NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2559-23
KIMBERLY CASTRO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORP. and ADEOYE WINSALA,
Defendants-Respondents. __________________________
Submitted September 9, 2025 – Decided September 18, 2025
Before Judges Firko, Perez Friscia and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-2924-19.
Matt Simon Law, attorneys for appellant (Matthew C. Simon, on the briefs).
Ruprecht Hart Ricciardulli & Sherman, LLP, attorneys for respondents (Thomas C. Hart, of counsel and on the brief; Alexander Stockdale and Andrew C. Smedberg, on the brief).
In this personal injury case, plaintiff Kimberly Castro appeals from the
April 8, 2024 trial court order granting defendants New Jersey Transit
Corporation's (NJT) and Adeoye Winsala's motions for a directed verdict and
judgment. The trial court determined there were no genuinely disputed issues
of material fact from which a reasonable jury could conclude Winsala
negligently operated an NJT bus at the time of the intersectional collision in
which plaintiff was injured. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that on November 28, 2018, at
approximately 6:55 p.m., her vehicle, a white Toyota Prius, was struck by NJT's
bus driven by Winsala, in Newark. Plaintiff further alleged that she had a green
light at the time of the collision, and Winsala did not have a green light.
According to plaintiff, Winsala was speeding, failed to yield, failed to brake,
and negligently operated the bus. Plaintiff also alleged that NJT was vicariously
liable for Winsala's negligence. As a result of the accident, plaintiff claimed she
sustained permanent injuries, and she sought compensatory damages.
The record shows the accident occurred at the intersection of Lindbergh
Road and an access ramp to Terminal A at Newark Liberty International Airport.
The intersection is controlled by a traffic light. At the intersection where the
A-2559-23 2 accident occurred, there were two northbound lanes and two southbound lanes
separated by a concrete median. The northbound lanes of Lindbergh Road curve
to the left before and after the intersection. Winsala was operating the bus in a
northbound direction, and plaintiff was traveling southbound, attempting to turn
left onto the Terminal A ramp. A dedicated left turn lane was available for the
southbound traffic turning lane left onto the Terminal A ramp, while the two
southbound lanes are for traffic going straight through the intersection.
The speed limit on Lindbergh Road is thirty miles per hour. Winsala
testified at his deposition that he had a green traffic light as he drove through
the intersection. As Winsala was approximately halfway through the
intersection, he testified that plaintiff's vehicle struck the bus near the middle of
the driver's side as she attempted to enter the access ramp to Terminal A.
Winsala claimed he always remained in his lane of travel. The posted speed
limit was thirty miles per hour.
The accident was captured on the bus's two dash cameras, "Dash Cam A"
and "Dash Cam B," and a nearby gas station camera. 1 Dash Cam A shows
plaintiff's vehicle turning in front of another vehicle in the dedicated left turn
lane. Dash Cam B depicts plaintiff's vehicle first making contact with the left
1 This court independently reviewed the videos. A-2559-23 3 side of the bus. The gas station video shows plaintiff's vehicle driving towards
the side of the bus and making contact with the left side of the bus as the bus
continues to drive forward. None of the videos show plaintiff's vehicle stopped
before making contact with the bus.
The bus was also equipped with an event recorder and forward-facing
video cameras that captured the incident. The camera situated in front of the
bus showed that as Winsala reached the intersection, he turned the steering
wheel to the left as the road curved to the left before the intersection. The video
footage also revealed that as Winsala went through the intersection, the light
stayed green the entire time. Winsala testified that he honked the horn and began
moving the bus to the right and away from plaintiff's vehicle "1.25 seconds"
before plaintiff's vehicle struck the bus.
The forward-facing camera from the front window of the bus did not show
plaintiff's vehicle hitting the front of the bus, rather the crash is heard after the
bus was halfway through the intersection. Defendants maintained plaintiff did
not initiate her left turn from the left turn only lane, but rather drove around
several vehicles that were stopped in the left turn only lane and executed her left
turn from the left through lane.
A-2559-23 4 During discovery, plaintiff served an accident reconstruction expert report
from Dennis F. Andrews, Ph.D. In his report, Dr. Andrews opined that Winsala
"turned left and sideswiped [plaintiff's] vehicle when a third vehicle crossed in
front of his vehicle from left to right." Relying on photographs, Dr. Andrews
concluded that plaintiff's vehicle "was not entering the subject intersection and
[traveling] into the path of the [NJT] bus." Dr. Andrews's report does not state
Winsala left his lane of travel at any time prior to impact.
