KIMBERLY MCCORMICK v. RICHARD J. BECKWITH, Personal Representative.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedNovember 25, 2025
Docket25-P-0051
StatusUnpublished

This text of KIMBERLY MCCORMICK v. RICHARD J. BECKWITH, Personal Representative. (KIMBERLY MCCORMICK v. RICHARD J. BECKWITH, Personal Representative.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KIMBERLY MCCORMICK v. RICHARD J. BECKWITH, Personal Representative., (Mass. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-51

KIMBERLY MCCORMICK

vs.

RICHARD J. BECKWITH, personal representative.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Kimberly McCormick, appeals from a summary

judgment entered against her in the Superior Court. McCormick

filed a complaint against the defendant, Richard J. Beckwith, as

the personal representative of the estate of their mother,

Brenda T. Beckwith, claiming that McCormick was entitled to

certain property, including General Electric stock or securities

that McCormick alleged were gifted to her by her father when

McCormick was a minor.2 McCormick filed the complaint on

1 Of the estate of Brenda T. Beckwith.

2In addition to the General Electric stock, the other property McCormick alleged that her mother owed was (1) insurance proceeds from the destruction of a building McCormick and her mother held as joint tenants, (2) repair costs for McCormick's vehicle damaged when her mother was in December 27, 2022, more than one year after her mother's death

on September 19, 2021. Because, in reviewing the limited record

on appeal, we agree with the motion judge that the plaintiff's

claims are time barred pursuant to G. L. c. 260, § 2A, and G. L.

c. 190B, § 3-803 (a), we affirm.

Discussion. "Our review of a decision on a motion for

summary judgment is de novo." Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 488

Mass. 633, 636 (2021).3 An action for replevin4 must be

commenced in the three years after the cause of action accrues.

G. L. c. 260, § 2A. Under the discovery rule, a cause of action

accrues "when a plaintiff discovers, or any earlier date when

she should reasonably have discovered, that she has been harmed

possession, (3) compensation for work McCormick performed on her mother's house, (4) personal belongings stored at her mother's property, and (5) compensation for financial assets McCormick's mother wrongfully took from her.

3 "The burden is on the appellant to ensure that an adequate record exists for an appellate court to evaluate." Openshaw v. Openshaw, 493 Mass. 599, 611 n.21 (2024), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 419 Mass. 366, 371 (1995). "An appellant's obligation to include those parts of the trial transcript and copies of motions which are essential for review of the issues raised on appeal . . . is a fundamental and longstanding rule of appellate civil practice" (quotation and citation omitted). Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 84 (1995). See Mass. R. A. P. 8 (a)-(c), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1611 (2019); Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019).

4 Replevin is a cause of action to recover goods that another person has unlawfully taken or detained. See G. L. c. 247, § 7.

2 or may have been harmed by the defendant's conduct." Bowen v.

Eli Lilly & Co., 408 Mass. 204, 205-206 (1990). Additionally,

"a personal representative shall not be held to answer to an

action by a creditor of the deceased unless such action is

commenced within 1 year after the date of death of the

deceased." G. L. c. 190B, § 3-803 (a). Where the statutes of

limitations under G. L. c. 260 and G. L. c. 190B are

inconsistent, the shorter statute of limitations in G. L.

c. 190B governs. Abrahamson v. Estate of LeBold, 89 Mass. App.

Ct. 223, 225-226 (2016). See G. L. c. 260, § 19 ("If a special

provision is otherwise made relative to the limitation of any

action, any provision of this chapter inconsistent therewith

shall not apply").

McCormick does not dispute the motion judge's finding,

consistent with McCormick's own assertions, that she tried to

retrieve her personal belongings from her mother in February

2018 but her mother refused. See Bowen, 408 Mass. at 205-206

(cause of action accrues at plaintiff's discovery of harm). At

that point McCormick was made aware that her property was being

held against her wish. Because she did not commence a cause of

action for the property until December 27, 2022, more than four

years later, her claims are time barred. See G. L. c. 260,

§ 2A.

3 McCormick claims that she did not learn that her mother was

in possession of one category of the claimed property, the

General Electric stock, until her father's death in 2020. Her

claims are nevertheless barred because McCormick filed her claim

more than one year after her mother's death. See G. L. c. 190B,

§ 3-803 (a) ("a personal representative shall not be held to

answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased unless such

action is commenced within 1 year after the date of death of the

deceased"). McCormick notes that she objected to the estate on

December 20, 2021, but the objection makes no reference to her

property claims, and she failed to provide the affidavit of

objection. Where McCormick's claims rely on the content of her

objection, reviewing the merits of these claims would require us

to engage in speculation. Contrast Matter of M.C., 481 Mass.

336, 345 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Bottiglio, 357 Mass.

593, 597 (1970) (incomplete record sufficient to permit review

where court was not required to "resort to speculation"). We

4 therefore must agree with the motion judge that McCormick's

claims are time barred.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Desmond & Toone, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: November 25, 2025.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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Related

Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co.
557 N.E.2d 739 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1990)
Commonwealth v. Bottiglio
259 N.E.2d 570 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1970)
Abrahamson v. Estate of LeBold
47 N.E.3d 686 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2016)
Commonwealth v. Woods
645 N.E.2d 1153 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1995)
Cameron v. Carelli
653 N.E.2d 595 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1995)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)
In re M.C.
115 N.E.3d 546 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2019)

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KIMBERLY MCCORMICK v. RICHARD J. BECKWITH, Personal Representative., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kimberly-mccormick-v-richard-j-beckwith-personal-representative-massappct-2025.