OPINION
MUSGRAVE, Senior Judge:
The plaintiff King Supply Co. LLC (“King”) invokes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) to contest the ruling by the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC” or “Commerce”) that King’s imports are within the scope of
Antidumping Duty Order and Amendment to the Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from the People’s Republic of China,
57 Fed. Reg. 29702 (July 6, 1992) (“Order), which is directed, in pertinent part, to
carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings, having an inside diameter of less than 14 inches, imported in either finished or unfinished form. These formed or forged pipe fittings are
used to join sections in piping systems
where conditions require permanent, welded connections, as distinguished from fittings based on other fastening methods (e.g., threaded, grooved, or bolted fittings). . . .
57 Fed. Reg. at 29703 (italics added).
See
19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k).
King asserted to Commerce that its imports are used in structural applications, not piping systems, and hence are not within the scope of the Order. Commerce, however, concluded that the second sentence, above, “does not contain an end-use exclusion” that would otherwise exclude King’s pipe fittings, implying, in essence, that the Order applies to all pipe fittings regardless of end use. DOC Final
Scope Ruling Decision, PDoc 29, at 5. Commerce then ruled that King’s imports are within the Order’s scope because they meet the physical description of subject merchandise. For the following reasons, the court is persuaded that Commerce’s rationale for its decision is incorrect. The matter must therefore be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Standard of Review
Review at this stage is pursuant to the substantial evidence standard of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i), meaning “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
See also Micron Tech, Inc. v. United States,
117 F.3d 1386, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The context of such “reasonableness” is with respect to the record as a whole.
See Mittal Steel Galati v. United States,
31 CIT 730, 731, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1275 (2007)
(citing Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States,
485 F.3d 1345, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Although the Court will give “significant” deference to Commerce’s interpretation of its own antidumping duty orders, it will not do so with respect to an interpretation that changes the scope of a particular order or contradicts the order’s express terms.
See, e.g., Sango International L.P. v. United States,
32 CIT _, _, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332 (2008);
Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United States,
28 CIT 830, 842, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1183 (2004).
Discussion
I
The language of an antidumping duty order is the “cornerstone” of scope analysis.
See Allegheny Bradford,
28 CIT at 843, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (citations omitted). Scope language may be clarified for a low-threshold of ambiguity but not be interpreted so as to effectively change an order’s scope nor declared ambiguous where no ambiguity exists.
See, e.g., id.
(referencing
inter alia Novosteel SA v. United States,
284 F.3d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See also Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States,
296 F.3d 1087, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“review of the petition and the investigation may provide valuable guidance as to the interpretation of the final order ... [b]ut they cannot substitute for language in the order itselff:]
... a predicate for the interpretive process is language in the order that is subject to
interpretation”) (italics added);
Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. United States,
60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unfair trade orders may not be interpreted in a manner that changes their scope).
The defendant and defendant-intervenors argue that the second sentence of the Order’s scope language is simply meant to distinguish
permanent versus non-permanent fastening methods, as opposed to pipe fittings used in piping systems. For example, the defendant’s brief describes a key criterion as “permanent, welded connections
of the sort
used in piping systems [.]” Def.’s Br. in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for J. Upon the Agency R. at 11 (“Def.’s Br.”) (italics added). The problem with this construct is that it does not comport with the actual language of the Order. It is well established that operative terms in antidumping duty orders are to be given effect as written and not rendered mere surplusage.
See, e.g., Eckstrom Industries Inc. v. United States,
254 F. 3d 1068, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the Government’s interpretation of the conditions of use provision renders this language mere surplusage”);
Bond Street, Ltd. v. United States,
33 CIT _, _, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1351 (2009) (key language in the order is not to be rendered “mere surplusage”);
Vertex Int’l, Inc. v. United States,
30 CIT 73, 79-81 (2006) (Commerce is required to give effect to express language in antidumping duty orders). The defendant’s (and defendant-intervenors’) reading of the Order either renders “used ... in piping systems” mere surplusage, erroneously conflates the quality of usage embodied by that phrase with joining methods, or inserts other language that simply does not exist in the Order.