At the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment and
to bar Dr. Andrews from testifying at the time of trial. On August 9, 2023, in
an oral decision, the motion court denied both motions.2 Defendants moved for
reconsideration. On March 1, 2024, the motion court denied defendants' motion
for reconsideration.
Prior to trial, defendants moved in limine to bar Dr. Andrews from
testifying at trial. The motion was denied. The matter was tried before a jury
on April 3, 4, and 5, 2024. Following opening statements, defense counsel made
an initial motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that plaintiff's counsel's
opening statement failed to establish sufficient evidence to support negligence
2 The motion papers and August 9, 2023 transcript are not in the appellate record. A-2559-23 5 claims by defendants. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice but
held that defendants could renew their motion for a directed verdict at the close
of plaintiff's case.
Plaintiff called Dr. Andrews as her first witness. He was qualified as an
accident reconstruction expert. Based upon his review of the videos,
photographs, deposition transcripts, and documentary evidence, Dr. Andrews
testified the bus accelerated to twenty-eight miles per hour before reaching the
intersection and that Winsala turned his wheel to the left before the impact
occurred to negotiate the left curve of the roadway. According to Dr. Andrews,
after the accident, Winsala turned the wheel substantially to the right in order to
drive over to the right shoulder lane. Dr. Andrews opined that the damage to
plaintiff's vehicle and the bus indicated it was a "side[-]swipe impact" because
"the hood of the vehicle is displaced to the left because you can see the lip of
the hood located to the left."
During Dr. Andrews's direct testimony, Dash Cam A, Dash Cam B, and
the gas station video were played for the jury. Regarding Dash Cam A, Dr.
Andrews testified:
Well, the bus driver turns the wheel to the left, the impact that occurred, you can hear the impact and then immediately, the bus driver turns his wheel to the
A-2559-23 6 right and you can see the bus moving over into a right- hand lane.
I also noticed on [Dash Cam A] and I believe that's [Dash Cam A] that the bus driver was traveling at [twenty-eight] miles per hour.
In regard to Dash Cam B, Dr. Andrews stated the following:
Well, Dash Cam B is a camera mounted way in the back of the bus. So we're showing from the back of the bus towards the front and you can't really make out the bus driver's movements that well nor can you see anything outside of the windows on the left or right side of the bus.
The only thing you see on the left and right side windows of the bus is the bright lights. It's—the video shows white, which would be the lighting, ambient lighting of any stores nearby, street lighting but you can't see anything outside of the bus.
As to the gas station video, Dr. Andrews testified:
I noticed that, as the bus passed [plaintiff's] vehicle, [plaintiff's] vehicle stopped prior to the impact and you can tell a little bit where the bus, after the vehicle crossed in front of it suddenly, the bus slightly moved to the left and that's when the impact occurred.
....
[N]one of the videos showed the bus slowing down. As a matter of fact, the videos show the bus was accelerating.
A-2559-23 7 On cross-examination, Dr. Andrews opined that a motorist navigating the
subject intersection would have to drive left to follow the geometry of the road
but "after the point of impact. . . ." Dr. Andrews conceded that the photographs
show "slight[] rearward" damage to plaintiff's hood. Dr. Andrews testified that
he determined plaintiff's vehicle was "stopped" at the time of impact based on
the gas station video. However, when questioned about the gas station video,
Dr. Andrews was unable to identify plaintiff's vehicle in the footage. Dr.
Andrews stated that the bus moved to the left prior to impact, but he did not
consider the "degree" to which the bus moved important to his analysis.
Plaintiff was the next witness who testified that day. Plaintiff stated she
had been attempting to make a left-hand turn at the intersection and suddenly
saw a bus coming at her "very fast." Plaintiff testified her first reaction was to
come to a "complete stop." Plaintiff denied going into the path of the bus. As
she was holding the steering wheel, plaintiff testified "[she] was struck and side-
swiped by a bus, which was terrible" because the front of her vehicle "smashed
inwards." According to plaintiff, she was stationary at the time of the impact,
the bus "sped up, changed directions[,] and swerved into [her] car." In contrast,
plaintiff had testified at her deposition that her vehicle was in motion and not
stopped at the time of impact.
