King v. Thompson

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of District of Columbia

King v. Thompson

14 F. Cas. 553, 3 D.C. 146, 3 Cranch 146

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of District of Columbia

DecidedMay 15, 1827

StatusPublished

This text of 14 F. Cas. 553 (King v. Thompson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

King v. Thompson, 14 F. Cas. 553, 3 D.C. 146, 3 Cranch 146 (circtddc 1827).

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Opinion

The Court was of opinion that the indorser was not discharged, and sustained the exception to the report.

In the case of Bay v. Tallmadge, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 315, Chancellor Kent says : — “I am not aware of any case that has ever imposed upon the creditor the necessity of peculiar diligence against the principal, on the ground of the still existing relation of principal and surety, after judgment and execution against the bail or the surety. It becomes too late, then, to inquire into the antecedent relations between the parties. Those relations become merged in the judgment. This was expressly declared to be the case, as between the holder and maker and indorser of a promissory note, by the Supreme Court of the United States, [147]*147in Lenox v. Prout, 3 Wheat. 520.” See also 3 Wheat. 157, in notis; Fulton v. Matthews, 15 Johns. 433; Shubrick's Executors v. Russell, 1 Desaussure’s Rep. 315; Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174; Rutledge v. Greenwood, 2 Dess. Rep. 389; Commissioners of Berks v. Ross, 3 Binney’s Rep. 20; Trimble v. Thorne, 16 Johns. 152.

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The Court was of opinion that the indorser was not discharged, and sustained the exception to the report.

In the case of Bay v. Tallmadge, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 315, Chancellor Kent says : — “I am not aware of any case that has ever imposed upon the creditor the necessity of peculiar diligence against the principal, on the ground of the still existing relation of principal and surety, after judgment and execution against the bail or the surety. It becomes too late, then, to inquire into the antecedent relations between the parties. Those relations become merged in the judgment. This was expressly declared to be the case, as between the holder and maker and indorser of a promissory note, by the Supreme Court of the United States, [147]*147in Lenox v. Prout, 3 Wheat. 520.” See also 3 Wheat. 157, in notis; Fulton v. Matthews, 15 Johns. 433; Shubrick's Executors v. Russell, 1 Desaussure’s Rep. 315; Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174; Rutledge v. Greenwood, 2 Dess. Rep. 389; Commissioners of Berks v. Ross, 3 Binney’s Rep. 20; Trimble v. Thorne, 16 Johns. 152.

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Bluebook (online)

14 F. Cas. 553, 3 D.C. 146, 3 Cranch 146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/king-v-thompson-circtddc-1827.

Opinion

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