Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 1 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Antonio King, Plaintiff
v. Civil No. 04-cv-356-SM Opinion No. 2006 DNH 103 Cesar Rivas, Theresa Pendleton, and James O'Mara, Jr., Superintendent of the Hillsborough County Department of Corrections
O R D E R
Plaintiff, Antonio King, seeks a new trial on damages with
respect to the jury's finding on Count I of his complaint. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Having carefully considered the matter, the
court concludes that a new trial on damages is warranted.
In Count I, King alleged that Defendant Cesar Rivas, a
correctional officer at the Hillsborough County House of
Corrections, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by falsely
accusing him, a pretrial detainee, of being one of several
inmates who charged Rivas and threatened to take him hostage.
King further alleged that Rivas made the false accusation knowing
and intending that, as a result. King would be taken to the
Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) , where he would be punished. And, Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 2 of 7
King alleged that he, in fact, was taken to the RHU and did
suffer punishment as a direct result of Rivas' false accusation.
The case was tried on the merits and a jury returned a
verdict in King's favor on Count I. It awarded nominal damages
of $1.00, no compensatory damages, and $500.00 in punitive
damages.
As King points out, the jury necessarily found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Rivas falsely accused him of
involvement in the alleged threatening behavior, did so
intentionally and for the purpose of causing him to be punished,
and that he was actually punished as a direct result of Rivas'
false accusation. That punishment took the form of an
administrative sanction of thirty days in punitive segregation.
A subsequent administrative reclassification of his custody level
was also based in substantial part on Rivas' false accusation.
The reclassification resulted in King being held in isolation
well beyond the thirty day punitive sanction, for a total period
in isolation of some five months.
While in the RHU, King was deprived of many privileges he
otherwise would have enjoyed and endured much more severe
conditions of confinement. For example, he was confined to his
2 Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 3 of 7
cell for twenty-three hours of each day, was allowed no reading
material for thirty days, and after that he was allowed only the
Bible. Without question, Rivas' intentionally false accusation
caused King to suffer conditions of confinement that were
materially more severe in segregation than they would have been
absent the false accusation and under his previous
classification.
The evidence of actual injury — isolation — was largely
uncontested. Instead, the parties focused on whether Rivas'
accusation was or was not false. The government may, of course,
impose necessary restrictions and conditions upon a pretrial
detainee — that is, conditions necessary to maintain security,
order and discipline, and to ensure his presence at trial. And
the government may impose reasonable punishment for violations of
institutional rules. See O'Connor v. Huard. 117 F.3d 12, 16 (1st
C i r . 1997).
But here the jury found that Rivas falsely accused King of
misconduct, knowing and intending that he would be punished.
Administrative punishment imposed upon a pretrial detainee
without a legitimate penalogical purpose violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plainly, punishment
resulting from Rivas' false accusation subjects Rivas to § 1983
3 Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 4 of 7
liability. Accordingly, King was entitled to full and fair
compensatory damages for the actual injuries he suffered —
deprivation of liberty (at a minimum, injury measured by the
difference in the degree of liberty he would have enjoyed absent
the false accusation) , as well as attendant mental anguish and
physical discomfort and deprivations.
Defendants do not directly address the pertinent issue:
whether King suffered a compensable injury. Instead, they argue
that the only claim King had for compensatory damages was for
mental pain and suffering, and that he failed to persuade the
jury that he actually sustained such injuries, or if he did, that
they were more than de minimus. Therefore, they argue, the
nominal damages award was proper and sustainable. The court
disagrees.
It has been widely recognized that the wrongful imposition
of punitive segregation constitutes an actual compensable injury,
and an award of only nominal damages for that injury is plainly
inadequate under the law. See King v. Higgins. 702 F.2d 18 (1st
Cir. 1983) (disciplinary hearing deprived plaintiff of due
process, and that deprivation also tainted his reclassification
hearing. Time served in isolation as punishment entitled
plaintiff to compensatory damages); H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard.
4 Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 5 of 7
786 F.2d 1080, 1088 (11th Cir. 1986) (compensatory damages
appropriate for wrongful solitary confinement, citing King v.
Higgins, supra; error for district court to award only nominal
damages); Trobaugh v. Hall. 176 F.3d 1087, 1088-89 (8th Cir.