A-2559-23 8 On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that when turning at the subject
intersection, a driver has to do so from only the left turn lane. Plaintiff explained
that at some point while making the left turn, the green arrow "switched to [a]
solid green [light . . . .]" Plaintiff testified that when the police officer prepared
the initial accident report, "he kept drawing the picture that it was like this when
the accident was never forward, it was sideways." Plaintiff testified she returned
to the police station to amend the report a few weeks later and "kept telling [the
officer] it was a green arrow and at some point, it switched to solid green and it
was never added in the report." Plaintiff stated that before she was hit by the
bus, "[she] came to a complete stop because [she] saw something coming really
fast."
Plaintiff's cross-examination continued the next day. Defense counsel had
plaintiff read from the amended police report, which stated, "driver of vehicle
two [(plaintiff)] states that vehicle one [(Winsala)] was driving fast [at] a red
light and struck her vehicle on the front right side as she was making a left turn,
on a green left arrow into the intersection." In response, plaintiff admitted at
trial she did not believe that Winsala had a red light, and despite seeing that
statement on the amended police report, she never went back to the police station
to change it.
A-2559-23 9 Plaintiff then contradicted herself and stated that she did go back to try
and change the amended report to state Winsala did not have a red light, but the
police officer "told [her] that the report is staying how it is, take it or leave it."
Further, on cross-examination, plaintiff admitted at her deposition she testified
she had a green turning arrow but was now stating she had a green turning arrow
"that turned solid green at some point" while she was turning. Plaintiff denied
that her story had "changed" since her deposition. Plaintiff testified "[m]y
story's always been the same, that [it was] a left green arrow, and yes at some
point it changed [to full] green."
Plaintiff called her parents, her sister, and Dr. Joseph Bellapianta to testify
on the issue of damages, which is not relevant to this appeal. After plaintiff
rested, defense counsel renewed his motion for a directed verdict and moved for
judgment under Rule 4:40-13 on the basis no evidence was introduced to show
that Winsala or NJT were negligent, and no rational juror could find in plaintiff's
favor. Defense counsel argued plaintiff and Dr. Andrews agreed she would have
had to yield to the bus; it was undisputed the bus had a green light; and there
was no evidence Winsala was speeding.
3 Rule 4:40-1 states in pertinent part: "[a] motion for judgment, stating specifically the grounds therefor, may be made by a party either at the close of all the evidence or at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent." A-2559-23 10 Plaintiff countered that plaintiff and Dr. Andrews both testified that she
did not go into the path of the bus; plaintiff was stopped at the time of the
accident waiting to make a left turn; and the expert opined it was a side-swipe
impact. Plaintiff maintained that the fact she did not enter the bus's lane of travel
and the bus side-swiped her vehicle "implies" the bus hit her vehicle.
The trial court granted defendants' motions, finding there was no
sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of Winsala. The trial court found
Winsala "did nothing legally wrong," and plaintiff failed to "yield to all of the
other traffic." In particular, the trial court noted Dr. Andrews agreed that
Winsala never left his lane of travel, which contradicted the expert's conclusion,
"within a reasonable degree of accident reconstruction certainty," that the cause
of the impact was purportedly "the left turn" of the bus.
The trial court emphasized plaintiff presented no proof that Winsala was
"distracted" or "speeding." The trial court credited Winsala's deposition
testimony that he "slightly moved to the left," he explained "why" he moved to
the left and noted "the road goes to the left." A memorializing order was entered.
On appeal, plaintiff primarily argues that the trial court improperly
dismissed the complaint on directed verdict because there were questions of fact
for the jury to decide. Plaintiff also contends the trial court improperly refused
A-2559-23 11 her request to read Winsala's entire deposition transcript and admit Winsala's
NJT complaint log into evidence.
II.
A trial court applies the same standard as a motion for involuntary
dismissal under Rule 4:37-2(b) when deciding a defendant's Rule 4:40-1
directed verdict motion at the close of a plaintiff's case. Rule 4:37-2(b) permits
the judge to grant a motion for involuntary dismissal of any action, or part
thereof, at the end of a plaintiff's case on "the ground that upon the facts and
upon the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." "Whether the action is
tried with or without a jury, such motion shall be denied if the evidence, together
with the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in plaintiff's
favor." Ibid.