Be that as it may, the court concurs with Commerce’s finding that consideration of the
Diversified Products
factors of 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) was unnecessary.
See Allegheny Bradford,
28 CIT at 845, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (where the meaning of an order is plain, there is nothing more to interpret).
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OPINION
MUSGRAVE, Senior Judge:
The plaintiff King Supply Co. LLC (“King”) invokes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) to contest the ruling by the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC” or “Commerce”) that King’s imports are within the scope of
Antidumping Duty Order and Amendment to the Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from the People’s Republic of China,
57 Fed. Reg. 29702 (July 6, 1992) (“Order), which is directed, in pertinent part, to
carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings, having an inside diameter of less than 14 inches, imported in either finished or unfinished form. These formed or forged pipe fittings are
used to join sections in piping systems
where conditions require permanent, welded connections, as distinguished from fittings based on other fastening methods (e.g., threaded, grooved, or bolted fittings). . . .
57 Fed. Reg. at 29703 (italics added).
See
19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k).
King asserted to Commerce that its imports are used in structural applications, not piping systems, and hence are not within the scope of the Order. Commerce, however, concluded that the second sentence, above, “does not contain an end-use exclusion” that would otherwise exclude King’s pipe fittings, implying, in essence, that the Order applies to all pipe fittings regardless of end use. DOC Final
Scope Ruling Decision, PDoc 29, at 5. Commerce then ruled that King’s imports are within the Order’s scope because they meet the physical description of subject merchandise. For the following reasons, the court is persuaded that Commerce’s rationale for its decision is incorrect. The matter must therefore be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Standard of Review
Review at this stage is pursuant to the substantial evidence standard of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i), meaning “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
See also Micron Tech, Inc. v. United States,
117 F.3d 1386, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The context of such “reasonableness” is with respect to the record as a whole.
See Mittal Steel Galati v. United States,
31 CIT 730, 731, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1275 (2007)
(citing Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States,
485 F.3d 1345, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Although the Court will give “significant” deference to Commerce’s interpretation of its own antidumping duty orders, it will not do so with respect to an interpretation that changes the scope of a particular order or contradicts the order’s express terms.
See, e.g., Sango International L.P. v. United States,
32 CIT _, _, 556 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332 (2008);
Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United States,
28 CIT 830, 842, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1183 (2004).
Discussion
I
The language of an antidumping duty order is the “cornerstone” of scope analysis.
See Allegheny Bradford,
28 CIT at 843, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (citations omitted). Scope language may be clarified for a low-threshold of ambiguity but not be interpreted so as to effectively change an order’s scope nor declared ambiguous where no ambiguity exists.
See, e.g., id.
(referencing
inter alia Novosteel SA v. United States,
284 F.3d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See also Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States,
296 F.3d 1087, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“review of the petition and the investigation may provide valuable guidance as to the interpretation of the final order ... [b]ut they cannot substitute for language in the order itselff:]
... a predicate for the interpretive process is language in the order that is subject to
interpretation”) (italics added);
Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. United States,
60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unfair trade orders may not be interpreted in a manner that changes their scope).
The defendant and defendant-intervenors argue that the second sentence of the Order’s scope language is simply meant to distinguish
permanent versus non-permanent fastening methods, as opposed to pipe fittings used in piping systems. For example, the defendant’s brief describes a key criterion as “permanent, welded connections
of the sort
used in piping systems [.]” Def.’s Br. in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for J. Upon the Agency R. at 11 (“Def.’s Br.”) (italics added). The problem with this construct is that it does not comport with the actual language of the Order. It is well established that operative terms in antidumping duty orders are to be given effect as written and not rendered mere surplusage.