1999) ("In our opinion, the $1 compensatory damage award was
patently insufficient to compensate [plaintiff] for the injury he
suffered by being placed in segregation in retaliation for
exercising a constitutional right."); Charron v. Medium Sec.
Inst., 730 F. Supp. 987, 995-97 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (Pretrial
detainee's placement in segregation was a restriction not
reasonably related to a legitimate penalogical goal or purpose
and, therefore, amounted to punishment that may not
constitutionally be inflicted; one hundred dollars awarded for
each day of wrongful segregated confinement.).
Because King was a pretrial detainee he was not subject to
punishment prior to trial, save for discipline properly imposed
for misbehavior in violation of legitimate House of Corrections
rules and policies. While it is true that incarceration itself
generally serves to deprive even pretrial detainees of their
liberty, and increasingly restrictive degrees of deprivation
within a jail are customarily used as punishment for rules
infractions. King was not subjected to legitimate punishment for
5 Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 6 of 7
an actual rules infraction. Instead, he was wrongfully subjected
to extreme discipline based on Rivas' intentionally false report.
In short, the evidence was essentially undisputed, and the
jury's verdict on liability established, that King was wrongfully
punished.
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Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 1 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Antonio King, Plaintiff
v. Civil No. 04-cv-356-SM Opinion No. 2006 DNH 103 Cesar Rivas, Theresa Pendleton, and James O'Mara, Jr., Superintendent of the Hillsborough County Department of Corrections
O R D E R
Plaintiff, Antonio King, seeks a new trial on damages with
respect to the jury's finding on Count I of his complaint. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Having carefully considered the matter, the
court concludes that a new trial on damages is warranted.
In Count I, King alleged that Defendant Cesar Rivas, a
correctional officer at the Hillsborough County House of
Corrections, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by falsely
accusing him, a pretrial detainee, of being one of several
inmates who charged Rivas and threatened to take him hostage.
King further alleged that Rivas made the false accusation knowing
and intending that, as a result. King would be taken to the
Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) , where he would be punished. And, Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 2 of 7
King alleged that he, in fact, was taken to the RHU and did
suffer punishment as a direct result of Rivas' false accusation.
The case was tried on the merits and a jury returned a
verdict in King's favor on Count I. It awarded nominal damages
of $1.00, no compensatory damages, and $500.00 in punitive
damages.
As King points out, the jury necessarily found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Rivas falsely accused him of
involvement in the alleged threatening behavior, did so
intentionally and for the purpose of causing him to be punished,
and that he was actually punished as a direct result of Rivas'
false accusation. That punishment took the form of an
administrative sanction of thirty days in punitive segregation.
A subsequent administrative reclassification of his custody level
was also based in substantial part on Rivas' false accusation.
The reclassification resulted in King being held in isolation
well beyond the thirty day punitive sanction, for a total period
in isolation of some five months.
While in the RHU, King was deprived of many privileges he
otherwise would have enjoyed and endured much more severe
conditions of confinement. For example, he was confined to his
2 Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 3 of 7
cell for twenty-three hours of each day, was allowed no reading
material for thirty days, and after that he was allowed only the
Bible. Without question, Rivas' intentionally false accusation
caused King to suffer conditions of confinement that were
materially more severe in segregation than they would have been
absent the false accusation and under his previous
classification.
The evidence of actual injury — isolation — was largely
uncontested. Instead, the parties focused on whether Rivas'
accusation was or was not false. The government may, of course,
impose necessary restrictions and conditions upon a pretrial
detainee — that is, conditions necessary to maintain security,
order and discipline, and to ensure his presence at trial. And
the government may impose reasonable punishment for violations of
institutional rules. See O'Connor v. Huard. 117 F.3d 12, 16 (1st
C i r . 1997).
But here the jury found that Rivas falsely accused King of
misconduct, knowing and intending that he would be punished.
Administrative punishment imposed upon a pretrial detainee
without a legitimate penalogical purpose violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plainly, punishment
resulting from Rivas' false accusation subjects Rivas to § 1983
3 Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 4 of 7
liability. Accordingly, King was entitled to full and fair
compensatory damages for the actual injuries he suffered —
deprivation of liberty (at a minimum, injury measured by the
difference in the degree of liberty he would have enjoyed absent
the false accusation) , as well as attendant mental anguish and
physical discomfort and deprivations.
