Kindsfater v. Butte County

458 N.W.2d 347, 1990 S.D. LEXIS 86, 1990 WL 87191
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedJune 27, 1990
Docket16797
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 458 N.W.2d 347 (Kindsfater v. Butte County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kindsfater v. Butte County, 458 N.W.2d 347, 1990 S.D. LEXIS 86, 1990 WL 87191 (S.D. 1990).

Opinion

MILLER, Justice.

In this appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision in a trial de novo in a real estate tax assessment proceeding.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

In 1987, Don McGinnis, Director of Equalization for Butte County (assessor), assessed farm land belonging to the appellant taxpayers. Those 1987 valuations were as follows:

Manuel Kindsfater $89,929.00
Lyle Ruby 41,941.00
Marvin & Sheree Kindsfater 46,069.00

Taxpayers appealed the 1987 value determinations to the board of county commissioners acting as a board of equalization. *348 Taxpayers claimed that the assessment of their land improperly included their shares of stock in the Redwater Irrigation Association. The board denied taxpayers’ appeal. Taxpayers then appealed to the circuit court which ultimately issued its memorandum opinion, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order holding that the assessment was void because the assessor failed to follow the criteria required by SDCL 10-6-33.1 1 and our holding in Matter of Butte County, 385 N.W.2d 108 (S.D.1986). However, the order was later vacated by stipulation of the parties and an interim order was entered requiring a reassessment of taxpayers’ land in accordance with statutory and constitutional criteria. The interim order also specifically adjudged the 1987 assessment as void.

The reassessment determined the land values to be twice that of the original 1987 assessment and were as follows:

Manuel Kindsfater $197,805.00
Lyle Ruby 94,013.00
Marvin & Sheree Kindsfater 88,603.00

In proceedings which everyone called a “rehearing,” the trial court heard the assessment appeal de novo and entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. Its findings detailed the procedures utilized by the assessor in the reassessment process and specifically found that the reassessment values (unlike the original assessment) did not assign an additional value “based upon the nature of the water right, whether lands were actually irrigated or other management practices and decision.”

The trial court concluded, among other things, that although the 1987 assessment procedures were void, the procedures utilized by the assessor in the reassessment substantially complied with SDCL 10-6-33.1 and constitutional directives and is entitled to the presumption that the valuations were correct. It held that although the “full and true value” of taxpayers’ land was as indicated by the reassessment, such values “would result in a lack of uniformity and inequitable treatment as to these taxpayers.” Recognizing that equalization of assessments is contemplated in such proceedings, it reduced the values of the property to the values previously assigned by the assessor in the original 1987 assessment.

DECISION

ISSUE

I

WAS THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION CLEARLY ERRONEOUS?

Scope of Review

Taxpayers have stated its first issue as follows:

When a real estate tax assessment has been adjudged to be void by reason of discrimination (i.e., higher than the assessment of other similar and comparable properties), the appropriate remedy is to reduce such assessment to such amount as may be necessary to remove the discrimination.

It is apparent that taxpayers have overlooked the appropriate standard of review in tax assessment appeals. Settled law in this state provides that our scope of review of a trial court’s decision in a trial de novo of a tax assessment is to determine whether the findings are clearly erroneous. Butte County, supra at 110; Mortenson v. Stanley County, 303 N.W.2d 107 (S.D. *349 1981); Knodel v. Bd. of County Com’rs, 269 N.W.2d 386 (S.D.1978); Willow, Inc. v. Yankton County, 89 S.D. 643, 237 N.W.2d 660 (1975); Yadco, Inc. v. Yankton County, 89 S.D. 651, 237 N.W.2d 665 (1975). Nowhere in its argument on this issue have taxpayers asserted that the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous. 2 Rather, they rely on older authorities standing for the proposition that if there was a discriminatory value assessed, the appropriate remedy is a reduction in value. They cite Appeals of Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co., 85 S.D. 613, 188 N.W.2d 276 (1971); Baken Park, Inc. v. County of Pennington, 79 S.D. 156, 109 N.W.2d 898 (1961); In re Jepsen’s Appeal, 76 S.D. 421, 80 N.W.2d 76 (1957); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Young, 60 S.D. 291, 244 N.W. 370 (1932).

We see no reason to specifically reverse the authorities cited by taxpayers because in certain respects there are salient distinguishing factors. However, we reiterate that in cases such as this, we review on the clearly erroneous standard.

Merits

Taxpayers’ stated issue would suggest that the trial court, in voiding the 1987 assessment, found that the assessment values were discriminatory. That is not correct! The trial court specifically held that the assessment procedures lacked uniformity and were discriminatory. Additionally, the trial court in requiring the reassessment specifically ordered that the assessor reassess the land according to: (1) the capacity of the land to produce agricultural products; (2) soil type, terrain, and topographical condition of the property; (3) the present market value of the property in question; (4) the character of the area or place in which said property is located; (5) such other agricultural factors as may from time to time become applicable; and (6) the irrigability of the land. As a caveat to factor (6), the circuit court stated, “[w]ith respect to irrigability, the County Assessor shall determine the irrigability based on the land’s location, soil, terrain, topography, and appurtenant and nontransferable water rights_” These requirements complied with SDCL 10-6-33.1 and Butte County, supra

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Bluebook (online)
458 N.W.2d 347, 1990 S.D. LEXIS 86, 1990 WL 87191, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kindsfater-v-butte-county-sd-1990.