See, e.g., Eckstrom Industries Inc. v. United States,
254 F. 3d 1068, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the Government’s interpretation of the conditions of use provision renders this language mere surplusage”);
Bond Street, Ltd. v. United States,
33 CIT _, _, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1351 (2009) (key language in the order is not to be rendered “mere surplusage”);
Vertex Int’l, Inc. v. United States,
30 CIT 73, 79-81 (2006) (Commerce is required to give effect to express language in antidumping duty orders). The defendant’s (and defendant-intervenors’) reading of the Order either renders “used ... in piping systems” mere surplusage, erroneously conflates the quality of usage embodied by that phrase with joining methods, or inserts other language that simply does not exist in the Order.
Be that as it may, the court concurs with Commerce’s finding that consideration of the
Diversified Products
factors of 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) was unnecessary.
See Allegheny Bradford,
28 CIT at 845, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (where the meaning of an order is plain, there is nothing more to interpret). King’s alternative argument regarding subsection (k)(2) therefore need not be addressed. The Order’s scope language plainly states, “[t]hese formed or forged pipe fittings are
used to join sections in piping systems
where conditions require permanent, welded connections, as distinguished from fittings based on other fastening methods
{e.g.,
threaded, grooved, or bolted fittings)” (italics added). The Order describes
the
use (one and only one use) of the pipe fittings subject to the scope of the investigation. No other use is described. As so described, it amounts to an exclusive use. To conclude that this language is merely an example of “possible use” is to impute meaning that the language simply does not possess.
Cf. Duferco Steel, supra,
296 F.3d at 1096 (“Commerce cannot find authority in an order based on the theory that the order does not deny authority”). The reference to use in piping systems does not indicate, for example, a qualification of “for example,” “e.g.,” “such systems as,” “chiefly used,” “principally used,” “capable of being used,” or any other such similarly expansive signal that would indicate the interpretation the defendant and defendant-intervenors apparently argue. Further, contrary to Commerce’s (and the defendant-
intervenors’) reading of the second sentence of the scope language, the fastening methods of pipe fittings are a separate consideration from, and do not alter, this apparently explicit product use requirement.
Scope definitions that include use as a defining characteristic of subject merchandise have been routinely upheld
, and Commerce has apparently described usage with more precision and specificity in other contexts when including or excluding products from the scope of an antidumping duty order.
The defendant-intervenor Tube Forgings of America (TFA) thus argues that in such contexts Commerce often requires end-use certificates when excluding products based on end-use, suggesting that the absence of a certificate requirement is a reason to find there is no end use restriction in the Order, but the Court cannot discern a consistent administrative policy on end-use certification.
Even if one could be discerned, TFA’s argument would
appear to be directed more towards requiring certification in this instance, since the argument does not imply that “[t]hese . . . pipe fittings are used to join sections in piping systems” has any meaning other than as written.
And lest the reader wonder if there is sufficient ambiguity in “piping systems” to encompass structural applications, the record of the investigation reveals that all the parties, including Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC” or “Commission”), had a precise understanding of what “piping systems” are: in the context of the Order, they are essentially conveyances, i.e., systems of pipes that encompass and enable the flow of a gas or fluid.
Cf. Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States,
161 F.3d 1365, 1369 (1998) (upholding Commerce’s determination to apply precise and literal terms of an “unambiguous” order referring to principle use and not actual use). The substantial evidence of record, as Kang points out, supports finding only two apparent uses for carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings: in piping systems and in structural applications.
Cf.
ITC Final Report at A-7. The latter were plainly not included specifically in the scope language of the Order, which only describes “use[ ] ... in piping systems.”
The remaining points by the defendant and defendant-intervenors do not appear meritorious and need not be further addressed. Commerce has interpreted the Order in a manner inconsistent with its plain meaning, and therefore the matter must be remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
II
It may well be that what Commerce and the domestic industry intended was not what turned out to have been described in the final determination and order and if so, perhaps the result of drafting oversight or clerical error. That is not the concern here, however. Suffice it to state that by treading in Commerce’s footsteps and reading the record of the antidumping petition and investigation, the court is unable to find evidence to support Commerce’s interpretive conclusion regarding the scope of the Order, as written and as published.
