Kimberly Syoboda v. Family Stops USA, LLC

Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 391 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II

No. CV-25-298

KIMBERLY SYOBODA Opinion Delivered September 9, 2026

APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT V. SMITH DISTRICT [NO. 66FCV-24-253]

FAMILY STOPS USA, LLC APPELLEE HONORABLE R. GUNNER DELAY, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

This is an appeal of the Sebastian County Circuit Court’s order vacating a default judgment against appellee Family Stops USA, LLC (“Family Stops”), in favor of appellant Kimberly Syoboda. Kimberly argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in vacating the judgment because it did so sua sponte rather than in response to a motion and, alternatively, that service on Family Stops was proper. We affirm.

I. Background Facts

On March 11, 2024, Kimberly filed a civil suit against Family Stops in the Sebastian County Circuit Court. Proof of service was filed on May 14, and the process server checked the box on the form stating that “[o]n 5/14/2024, at 1:00PM I delivered the summons and complaint with Elizabeth Owens, an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of Family Stops USA, LLC.”

On June 21, Kimberly filed a motion for default judgment against Family Stops. The motion alleged that Family Stops was served via personal service on an authorized agent at 1549 N. Greenwood in Fort Smith, Arkansas. The circuit court entered an order for default judgment on July 16 and set a damages hearing for August 28. Kimberly moved to continue the hearing, asserting that she needed additional time to gather medical records and bills to determine the amount of damages. On December 3, the court sent a letter advising the parties that the matter had been rescheduled for a hearing “regarding Service.”

The hearing on service was held on February 7, 2025. The circuit court sua sponte inquired as to the status of service. Specifically, the court stated that, in looking at the file, it noticed the proof of service showed that Elizabeth Owens was served as an authorized agent of Family Stops. However, as the court noted, the secretary of state’s website listed J.T. Smith as the registered agent for service. In response, Kimberly’s attorney stated that the process server, Kathy Trotter, attempted service at the address listed on the secretary of state’s website; however, the location was abandoned. Kimberly’s attorney also stated that Ms. Trotter served Ms. Owens—who was working as a cashier—at Family Stops’ physical location.

At the hearing, Ms. Trotter testified that no other individuals were at the store when Ms. Owens was served, and furthermore, that she attempted service at 4001A Planters Road, but the property was vacant. The circuit court asked Ms. Trotter why she stated on the affidavit that she served an agent authorized to accept service for Family Stops, and Ms. Trotter testified that while she did not prepare the affidavit, it was her “understanding” that Ms. Owens was an authorized agent. When asked how she came to that conclusion, Ms.

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Trotter stated that the company she worked for instructed her to serve Ms. Owens. Specifically, Ms. Trotter explained that her employer advised her to serve the person who was “working on duty” and that “if someone isn’t available that’s authorized, [to] serve the person that is working.” Finally, Ms. Trotter acknowledged that she did not serve the individual listed as the agent on the summons. In conclusion, the circuit court stated that

[Ms. Trotter] admitted that the summons directed her specifically to serve J.T. Smith and she did not do that, even though she’s checked a box that says she left it with an agent authorized by appointment for service. And I think she has conceded that was not the case.

Kimberly filed a posthearing brief maintaining that a diligent effort was made to serve Family Stops pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-20-113(a) and (b) and, furthermore, that Ms. Owens was a “manager, clerk, or other person in charge of regular business at a store”; thus, service was effectuated. On February 13, the circuit court entered an order vacating the default judgment. In the order, the circuit court noted that before the hearing on damages, Kimberly’s counsel stated that she would not be presenting any additional evidence. Thereafter, the court explained that there was reason to question whether “good service” was obtained on Family Stops. The court concluded the following:

[S]ervice does not satisfy the requirements of ARCP 4(f)(6) pertaining to service upon limited liability corporations. Specifically, the Court finds Ms. Owens was not the registered agents’ secretary, or assistant; was not the manager of the LLC, or the manager’s secretary or assistant; was not a member of the LLC, or a member’s secretary or assistant; and was not authorized by law to accept service on behalf of the Defendant.

Kimberly filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.