A dismissal is appropriate when "no rational jury could conclude from the
evidence that an essential element of the plaintiff's case is present." Pressler &
Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 4:37-2(b) (2026). Said
differently, a directed verdict is proper "if the evidence and uncontradicted
testimony is 'so plain and complete that disbelief of the story could not
reasonably arise in the rational process of an ordinarily intelligent mind, then a
question has been presented for the [judge] to decide and not the jury.'" Frugis
A-2559-23 12 v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 270 (2003) (quoting Ferdinand v. Agric. Ins. Co.,
22 N.J. 482, 494 (1956)).
We review the grant of a directed verdict de novo. See Manalapan Realty,
L.P. v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). We accord no
special deference to a trial court's assessment of the documentary record because
it does not turn on a trial court's determinations of credibility but instead on
questions of law. Ibid. (noting that no "special deference" applies to a trial
court's legal determinations). We accept as true all evidence that supports the
non-moving party's position and all favorable inferences therefrom. Akhtar v.
JDN Props. at Florham Park, LLC, 439 N.J. Super. 391, 403 (App. Div. 2015).
It is undisputed defendant NJT is a public entity and plaintiff's claims are
thus properly evaluated under the provisions of the Torts Claims Act (TCA),
N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to :12-3. Muhammad v. N.J. Transit, 176 N.J. 185, 194 (2003).
"[P]ublic entity liability is restricted under the [TCA]." Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex,
209 N.J. 51, 55 (2012). Generally, a public entity is "immune from tort liability
unless there is a specific statutory provision imposing liability." Kahrar v.
Borough of Wallington, 171 N.J. 3, 10 (2012) (citing Collins v. Union Cnty.
Jail, 150 N.J. 407, 413 (1997)); see also N.J.S.A. 59:1-2, 2-1. Accordingly,
"immunity for public entities is the general rule and liability is the exception."
A-2559-23 13 Kemp by Wright v. State, 147 N.J. 294, 299 (1997); accord D.D. v. Univ. of
Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 213 N.J. 130, 134 (2013) (describing that rule as "the
'guiding principle' of the [TCA]." (quoting Coyne v. State Dep't of Transp., 182
N.J. 481, 488 (2005))).
"To sustain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish [the
following] four elements: '(1) a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3)
proximate cause; and (4) damages.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015)
(quoting Polzo, 196 N.J. at 584). The plaintiff must do so "by some competent
proof." Ibid. (quoting Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406
(2014)). The mere happening of an accident does not raise a presumption of
negligence. See Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enters., 266 N.J. Super 662, 670 (App.
Div. 1993).
Before us, plaintiff argues the trial court erroneously relied on Dr.
Andrews's expert report submitted in conjunction with the in limine motions and
inserted its own opinion that Winsala "never left the lane." According to
plaintiff, the trial court directed her counsel to clarify that the bus never left its
lane of travel, and Dr. Andrews disagreed and said, "no." Dr. Andrews also later
testified that when the red car cut in front of the bus, Winsala turned the wheel
A-2559-23 14 "slightly to the left" to avoid hitting it, and that is when the impact occurred.
We are unpersuaded.
Here, based on the uncontroverted evidence presented, plaintiff was in the
left through lane of the roadway and not the dedicated left-hand turning lane at
the time of the accident. The record shows plaintiff's lane was controlled by a
designation on the roadway that only a straight path of travel is permitted.
Instead of obeying that traffic command, she made a left-hand turn from the left
through lane. Plaintiff disregarded the lane markings and drove her vehicle into
a lane of travel she should not have occupied. Although both drivers had a duty
to make proper observations, see Beck v. Washington, 149 N.J. Super. 569, 572
(App. Div. 1977), plaintiff's presence on the roadway next to Winsala's lane of
travel at the time of impact was not reasonably foreseeable. Based upon our de
novo review, we conclude Winsala was not negligent.
Plaintiff had the burden to establish Winsala was at least fifty percent
responsible for the accident to permit her to recover against defendants. See
Stabile v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 263 N.J. Super. 434, 439-41 (App. Div. 1993); see
also N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8. The trial court found plaintiff failed to carry
her burden to establish a prima facie case of Winsala's greater liability for the
accident. Although the trial court acknowledged Winsala may have moved
A-2559-23 15 slightly to the left when driving at the intersection, it found the discrepancy
immaterial for purposes of the directed verdict. Moreover, plaintiff offered no
evidence that Winsala left his lane, went over the speed limit, or did anything
wrong. The record supports that determination.