Cf.
19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(l).
From the time of the May 1991 domestic carbon fitting industry petition
to the final affirmative determinations by Commerce and the Commission, the operative language “used to join sections in piping systems” remained unchanged even though the domestic pipe fittings industry submitted comments on the scope language of the investigations, with the result that the language was altered in certain ways not relevant to this proceeding.
See Initiation of Antidump-ing Duty Investigation: Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings From the People’s Republic of China,
56 Fed. Reg. 27730 (DOC June 17, 1991) (“[t]hese formed or forged pipe fittings are
used to join sections in piping systems
where conditions require permanent, welded connections . . .” ) (italics added);
Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings From the People’s Republic of China,
56 Fed. Reg. 66831, 66832 (DOC Dec. 26, 1991) (“[t]hese formed or forged pipe fittings are
used to join sections in piping systems
where conditions require permanent, welded connections ...”) (italics added);
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings From the People’s Republic of China,
57 Fed. Reg. 21058, 21059 (DOC May 18,1992) (“[t]hese formed or forged pipe fittings are
used to join sections in piping systems
where conditions require permanent, welded connections . . .”) (italics added);
Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings From the China and Thailand,
USITC Pub. 2401 at 2 n.2 (Inv. Nos. 731-TA-520 and 521) (Preliminary) (July 9, 1991),
reprinted at
56 Fed. Reg. 32587, 32587 n.2 (ITC July 17,
1991) (“[t]hese formed or forged pipe fittings are
used to join sections in piping systems
where conditions require permanent, welded connections . . .”) (italics added);
Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings From China and Thailand; Investigation,
57 Fed. Reg. 2783, 2784 n.1 (ITC Jan. 23, 1992) (notice of institution and schedule of final material injury investigation) (“[t]hese formed or forged pipe fittings are
used to join sections in piping systems
where conditions require permanent, welded connections . . .”) (italics added);
Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings From China and Thailand,
USITC Pub. 2528 (Inv. Nos. 731-TA-520 and 521) (Final) (June 25, 1992),
summarized at 57
Fed. Reg. 29331 (ITC July 1, 1992) (final determination) (repeating the scope of the preliminary determination and final investigation institution notice, specifically with respect to the use in piping systems of subject merchandise).
But cf. Certain Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from the People’s Republic of China and Thailand,
56 Fed. Reg. 24410 (Inv. Nos. 731-TA-520 and 521) (Preliminary) (ITC May 30, 1991) (notice of institution of preliminary investigation; stating that products being investigated were finished or unfinished carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings, less than 14 inches in inside diameter, and provided for in subheading 7307.93.30 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States). And for that matter, the interpretation of ancillary documentation cannot substitute for or contravene the plain meaning of legally operative terms in the Order.
See Tak Fat Trading Co. v. United States,
396 F. 3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (the language of the order determines its scope);
Duferco Steel, supra,
296 F.3d at 1097 (the language in the order is the “cornerstone” of analysis of an order’s scope).
Conclusion
Commerce’s scope determination that the Order applies to pipe fittings meeting the physical requirements of the Order’s scope language advances an interpretation that is unsupported by the language of the Order and is therefore' unlawful.
See
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i). At the same time, the court upholds Commerce’s decision not to conduct a
Diversified Products
analysis pursuant 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) on the ground that the relevant scope language is plain or “unambiguous,”
see, e.g.,
Def.’s Br. at 11, to wit: “[t]hese . . . pipe fittings are used to join sections in piping systems . . . .” The scope of the Order cannot reasonably be construed to apply to pipe fittings used only to join sections in structural applications. As to what Commerce requires in that regard, to prevent circumvention of
the Order, the court expresses no opinion, but the matter must be remanded so that Commerce may issue a scope determination consistent with this opinion.
Judgment will enter accordingly.