King v. Commissioner

1996 T.C. Memo. 231, 71 T.C.M. 3033, 1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 251
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in King v. Commissioner. Read the opinion of the Court — 75 T.C.M. 1838
United States Tax Court·Decided May 22, 1996·No. Docket No. 18362-93·Unpublished

Opinion

CHARLES E. KING, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
King v. Commissioner
Docket No. 18362-93
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1996-231; 1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 251; 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3033;
May 22, 1996, Filed

*251 Decision will be entered for respondent.

Charles E. King, pro se.
Reginald R. Corlew, for respondent.
GOLDBERG

GOLDBERG

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and 182. 1 Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax for 1990 in the amount of $ 672. The issues are: (1) Whether petitioner is entitled to deduct expenses attributable to a home office under section 280A; (2) whether petitioner is entitled to claim a deduction for health insurance premiums; and (3) whether petitioner is entitled to a deduction for a contribution to an individual retirement account (IRA).

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the exhibits received into evidence are incorporated herein by *252 this reference. Petitioner filed a timely joint Federal income tax return for 1990 with his wife, Betty W. King (Mrs. King), now deceased. Petitioner resided in Holly Hills, Florida, at the time he filed his petition.

In 1983, after petitioner retired from his position as a school administrator for Fairfax County, Virginia, he and Mrs. King moved to Holly Hills, Florida, and started a yacht charter and brokerage business under the name of King International. King International was a sole proprietorship with its business office located in petitioner's home at 1402 Riverside Drive, Holly Hills, Florida. Petitioner ran the daily operations, and Mrs. King handled the financial end of the business.

During the year at issue, petitioner received pension income of $ 44,669.45 and interest income of $ 12,111.23, a portion of which he used to finance his business operations. Petitioner owned a West Mariner 39 yacht which he used to advertise his brokerage activities and attract charter customers for King International. During 1990, petitioner was not employed, and, other than the $ 950 earned from his charter activities, received no nonemployee compensation.

On his 1990 Federal income tax*253 return, petitioner claimed deductions for IRA contributions of $ 950 and self-employed health insurance of $ 950. On his Schedule C for King International, petitioner reported gross income of $ 950 and deducted business expenses in the aggregate amount of $ 11,272.26, resulting in a net loss of $ 10,322.26. In particular, petitioner claimed deductions for utilities of $ 351.22 and "Repairs and maintenance of office in home" of $ 161.32, each representing 20 percent of the total utility and maintenance cost of petitioners' residence.

In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that petitioner was not entitled to adjustments to income for an IRA contribution or health insurance pursuant to the limitations of sections 219(b) and 162(1)(2)(A), respectively. Respondent also disallowed the deductions for home office expenses pursuant to the limitations prescribed by section 280A(c)(5). Respondent does not dispute that petitioner was engaged in a business for profit within the meaning of sections 162 and 183, or that he has substantiated his business expenses. Respondent's determinations are presumed correct, and petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).*254

We first address whether petitioner is entitled to claim a deduction for expenses attributable to his home office. Section 280A provides in relevant part:

SEC. 280A. DISALLOWANCE OF CERTAIN EXPENSES IN CONNECTION WITH BUSINESS USE OF HOME, RENTAL OF VACATION HOMES, ETC.

(a) General Rule.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of a taxpayer who is an individual or an S corporation, no deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable year as a residence.

* * * *

(c) Exceptions for Certain Business or Rental Use; Limitation on Deductions for Such Use.--

(1) Certain business use.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis--

(A) [as] the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer,

(5) Limitation on deductions.--In the case of a use described in paragraph (1) * * * the deductions allowed under this chapter for the taxable year by reason of being attributed to such use shall not exceed the excess *255 of--

(A) the gross income derived from such use for the taxable year, over

(B) the sum of--

(i) the deductions allocable to such use which are allowable under this chapter for the taxable year whether or not such unit (or portion thereof) was so used, and

(ii) the deductions allocable to the trade or business (or rental activity) in which such use occurs (but which are not allocable to such use) for such taxable year.

The home office deduction is, therefore, limited to the excess of the gross income generated from the business activity conducted in the office, over all other deductible expenses attributable to such activity, but which are not allocable to the use of the unit itself. Grinalds v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

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King v. Commissioner, 1996 T.C. Memo. 231, 71 T.C.M. 3033, 1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 251 (tax 1996).

1996 T.C. Memo. 231 (King v. Commissioner) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Welch v. Helvering
290 U.S. 111 (Supreme Court, 1933)
Grinalds v. Commissioner
1993 T.C. Memo. 66 (U.S. Tax Court, 1993)