King v. City and County of San Francisco

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJuly 22, 2021
Docket3:21-cv-02843
StatusUnknown

This text of King v. City and County of San Francisco (King v. City and County of San Francisco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
King v. City and County of San Francisco, (N.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 TROY KING, Case No. 21-cv-02843-AGT

9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 10 v. DISMISS AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND 11 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 8 12 Defendants.

13 14 The City and County of San Francisco (“CCSF”) has moved to dismiss pro se plaintiff 15 Troy King’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.1 Dkt. 8. King, in 16 response, “asks the Court to dismiss the complaint and grant [him] Leave of Court to amend his 17 complaint.” Dkt. 14 at 1. CCSF does not oppose amendment of the four claims currently alleged 18 in King’s complaint—(1) violation of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) violation of 19 due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (3) negligence, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional 20 distress—but objects to any amendment adding new, unrelated claims. Dkt. 11 at 3. As set forth 21 below, the Court grants CCSF’s motion and grants King leave to amend his current claims only. 22 King is encouraged to visit the Court’s website, where he can obtain information and 23 resources about appearing pro se. See U.S. District Court, N.D. Cal., Representing Yourself, 24 https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/. 25

26 1 King brought this action against CCSF, the San Francisco Municipal Transport Agency (“SFMTA”), and Does 1–20. SFMTA, as a department of CCSF, cannot be sued individually. 27 See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 23000, 23004. For purposes of this motion, the Court will construe all 1 1. Federal Claims 2 King’s first and second causes of action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allege that 3 CCSF violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. 4 Municipalities such as CCSF may be subject to liability under § 1983 where official policy 5 or custom causes a constitutional injury. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 6 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). However, as the Supreme Court made clear in Monell, “a municipality 7 cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality 8 cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691. King’s 9 constitutional claims here attempt to do just that—hold CCSF liable as an employer based only on 10 the alleged unconstitutional acts of its employee, the unnamed SFMTA officer who allegedly 11 engaged in “an unpleasant exchange of words” with King and then retaliated against him by 12 issuing him a fraudulent notice of parking violation for unlawfully being in the bus zone. See 13 Compl. ¶¶ 9–10. But as noted, CCSF cannot be sued under this respondeat superior theory of 14 liability; King must instead identify “deliberate action attributable to the municipality that directly 15 caused a deprivation of [his constitutional] rights.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 16 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); see City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 17 385 (1989) (requiring “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged 18 constitutional deprivation” for municipal liability under § 1983). Although King cites to Monell in 19 his complaint, see Compl. ¶ 21, he fails to allege facts showing the existence of any CCSF official 20 policy or custom that caused his constitutional injuries. See King v. Alameda Cty. Dep’t of Child 21 Support Servs., No. 21-cv-02839-SI, 2021 WL 2688823, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2021) (“Proof 22 of random acts or isolated incidents of unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee 23 are insufficient to establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom.”). 24 Kings constitutional claims also suffer from additional defects. To state a § 1983 claim for 25 violation of the Equal Protection Clause, King “must show that the defendants acted with an intent 26 or purpose to discriminate against [him] based upon membership in a protected class.” Thornton 27 v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the complaint does not allege 1 discriminate against him based on that protected status. King’s response brief states that he is 2 African American and he “believes [the] unnamed SFMTA officer retaliated against him and 3 wrote the fraudulent Notice of Parking Citation because he is a black male,” Dkt. 14 at 1, 2, but 4 his complaint contains no facts showing that CCSF discriminated against him because he is 5 African American. 6 King similarly fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for violation of due process. 7 To succeed on a substantive or procedural due process claim, King “must first demonstrate that he 8 was deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest.” Gerhart v. Lake Cty., Mont., 637 9 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011). To the extent King is alleging a substantive due process claim, 10 he must also allege “conscience shocking behavior by the government.” Brittain v. Hansen, 451 11 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006). To the extent he is alleging a procedural process claim, King “must 12 allege facts showing not only that the State has deprived him of a liberty or property interest but 13 also that the State has done so without due process of law.” Gearhart v. Thorne, 768 F.2d 1072, 14 1073 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). The facts alleged in King’s complaint do not meet these 15 standards. King does not allege that he was deprived of a constitutionally protected property 16 interest, nor does he allege facts showing “conscience shocking behavior” or that he was deprived 17 of a property interest without adequate procedural safeguards. 18 Accordingly, the Court finds that King has failed to state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 19 and grants CCSF’s motion to dismiss. The Court will grant King leave to amend his complaint to 20 cure the deficiencies discussed above. If King chooses to amend, he must be able to allege facts 21 showing the existence of a municipal policy or custom that directly caused a deprivation of his 22 constitutional rights. In addition, his amendment must allege facts showing that his constitutional 23 rights to equal protection and/or due process were violated, as detailed above. 24 2. State Claims 25 King also alleges state law claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional 26 distress. Because it is unclear whether King will be able to state a federal claim, the Court 27 declines to address CCSF’s arguments supporting dismissal of King’s state claims at this juncture. ] chooses to pursue his state claims in any amendment. 2 ok 3 In his response to CCSF’s motion to dismiss, King states that he “has additional 4 || complaints against SFMTA to file and one currently under review. Please, refer to Exhibits B and 5 C.” Dkt. 14 at 4. King requests that he be allowed “to amend his complaint with additional 6 || complaints” and asks for “a minimum of sixty days .. . to file an amended complaint while his 7 || complaints against SFMTA are being reviewed and others are filed.” /d.

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King v. City and County of San Francisco, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/king-v-city-and-county-of-san-francisco-cand-2021.