Kiner v. State Board of Education

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Kiner v. State Board of Education

344 So. 2d 656, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15664

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 19, 1977

DocketNo. BB-292

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 344 So. 2d 656 (Kiner v. State Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Kiner v. State Board of Education, 344 So. 2d 656, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15664 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977).

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Opinion

SMITH, Judge.

This petition for certiorari seeks review of the respondent Board’s order revoking petitioner’s teaching certificate on the ground she “entered a plea of guilty to a felony, to wit: Manslaughter.” Petitioner killed her husband with a shotgun. She was placed on probation after adjudication of guilt was withheld. Although the Board’s order does not in terms recite that petitioner was “guilty . . . of an act involving moral turpitude,” her plea of guilty is prima facie evidence of that fact. Section 231.28(3), Florida Statutes (1975). No evidence was offered significantly mitigating the apparent turpitude of the acknowledged offense. Petitioner’s certificate was therefore revocable under Section 231.28(1). We do not reach petitioner’s constitutional arguments which are based on other, more drastic conceptions of the meaning and application of the statute. The petition is

DENIED.

RAWLS, Acting C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.

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SMITH, Judge.

This petition for certiorari seeks review of the respondent Board’s order revoking petitioner’s teaching certificate on the ground she “entered a plea of guilty to a felony, to wit: Manslaughter.” Petitioner killed her husband with a shotgun. She was placed on probation after adjudication of guilt was withheld. Although the Board’s order does not in terms recite that petitioner was “guilty . . . of an act involving moral turpitude,” her plea of guilty is prima facie evidence of that fact. Section 231.28(3), Florida Statutes (1975). No evidence was offered significantly mitigating the apparent turpitude of the acknowledged offense. Petitioner’s certificate was therefore revocable under Section 231.28(1). We do not reach petitioner’s constitutional arguments which are based on other, more drastic conceptions of the meaning and application of the statute. The petition is

DENIED.

RAWLS, Acting C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.

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344 So. 2d 656, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15664, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kiner-v-state-board-of-education-fladistctapp-1977.

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