Defendants do not directly address the pertinent issue:
whether King suffered a compensable injury. Instead, they argue
that the only claim King had for compensatory damages was for
mental pain and suffering, and that he failed to persuade the
jury that he actually sustained such injuries, or if he did, that
they were more than de minimus. Therefore, they argue, the
nominal damages award was proper and sustainable. The court
disagrees.
It has been widely recognized that the wrongful imposition
of punitive segregation constitutes an actual compensable injury,
and an award of only nominal damages for that injury is plainly
inadequate under the law. See King v. Higgins. 702 F.2d 18 (1st
Cir. 1983) (disciplinary hearing deprived plaintiff of due
process, and that deprivation also tainted his reclassification
hearing. Time served in isolation as punishment entitled
plaintiff to compensatory damages); H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard.
4 Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 5 of 7
786 F.2d 1080, 1088 (11th Cir. 1986) (compensatory damages
appropriate for wrongful solitary confinement, citing King v.
Higgins, supra; error for district court to award only nominal
damages); Trobaugh v. Hall. 176 F.3d 1087, 1088-89 (8th Cir.
1999) ("In our opinion, the $1 compensatory damage award was
patently insufficient to compensate [plaintiff] for the injury he
suffered by being placed in segregation in retaliation for
exercising a constitutional right."); Charron v. Medium Sec.
Inst., 730 F. Supp. 987, 995-97 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (Pretrial
detainee's placement in segregation was a restriction not
reasonably related to a legitimate penalogical goal or purpose
and, therefore, amounted to punishment that may not
constitutionally be inflicted; one hundred dollars awarded for
each day of wrongful segregated confinement.).
Because King was a pretrial detainee he was not subject to
punishment prior to trial, save for discipline properly imposed
for misbehavior in violation of legitimate House of Corrections
rules and policies. While it is true that incarceration itself
generally serves to deprive even pretrial detainees of their
liberty, and increasingly restrictive degrees of deprivation
within a jail are customarily used as punishment for rules
infractions. King was not subjected to legitimate punishment for
5 Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 6 of 7
an actual rules infraction. Instead, he was wrongfully subjected
to extreme discipline based on Rivas' intentionally false report.
In short, the evidence was essentially undisputed, and the
jury's verdict on liability established, that King was wrongfully
punished. He was, therefore, entitled to a compensatory award of
damages as a matter of law. See, e.g.. Kerman v. City of New
York, 374 F.3d 93, 124-126 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Similarly, where the
plaintiff was indisputably deprived of his liberty, and the
conduct of the defendant responsible for the deprivation was
found to be unlawful, we have held that the plaintiff is entitled
to compensatory, not merely nominal, damages.") (citations
omitted).
Although no objection was interposed to the instructions,
still, the jury should have been instructed that, if they found
for King against Rivas, then King was entitled to compensatory
damages for the punishment that was imposed due to the false
accusation — here, the loss of liberty — as well as for any
damages sustained that were reasonably foreseeable and
proximately caused by Rivas' conduct (i.e., the reclassification
and concomitant deprivation of liberty).
6 Case l:04-cv-00356-SM Document 88 Filed 09/08/06 Page 7 of 7
Finding, as I do, clear error in the jury's failure to award
compensatory damages in any amount, and finding that the award of
$1 in nominal damages is legally inadequate and against the
substantial weight of the evidence presented, plaintiff's motion
for a new trial on damages with respect to Count I is hereby
granted.1
SO ORDERED.
even J / McAuliffe
September 8, 2006
cc: Michael J. Sheehan, Esq. Elizabeth L. Hurley, Esq. John A. Curran, Esq.
1 A new trial on damages alone is appropriate as there is no indication that the jury's failure to award compensatory damages was related in any manner to a compromise verdict on liability. See Phav v. Trueblood, Inc., 915 F .2d 764 (1st Cir. 1990); Bedenfield v. Shultz, 272 F. Supp. 2d 753 (N.D. 111. 2003). The jury's verdict on damages was likely attributable to the absence of a clear instruction that wrongful segregation or isolation does constitute an actual and compensable injury.