Besides there being no evidence in the record suggesting Winsala left his
lane, the trial court also determined there was no evidence Winsala was
"distracted" as plaintiff alleged. The trial court emphasized plaintiff "has a right
to turn only after she yield[s] to all of the traffic. That doesn't change the case
law, you must yield to all of the other traffic. You can't—and the bus driver
[(Winsala)] did nothing legally wrong." Viewing the facts on the directed
verdict motion in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the trial court concluded
that there was "no way a rational jury, a reasonable fact finder, can find from
this evidence that [Winsala] was more than [twenty-percent] responsible. It's
not possible . . . with the facts of this case."
We are also mindful of increased risk of danger with respect to drivers
making left-hand turns:
Left turns on two-way roadways. At any intersection where traffic is permitted to move in both directions on each roadway entering the intersection, an approach for a left turn shall be made in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the center line thereof and by passing to the right of such center line where it enters
A-2559-23 16 the intersection and after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection to the right of the center line of the roadway being entered. Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection.
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-123(b).]
Both plaintiff and Dr. Andrews conceded at trial that she had a duty to
yield to the bus. Winsala had a green light as he continued to drive the bus
through the subject intersection.
Based upon our de novo review, and according all favorable inferences to
plaintiff, we are satisfied that defendants' motion for a directed verdict and
judgment were properly granted. Plaintiff did not adduce evidence during her
case in chief sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to conclude Winsala was
speeding, distracted, left his lane, or that plaintiff—who was making a left turn
in front of the bus—had the right of way, even when viewed in the light most
favorable to her. In order to stave off the motion for a directed verdict here, it
was incumbent on plaintiff "to demonstrate by competent evidential material
that a genuine issue of fact exist[ed]." Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229, 241
(1957). There were no factual disputes for the jury to decide on the issue of
liability.
A-2559-23 17 III.
Next, plaintiff argues the trial court improperly refused her request to read
Winsala's entire deposition transcript into evidence at the close of he r case.
Plaintiff contends that in her Rule 4:25-7(b) Pretrial Information Exchange, she
did not include specific page and line numbers to Winsala's deposition testimony
intended to be read at trial. The trial court denied plaintiff's proffer to read the
entirety of Winsala's deposition testimony into the record.
Plaintiff asserts there is no court rule which precluded her from reading
the entire deposition transcript into the record. Plaintiff maintains that
defendants had timely notice of her intent to read Winsala's deposition transcript
into evidence and no objection or request for specific citations were ever made.
According to plaintiff, Winsala's deposition testimony is "probative" of
negligence because it relates to his failure to "observe, appreciate, and avoid"
her vehicle while traveling through an intersection with a green light. Plaintiff
also argues that the deposition testimony is relevant as to NJT's negligence in
employing Winsala and ignoring his alleged poor driving history, prior
complaints, and violations.
Defendants counter that plaintiff failed to comply with the Pretrial
Information Exchange prescribed in Rule 4:25-7(b). Specifically, defendants
A-2559-23 18 point out that plaintiff merely listed Winsala's deposition transcript as a potential
exhibit, but she never declared she intended to read the transcript into evidence
as an admission by a party opponent. Defendants also argue that plaintiff
"concedes" that she did not include specific page and line citations in her Pretrial
Information Exchange.
Since a trial court's discovery rulings are "entitled to substantial
deference," we review for an abuse of discretion. DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J.
212, 228 (2023) (quoting State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 593 (2016)). "We
generally defer to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless the court
has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken
understanding of the applicable law." Rivers v. LSC P'ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68,
80 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 559 (1997)).
We review the trial court's application of Rule 4:25-7 de novo. DiFiore, 254
N.J. at 228 ("[W]e review the meaning or scope of a court rule de novo, applying
ordinary principles of statutory construction to interpret the court rules.").
Rule 4:25-7(b) provides "in cases that have not been pretried, attorneys
shall confer and, seven days prior to the initial trial date, exchange the pretrial
information as prescribed by Appendix XXIII to these rules." Subsection (b)
specifically states:
A-2559-23 19 At trial and prior to opening statements, the parties shall submit to the court the following in writing: (1) copies of any [p]retrial [i]nformation [e]xchange materials that have been exchanged pursuant to this rule, and any objections made thereto; and (2) stipulations reached on contested procedural, evidentiary, and substantive issues. In addition, in jury trials, the parties shall also exchange and submit (1) any proposed voir dire questions, (2) a list of proposed jury instructions pursuant to R[ule] 1:8-7, with specific reference either to the Model Civil Jury Charges, if applicable, or to applicable legal authority, and (3) a proposed jury verdict form that includes all possible verdicts the jury may return. Failure to exchange and submit all the information required by this rule may result in sanctions as determined by the trial judge.
