King v. Granger, No. Sph-9103-59800 (Jul. 6, 1992)

1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6411
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJuly 6, 1992
DocketNo. SPH-9103-59800
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6411 (King v. Granger, No. Sph-9103-59800 (Jul. 6, 1992)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
King v. Granger, No. Sph-9103-59800 (Jul. 6, 1992), 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6411 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION In this case the defendant seeks to reopen a stipulated judgment which concluded a summary process action brought on the basis of non-payment of rent. Her motion raises interesting questions regarding the relationship between stipulated judgments and the mutual rights and responsibilities of Section 8 landlords and tenants. For the reasons set forth below the defendant's motion is granted. The stipulated judgment is reopened and the parties are directed to recalculate the defendant's arrearage for the period November 1990, through May 1991, and modify the stipulation accordingly if the recalculation discloses that the arrearage figure set forth in the stipulated judgment is incorrect.

I.
The plaintiff is a provider of Section 8 housing and as such is subject to state and federal statutes and regulations governing the administration of that program. Defendant has been a tenant of plaintiff for a number of years. Each April, pursuant to federal regulations, defendant participates in the annual recertification process which identifies the number of persons residing in the rental unit together with their income and expenses for the purpose of determining defendant's rent for the year beginning June 1. In accordance with the June, 1990 recertification, defendant's portion of the rent, based on two daughters living with her, was $295 per month.

In November, 1990, defendant advised plaintiff via a phone call that an adult daughter was no longer living with her, such that in the parlance of Section 8, there was a "change in her family composition." This change triggered the need for an "interim recertification" for the purpose of determining whether there should be a reduction of defendant's rent. Under federal law both the tenant and landlord have certain obligations with respect to the interim recertification process. Generally, the owner must obtain certain information from the tenant, verify the tenant's resources and complete appropriate paperwork. The tenant must report changes in family size and income and provide proof thereof. In connection with these responsibilities plaintiff's office manager informed defendant that she would have to provide a notarized statement affirming that her CT Page 6412 daughter no longer resided with her and also complete a "budget sheet" detailing defendant's family size, expenses and income. Defendant evidently furnished a budget sheet, but did not file the sworn affidavit despite a number of phone calls and messages from plaintiff. Plaintiff never advised defendant in writing of defendant's obligations with respect to an interim recertification, although the evidence discloses that defendant was fully aware of those obligations, having been recertified on an interim basis on at least four previous occasions, most recently in August, 1990.

On or about April 11, 1991, defendant completed the annual recertification process in which the rent for the year beginning June, 1991 was set at $183 per month, a reduction from the previous rent of $295. This reduction reflected that plaintiff's daughter no longer resided with her. On April 26 — two weeks after the annual recertification — plaintiff and defendant entered into a stipulated judgment, thereby resolving a January summary process action alleging non-payment of January's rent. In that action, defendant, appearing pro se, alleged in a special defense that she was unable to pay the last agreed upon rent because her daughter, who contributed to that rent, was no longer residing with her. Defendant acknowledged in her special defense that she had not complied with plaintiff's request that she provide plaintiff with an affidavit certifying that her daughter no longer resided with her.

The April 26 stipulated judgment recognized an arrearage of $1184, based upon the monthly rent of $295 set forth in the 1990 lease. The arrearage was to be repaid at the rate of fifty dollars per month. In accordance with the April 11 annual recertification the stipulation also provided that the defendant would pay monthly rent of one hundred eighty three dollars, effective June 1, 1991.

On February 13, 1992, the defendant filed Motion to Modify or Vacate a Stipulated Judgment. Defendant's principal claim is that the arrearage figure set forth in the stipulation ($1184) is incorrect because of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the federal requirements governing interim recertifications. Had the plaintiff complied with these rules, defendant claims that the arrearage figure would be lower in that it would have been calculated on the basis of a monthly rent of $183 instead of $295. For its part the landlord insists that it was the tenant who failed to comply with federal law by not filing a sworn affidavit certifying that her daughter no longer resided with her. Plaintiff insists that had the tenant completed the affidavit the rent would have been reduced.

Resolution of defendant's motion requires a consideration CT Page 6413 of state law rules governing finality of judgments and federal law governing Section 8 housing.

II.
A.
The Section 8 program is established by 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. Implementing regulations are found at 24 C.F.R. § 880.100 et seq. The purpose of the Section 8 program is to provide lower income families with decent, safe and affordable housing through the use of a system of housing assistance payments. To be eligible for occupancy, tenants must be low income. Priority for occupancy is given to families, handicapped individuals and persons displaced by governmental action. Although tenants are required to pay an amount of rent commensurate with their ability to pay according to a formula mandated by the so-called Brooke Amendment, id., landlords participating in the Section 8 program receive full "market rent" for each unit leased, by a combination of payments from the tenant and from the participating Public Housing Authority (PHA). The PHA makes up the difference between the tenant's share of the rent and the "market rent" received by the landlord.

The tenant's portion of the rent is principally a function of his family composition, income and expenses. In order to properly calculate the tenant's portion of the rent, federal regulations require that the tenant and landlord participate in an annual recertification process, the procedures for which are set forth in Paragraph 5 of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Handbook (HUD Handbook).

Sec. 5-4 of the HUD Handbook requires the landlord to:

1. Notify the tenant that recertification is due;

2. Interview tenant to obtain information on income, assets, family composition, and allowances;

3. Verify tenant's income, assets and allowances;

4. Complete applicable worksheets; and

5. Notify the tenant of any increases in rent.

The tenant must provide the information required for recertification including information necessary to verify the tenant's family composition, income and assets. If the tenant does not provide the necessary information within the time frame CT Page 6414 set forth in the regulations, his rent can be increased to what is known as "market rent."

Federal regulations additionally require a tenant to report any interim changes with respect to household composition, assets and income that may occur prior to the next annual recertification. Sec.

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Related

Solomon v. Keiser
577 A.2d 1103 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1990)
Housing Authority v. Lamothe
610 A.2d 695 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6411, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/king-v-granger-no-sph-9103-59800-jul-6-1992-connsuperct-1992.