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II. Standard of Review

When the issue on appeal is whether a default judgment is void due to defective service, this court reviews the circuit court’s decision de novo and gives no deference to the circuit court’s ruling. Self v. Hustead, 2017 Ark. App. 339, 525 S.W.3d 33. Additionally, a circuit court’s factual conclusions regarding service of process are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Jones v. Douglas, 2016 Ark. 166, 489 S.W.3d 648. Statutory service requirements, being in derogation of common-law rights, must be strictly construed, and compliance with them must be exact. Id. The same reasoning applies to service requirements imposed by court rules. Id. Service of valid process is necessary to give a court jurisdiction over a defendant. Id.

III. Discussion

Kimberly contends that the circuit court erred by setting aside the default judgment against Family Stops because it did so on its own rather than in response to an Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 55 motion. Alternatively, Kimberly argues that service of process on Family Stops was proper. We disagree.

Because valid service of process is required for a court to have jurisdiction over a defendant, we first address this issue. See, e.g., City of Tontitown v. First Sec. Bank, 2017 Ark. App. 326, 525 S.W.3d 18. Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(6) provides as follows:

Service on a limited liability company shall be on its registered agent for service of process, or the agent’s secretary or assistant; a manager of a limited liability company in which management is vested in managers rather than members, or the manager’s secretary or assistant; a member of a limited liability company in which management is vested in the members or in which management is vested in managers and there

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are no managers, or that member’s secretary or assistant; a managing or general agent of the limited liability company, or the agent’s secretary or assistant; any agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process; or as provided by an applicable statute.

Additionally, Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-20-113(b) (Repl. 2020) states that if an entity fails to appoint a registered agent or if its registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be served, the entity may be served by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to one or more of the governors of the entity by name at its principal office. The names and address of the principal office shall be as shown in the most recent annual report filed with the secretary of state’s office. Id. If this method of service fails, the statute then states that service of process may be made by handing “a copy to the manager, clerk, or other person in charge of any regular place of business or activity of the entity.” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-20-113(c). Here, Kimberly contends the evidence shows that Ms. Owens was a “manager, clerk, or other person in charge of any regular place of business or activity”; thus, she was a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of Family Stops pursuant to section 4-20-113(c). However, the record does not reflect, nor does Kimberly argue, that she complied with section (b) of the statute by first attempting service at the principal address via registered or certified mail with return receipt requested. Rather, Kimberly simply asserts that the principal address was no longer occupied by Family Stops. This does not constitute strict compliance. See, e.g., Brennan v. Wadlow, 372 Ark. 50, 270 S.W.3d 831 (2008) (reiterating that our case law is well settled that statutory service requirements, being in

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derogation of common-law rights, must be strictly construed and that compliance with them must be exact).

Furthermore, even if service attempts had been exhausted under section 4-20-113(b), subsection (c) requires service on “the individual in charge” of the business location. At the hearing, Ms. Trotter testified that her employer instructed her to serve the individual working at Family Stops if “someone isn’t available that’s authorized” and that Ms. Owens was the only person working in the store. Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court’s finding that Ms. Owens—who was working behind the cash register—lacked the authority by law to accept service on behalf of Family Stops constituted clear error. Because Kimberly failed to strictly comply with statutory service rules, we agree with the circuit court that she did not obtain proper service on Family Stops.

Moreover, because it is well established that default judgments rendered without valid service of process are void, Kimberly’s argument that the circuit court erred by vacating a void judgment on its own rather than in response to a motion must fail. See, e.g., Helena-W. Helena Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Shields, 2016 Ark. App. 312, 497 S.W.3d 202. Kimberly cites Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), which gives a circuit court authority to set aside a default judgment in response to a motion; the rule states that the court “may act” upon motion. While Arkansas courts have consistently addressed the void-judgment issue in the context of a party’s motion to set aside, see, e.g., Robin Dee Enters., Inc. v. Burns, 2024 Ark. App. 59, 684 S.W.3d 596, Kimberly does not cite any controlling authority in support of

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her argument that a court setting aside a void judgment—without a party filing a motion— constitutes reversible error.

Kimberly cites Byrd v. State, wherein this court reversed an entry of default because the circuit court entered the default judgment without the plaintiff filing a default motion. 2016 Ark. App. 489, 505 S.W.3d 699. However, as Kimberly acknowledges in her brief, Byrd involved a circuit court’s sua sponte entry of default, not the court setting aside a void judgment. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Kimberly’s argument that the “practical realities” of Byrd’s reversal of a sua sponte entry of default also compels the same result here.

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order vacating the default judgment against Family Stops because without effective service of process, the judgment entered was void.

Affirmed.

TUCKER and BARRETT, JJ., agree.

Lisa-Marie Norris, for appellant.

One brief only.