King Supply Co., LLC v. United States

34 Ct. Int'l Trade 1299, 2010 CIT 111
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedSeptember 30, 2010
DocketCourt 09-00477
StatusPublished

This text of 34 Ct. Int'l Trade 1299 (King Supply Co., LLC v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
King Supply Co., LLC v. United States, 34 Ct. Int'l Trade 1299, 2010 CIT 111 (cit 2010).

Opinion

OPINION

MUSGRAVE, Senior Judge:

The plaintiff King Supply Co. LLC (“King”) invokes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) to contest the ruling by the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC” or “Commerce”) that King’s imports are within the scope of Antidumping Duty Order and Amendment to the Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from the People’s Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 29702 (July 6, 1992) (“Order), which is directed, in pertinent part, to

carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings, having an inside diameter of less than 14 inches, imported in either finished or unfinished form. These formed or forged pipe fittings are used to join sections in piping systems where conditions require permanent, welded connections, as distinguished from fittings based on other fastening methods (e.g., threaded, grooved, or bolted fittings). . . .

57 Fed. Reg. at 29703 (italics added). See 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k). 1

King asserted to Commerce that its imports are used in structural applications, not piping systems, and hence are not within the scope of the Order. Commerce, however, concluded that the second sentence, above, “does not contain an end-use exclusion” that would otherwise exclude King’s pipe fittings, implying, in essence, that the Order applies to all pipe fittings regardless of end use. DOC Final *1301 Scope Ruling Decision, PDoc 29, at 5. Commerce then ruled that King’s imports are within the Order’s scope because they meet the physical description of subject merchandise. For the following reasons, the court is persuaded that Commerce’s rationale for its decision is incorrect. The matter must therefore be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Standard of Review

Review at this stage is pursuant to the substantial evidence standard of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i), meaning “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See also Micron Tech, Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1386, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The context of such “reasonableness” is with respect to the record as a whole. See Mittal Steel Galati v. United States, 31 CIT 730, 731, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1275 (2007) (citing Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 485 F.3d 1345, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Although the Court will give “significant” deference to Commerce’s interpretation of its own antidumping duty orders, it will not do so with respect to an interpretation that changes the scope of a particular order or contradicts the order’s express terms. See, e.g., Sango International L.P. v. United States, 32 CIT _, _, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332 (2008); Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United States, 28 CIT 830, 842, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1183 (2004).

Discussion

I

The language of an antidumping duty order is the “cornerstone” of scope analysis. See Allegheny Bradford, 28 CIT at 843, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (citations omitted). Scope language may be clarified for a low-threshold of ambiguity but not be interpreted so as to effectively change an order’s scope nor declared ambiguous where no ambiguity exists. See, e.g., id. (referencing inter alia Novosteel SA v. United States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See also Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“review of the petition and the investigation may provide valuable guidance as to the interpretation of the final order ... [b]ut they cannot substitute for language in the order itselff:] ... a predicate for the interpretive process is language in the order that is subject to interpretation”) (italics added); Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unfair trade orders may not be interpreted in a manner that changes their scope).

The defendant and defendant-intervenors argue that the second sentence of the Order’s scope language is simply meant to distinguish *1302 permanent versus non-permanent fastening methods, as opposed to pipe fittings used in piping systems. For example, the defendant’s brief describes a key criterion as “permanent, welded connections of the sort used in piping systems [.]” Def.’s Br. in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for J. Upon the Agency R. at 11 (“Def.’s Br.”) (italics added). The problem with this construct is that it does not comport with the actual language of the Order. It is well established that operative terms in antidumping duty orders are to be given effect as written and not rendered mere surplusage. See, e.g., Eckstrom Industries Inc. v. United States, 254 F. 3d 1068, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the Government’s interpretation of the conditions of use provision renders this language mere surplusage”); Bond Street, Ltd. v. United States, 33 CIT _, _, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1351 (2009) (key language in the order is not to be rendered “mere surplusage”); Vertex Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 30 CIT 73, 79-81 (2006) (Commerce is required to give effect to express language in antidumping duty orders). The defendant’s (and defendant-intervenors’) reading of the Order either renders “used ... in piping systems” mere surplusage, erroneously conflates the quality of usage embodied by that phrase with joining methods, or inserts other language that simply does not exist in the Order.

Be that as it may, the court concurs with Commerce’s finding that consideration of the Diversified Products factors of 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) was unnecessary. See Allegheny Bradford, 28 CIT at 845, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (where the meaning of an order is plain, there is nothing more to interpret).

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