Kimberly Magee v. Andrew Magee

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: November 21, 2025
• Docket: 2023-CA-1356
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 21, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-1356-MR

KIMBERLY MAGEE APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE MONICA K. MEREDITH, JUDGE ACTION NO. 10-CI-01555

ANDREW MAGEE APPELLEE

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL AS MOOT AND DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

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BEFORE: CALDWELL, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: This Court ordered the parties to show cause why this

appeal of an order ruling on post-divorce issues related to child custody and

support should not be dismissed as moot since the parties’ child (a son) turned

eighteen while this appeal was pending. The parties filed responses to our order.

In his show cause response, Andrew Magee (“Andrew”) contended

that the appeal should be dismissed as moot since the child had turned eighteen and thus reached the age of majority. Kimberly Magee (“Kimberly”) disagreed with

this contention. However, in our estimation, her show cause response did not

clearly articulate why her appeal had not been rendered moot by the parties’ child

having reached the age of majority—especially since she did not claim the parties’

son is disabled and she admitted he had turned eighteen and graduated high school.

She did not articulate in her show cause response how any legally cognizable

controversy still exists.

Thus, this Court finds that the parties have not shown cause why this

appeal should not be dismissed as moot. Courts lack jurisdiction to resolve issues

if there is no presently existing controversy for which a rendered judgment can

have a practical legal effect. Belt v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Families and

Children, 520 S.W.3d 406, 408-09 (Ky. App. 2017).

It is undisputed that the parties’ child is not disabled, has reached the

age of eighteen, and has graduated high school. Thus, he has reached the age of

majority and has legally become an adult. KRS1 2.015. Since the parties’ son is

no longer a minor child, Kentucky courts no longer retain jurisdiction to resolve

issues about his custody and care. KRS 23A.110(6) (family court’s statutory

objectives include: “To make adequate provision for the care, custody, and

support of minor children of divorce”); Anderson v. Johnson, 350 S.W.3d 453, 456

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. -2- (Ky. 2011) (construing KRS 403.320 “by saying that a timesharing modification

can be done ‘whenever’ it is in the best interests of the child to do so, the

legislature effectively gave the family court continuing jurisdiction to hear such

motions until the child reaches the age of majority or is emancipated.”) (footnote

and emphasis omitted). See also Turner v. Turner, 672 S.W.3d 43, 50 (Ky. App.

2023) (order regarding counseling “is by its nature appealable as a decision

impacting the custody and care of the minor children”).

Moreover, Kimberly does not argue that any recognized exception to

the general prohibition against courts’ determining moot matters applies here. Nor

do we discern that any such recognized exception applies here. See generally

Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 99-103 (Ky. 2014). For example, the issues

Kimberly raises on appeal are not “capable of repetition, yet evading review”

because the same parties cannot be affected again about such matters relating to the

care and custody of a minor child since their son (their only child together) has

reached the age of majority. Id. at 100-01.

And while Kimberly undoubtedly perceives that the issues she raises

on appeal are important to her and her family, this case does not present

substantial, recurring issues of importance to the public at large. So, the public

interest exception does not apply here either. Compare id. at 96-97 (“Although the

case has become moot by virtue of the child having turned eighteen years old, we

-3- recognize that the proper role of a GAL [guardian ad litem] is a recurring issue of

considerable public importance and, as explained more fully below, we exercise

our discretion to address that issue in the context of this case.”). Although

Kimberly generally contends that the family court judge and Andrew treated her

unfairly, she does not identify anything in this case which “poses a substantial

question of a public nature certain to recur in many other cases” for which lower

courts would benefit from guidance from this Court. See generally id. at 103.

In sum, Mother has not shown why this Court should not dismiss this

appeal as moot.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS Appeal No. 2023-CA-1356-

MR as MOOT. Moreover, we further DENY Andrew’s motion to dismiss the

appeal on other grounds as also MOOT.

ALL CONCUR.

ENTERED: ____11/21/25____ _____________________________ JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

-4- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kimberly B. Magee, pro se James R. Miller Shepherdsville, Kentucky Shepherdsville, Kentucky

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