Kimmerle v. Dowagiac Gas Co.

123 N.W. 565, 159 Mich. 34, 1909 Mich. LEXIS 783
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 10, 1909
DocketDocket No. 27
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 123 N.W. 565 (Kimmerle v. Dowagiac Gas Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kimmerle v. Dowagiac Gas Co., 123 N.W. 565, 159 Mich. 34, 1909 Mich. LEXIS 783 (Mich. 1909).

Opinion

Grant, J.

(after stating the facts). 1. The first three grounds of the demurrer may be considered together. They are, in substance, that complainant has shown no legal interest in the transactions between Frank W. Lyle and the Dowagiac Gas & Fuel Company, on the one side, and the defendants Harrison and the Dowagiac Gas Company, on the other. Complainant, as the assignee in bankruptcy of Mr. Lyle, succeeded to all his property and interests. If Mr. Lyle had any claim against the defendants, that claim passed, by the assignment, to complainant. If Mr. Lyle was a creditor, his assignee is also a creditor. All the contract relations between Mr. Lyle and the defendants passed by the assignment to the complainant. The same is true of the bankrupt copartnership which did a banking business. The bill avers that the defendant Dowagiac Gas Company assumed and agreed to pay to the bankrupt copartnership a note of $14,920, that the defendant Harrison was indebted to Mr. Frank W. Lyle in the sum of $48,000 on his contract with Lyle, and that said contract was assumed by the defendant Dowagiac Gas Company. If the allegations of the bill are true, then this contract was [40]*40taken over by the defendant company, and it is liable thereunder. Esper v. Miller, 131 Mich. 334 (91 N. W. 613).

2. If it were necessary to allege the insolvency of the defendant company, we think the allegations are sufficient, even if it were necessary to allege the facts upon which such insolvency is based. The bill (paragraph 35a) expressly alleges the insolvency, a statement made by Harrison that it owes more than it can pay, and that suits have been brought against it in which judgments have been rendered, or are about to be rendered, which the company is unable to pay; but we fail to understand wherein the solvency or insolvency of the defendant company is material. The rights of the complainant do not in any wise depend upon the solvency or insolvency of the company. That question affects, not the remedy, but the amount complainant can realize if he succeeds in maintaining his suit upon the hearing.

3. The bill alleges an effort made to settle matters through Mr. Harrison, who it is alleged is substantially the owner of the corporate property. The bill avers his own admission that he had authority to act for the company, for, in his letter, he informed complainant that he had employed two attorneys, one to represent him, and the other to represent the company, that complainant then applied to the office of the company at Dowagiac, was denied an examination of defendant’s books and records, and was informed that they had been removed from the State. These attempts at a settlement were sufficient, even if it were necessary to allege and prove them.

4. The bill states a case peculiarly appropriate for the interposition of a court of equity. It is not enough that complainant might have brought a suit at law. It is sufficient to show that his remedy at law would not be adequate. Blodgett v. Foster, 114 Mich. 688 (72 N. W. 1000, 68 Am. St. Rep. 504), wherein it was held that a suit in equity for an accounting would lie though all the accounts were on one side, but there were circumstances of [41]*41great complication or difficulty in the way of adequate relief at law.

It was said in Williams v. Neely, 134 Fed. 1 (67 C. C. A. 171, 69 L. R. A. 232):

“ The adequate remedy at law which will deprive a court of equity of jurisdiction is a remedy as certain, complete, prompt, and efficient to attain the ends of justice as the remedy in equity” — citing authorities.

The reading of the long and intricate contracts in this case, and the averments as to what was done under them, would convince even a layman that a suit at law with a jury would be inadequate.

5. The seventh and eighth grounds of the demurrer are disposed of by what has already been said.

6. The bill is not multifarious. All the defendants are shown by the averments of the bill to be connected with the contracts set up in the bill of complaint. The bank is made trustee, and is alleged to have some of the assets in its possession. It requires no argument to show that the relation between Harrison and the defendant company is such as to make them not only appropriate, but necessary, parties to the bill.

The decree is affirmed, with costs, and the case remanded to the court below for further proceedings in accordance with the rules and practice of the court.

Blair, C. J., and Moore, McAlvay, and Brooke, JJ., concurred.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
123 N.W. 565, 159 Mich. 34, 1909 Mich. LEXIS 783, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kimmerle-v-dowagiac-gas-co-mich-1909.