[R. 4:25-7(b).]
Further, Appendix XXIII states:
In cases that have not been pretried, attorneys shall confer and exchange the following information seven days prior to the initial trial date, unless such exchange has been waived by written consent of the parties pursuant to R[ule] 4:25-7(d):
...
3. A list of any proposed deposition or interrogatory reading(s) by page and line number or by question number.
...
[Pretrial Information Exchange, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix XXIII to R. 4:25- 7(b), at 2136 (2026).]
A-2559-23 20 Because plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4:25-7(b), we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request to read Winsala's
entire deposition transcript into the record at trial.
IV.
Finally, plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion and prevented
her from establishing a prima facie case of negligent hiring, training, and
retention by not allowing Winsala's NJT complaint log into evidence. The NJT
complaint log provides dates and general descriptions of complaints involving
Winsala, such as "customer complaint," "violation," and "investigation ok."
Plaintiff did not depose any individuals having knowledge of the entries in the
NJT complaint log or who was involved with its preparation. The trial court
ruled the NJT complaint log was inadmissible because the entries were
prejudicial and bore no similarities to the subject accident.
Negligent training and supervision claims "are not forms of vicarious
liability," but rather "are based on the direct fault of an employer." G.A.-H. v.
K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 415 (2019). To establish a party acted negligently, a
plaintiff must present evidence establishing "a duty of care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant, injury to the
plaintiff proximately caused by the breach, and damages." Robinson v. Vivirito,
A-2559-23 21 217 N.J. 199, 208 (2014). Where, as here, a plaintiff claims an employer
breached a duty "relate[d] to the risk of harm created by [an employee], the
plaintiff must prove that the [employer] knew or had reason to know of the risk
of harm in question." G.A.-H., 238 N.J. at 415.
To establish a negligent training or supervision claim, a plaintiff must
present evidence demonstrating:
(1) that the employer "knew or had reason to know of the particular unfitness, incompetence[,] or dangerous attributes of the employee and could reasonably have foreseen that such qualities created a risk of harm to other persons" and (2) "that, through the negligence of the employer in hiring the employee, the latter's incompetence, unfitness[,] or dangerous characteristics proximately caused the injury."
[Id. at 416 (quoting Di Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 173 (1982)).]
Stated differently, a "plaintiff must prove that (1) an employer knew or had
reason to know that the failure to supervise or train an employee in a certain way
would create a risk of harm and (2) that risk of harm materializes and causes the
plaintiff's damages." Ibid.
Winsala's NJT complaint log is bereft of any evidence that he was unfit or
possessed dangerous properties to operate a bus. Moreover, the NJT complaint
log provides scant information and does not even detail what the alleged
A-2559-23 22 complaints were. In the two years preceding the subject accident, Winsala only
had five complaints, and each was deemed "OK" in the record. There is no
evidence of Winsala being disciplined by NJT as a consequence of any of the
complaints, except once for using a cell phone. Most of the complaints were
about his tardiness.
At his deposition, Winsala testified that he obtained his commercial
driver's license in 2003, and after being hired by NJT, he attended a three-month-
long class on situational driving and evasive maneuverers. There is nothing in
the record to suggest Winsala was using a cell phone at the time of the subject
accident.
In assessing these points, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's exclusion of Winsala's NJT complaint log into evidence and no clear
error of judgment. Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225 N.J. 400, 413 (2016).
Plaintiff was obligated to present competent evidence establishing—or
supporting reasonable inferences—to satisfy the two-prong test in G.A.-H. 238
N.J. at 416. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit
Winsala's NJT complaint log into evidence.
In sum, our review of the record supports the trial court's determination
plaintiff did not present evidence at trial to show that "reasonable minds could
A-2559-23 23 differ" to survive defendants' motion for a directed verdict and judgment.
Having applied that standard on appeal, we agree with the trial court's order
granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict and judgment. We also
discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's evidentiary rulings.
Accordingly, we affirm the April 8, 2024 order.
Affirmed.
A-2559-23 24