s conduct is within the scope of

their employment “if, but only if:”

5 (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.

Id. (quoting Restatement § 228(1)). The District of Columbia, like many states, applies “the scope-

of-employment test very expansively.” Jacobs, 724 F.3d at 221 (quoting Harbury v. Hayden, 522

F.3d 413, 422 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). So expansively, in fact, that “[t]he scope-of-employment test

often is akin to asking whether the defendant merely was on duty or on the job when committing

the alleged tort.” Id. (quoting Harbury, 522 F.3d at 422 n.4).

The allegations in Ms. King’s Amended Complaint are insufficient to overcome the

presumption that Ms. Chapman and Dr. Crawford’s challenged conduct was within the scope of

their employment. The Amended Complaint indicates that the incidents occurred at DCVAMC

and arose out of work-related disputes. See Am. Compl. at 1–2. Moreover, the Amended

Complaint itself states: “In all 3 of these assaultive incidents, both Chapman and Crawford were

federal employees, acting within the scope of their employment with the DCVAMC, a hospital of

the Defendant U.S.A. federal government.” Id. at 2 (emphases in original). These allegations

support, rather than rebut, the presumption created by the Department of Justice’s certifications.

Accordingly, even making every inference in her favor, Ms. King has failed to allege “specific

facts,” Jacobs, 724 F.3d at 220, supporting that Ms. Chapman and Dr. Crawford’s conduct falls

outside the District of Columbia’s “very expansive[]” understanding of an employee’s scope of

employment, id. at 221 (quoting Harbury, 522 F.3d at 422 n.4). See also Johnson v. McCool, 808

F. Supp. 2d 304, 306 n.1 (D.D.C. 2011) (explaining that the Department of Justice’s certification

pursuant to the Westfall Act “shifts to the Plaintiff” the burden “to raise a material dispute

6 regarding the substance of the certification” (quoting Stokes v. Cross, 327 F.3d 1210, 1215 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (cleaned up)).

In sum, Ms. King has not done enough to dispute the United States’ substitutions as the

defendant for Ms. Chapman and Dr. Crawford, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the

United States from suit. In dismissing Ms. King’s lawsuit, the Court does not condone the violence

she alleges she suffered while serving at DCVAMC. But because the Court lacks jurisdiction to

hear Ms. King’s claims, it may not grant her relief. 2

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the United States’ Motion to Dismiss,

ECF No. 16.

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: August 28, 2025

2 The Court does not address the United States’ argument that the Court also lacks jurisdiction because Ms. King did not exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 5–6; see, e.g., Steinberg v. Republic of Sudan, No. 20-cv-2996, 2023 WL 2682369, at *4 n.7 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2023) (declining to address alternative arguments after concluding that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction).