King v. Owen

631 N.E.2d 762, 258 Ill. App. 3d 879
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedMarch 10, 1994
DocketNo. 4-93-0545
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 631 N.E.2d 762 (King v. Owen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
King v. Owen, 631 N.E.2d 762, 258 Ill. App. 3d 879 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

JUSTICE GREEN

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff George V. "Vince” King filed an action in the circuit court of McLean County on May 22, 1990, against defendants Michael Owen, d/b/a Owen Construction (Owen), McLean County Service Company (F.S.), and Modahl & Scott, Inc. (Modahl). Plaintiff sought recovery under the Structural Work Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, pars. 60 through 69) for injuries he received when he fell from a roof. The case proceeded to trial against defendants Owen and F.S., and on March 22, 1993, judgment was entered on general jury verdicts in favor of both defendants and against plaintiff.

Plaintiff maintains on appeal: (1) the jury’s verdicts were so contrary to the evidence that a judgment in favor of plaintiff must be entered n.o.v., or alternatively, were against the manifest weight of the evidence and a new trial should be granted; and (2) the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on the question of whether defendant F.S. was "in charge” of the jobsite.

We conclude the verdicts were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Plaintiff concedes that the argument relating to the question of whether F.S. was "in charge” is relevant only if we find that plaintiff is entitled to a new trial or a judgment n.o.v. Thus, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict on this issue. We affirm.

Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that defendant Owen was a contractor, and defendant F.S. was a general contractor engaged in the repair and replacement of the roof of a building owned by defendant Modahl. He further alleged he was working on the construction and repair of the roof of that building on September 17, 1989, when he was injured as a result of his fall through the roof to a concrete floor, 30 feet below. Plaintiff alleged his injuries were the proximate result of defendants’ wilful violations of the Act.

The Act provides as follows:

"All scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this State for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 60.)

The Act further provides:

"Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person having charge of the erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any building, bridge, viaduct or other structure within the provisions of this Act, shall comply with all the terms thereof ***.
* * *
For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any wilful violations of this Act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action shall accrue to the party injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby ***.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 69.

In order to sustain a cause of action for a violation of the Act against an employer, the plaintiff must establish the following: (1) he was involved in a construction activity protected under the Act; (2) the activity took place on a structure covered by the Act; (3) a scaffold or similar device defined by the Act was being used; (4) the device was unsafe or not safely placed or located; (5) the unsafe condition proximately caused the plaintiffs injury; (6) the defendant employer had charge of the work; and (7) the employer wilfully violated the Act. Cockrum v. Kajima International, Inc. (1993), 243 Ill. App. 3d 402. 410. 610 N.E.2d 1373. 1378.

A verdict should be directed or a judgment n.o.v. entered only in those cases where "all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.” (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14.) However, a movant may be entitled to a new trial when the evidence favoring the opponent is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence but not so weak as to entitle the movant to a judgment n.o.v. Maple v. Gustafson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454, 603 N.E.2d 508, 512-13.

The jury returned a general verdict in favor of defendants. The parties did not request a special verdict and did not submit special interrogatories. When a jury enters a general verdict for a defendant, we do not know on what basis it made its finding. (Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 449, 603 N.E.2d at 510.) Accordingly, the jury’s verdict was supportable under Pedrick and Maple if the jury could have properly found either that defendants did not wilfully violate the Act or that any wilful violation was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s fall and injuries.

The evidence at trial included the testimony of Richard Plimpton, who is the general manager of Modahl, Gene Harvey, the sales representative at F.S., and Michael Owen, owner of defendant Owen Construction.

Plimpton testified that Modahl is a ready-mix concrete manufacturing and délivery business. He described the building in question as follows: (1) it is a "pole” building, with metal siding, a metal roof and a concrete floor and it is used for material storage; (2) it is approximately 50 feet wide by 70 feet long, running from north to south; (3) the metal roof is supported by rafters that run east and west, and "purlins,” or 2 by 4 boards, which run north and south and which connect the rafters horizontally; and (4) the purlins are nailed to the rafters, and the metal roof is nailed to the purlins. He stated the building was constructed in the early 1970’s, and Modahl acquired it in 1984 or 1985.

Michael Owen, in further describing the building, stated there are 10 Plexiglass skylights in the roof, five on either side of the ridge cap or peak. Each is approximately 3 feet wide by 9 or 10 feet long, and they are spaced at an approximately equal distance apart.

The undisputed evidence was that sometime in August or September 1989, Plimpton hired Harvey to repair a leak in the roof of the building in question. Harvey inspected the roof both inside and out and concluded the repairs would include caulking nail holes, replacing one or two end caps and replacing six cracked sky lights. Harvey hired Owen to do the repairs on Modahl’s roof, and Michael Owen hired plaintiff, his brother Scott Owen, and Chris Harmon to do the actual work.

The evidence was also undisputed that on September 17, 1989, while working on the roof in question, plaintiff fell either through the roof or through a skylight to the floor below.

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Bluebook (online)
631 N.E.2d 762, 258 Ill. App. 3d 879, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/king-v-owen-illappct-1994.