Kimberly A. Goodman v. Members 1st Federal Credit Union

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: May 1, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-0649
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: MAY 1, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0649-MR

KIMBERLY A. GOODMAN AND DAVID W. HILL APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM LEWIS CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE BRIAN CHRISTOPHER MCCLOUD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-00120

MEMBERS 1ST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: This case arises from the issuance of a line of credit secured

by real estate located in Pennsylvania (the “Pennsylvania Property”) and used to

purchase real estate located in Lewis County, Kentucky (the “Kentucky Property”).

Appellants are Kimberly A. Goodman and David W. Hill (“Borrowers”). Appellee

is Members 1st Federal Credit Union (“Credit Union”). The parties filed multiple

motions for summary judgment. The Lewis Circuit Court granted Credit Union’s motions and denied Borrowers’ motions. Appellants appeal to this Court as a

matter of right. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2021, Borrowers obtained a $313,500.00 line of credit

from Credit Union secured by the Pennsylvania Property. The line of credit was

issued pursuant to a loan and collateral agreement (“Loan Agreement”).

Borrowers soon withdrew the entire line of credit. They purchased the Kentucky

Property on January 27, 2022. On July 12, 2023, Borrowers transferred the

Kentucky Property to Woodsmoke Acres, LLC (“Woodsmoke”). The transfer was

for $1.00, despite the Kentucky Property’s $210,000.00 assessment by the Lewis

County Property Valuation Administrator (“PVA”).1

A senior institutional lienholder, Orrstown Bank (referred to herein as

“Bank”) foreclosed on the Pennsylvania Property. Borrowers do not dispute their

default. On April 3, 2024, Credit Union purchased the Pennsylvania Property at

sheriff’s sale for $320,000.00. Credit Union received $84,974.33 after the Bank

was compensated. Credit Union made improvements and sold the Pennsylvania

Property for $436,459.16. The resale proceeds reduced Borrowers’ indebtedness

to $177,667.88.

1 A default judgment was entered against Woodsmoke, and it is not a party to this appeal.

-2- Credit Union filed suit in Lewis County Circuit Court to enforce the

terms of the Loan Agreement and more precisely, to recover the remainder owed

thereunder. Borrowers filled counterclaims alleging breach of contract and fraud.

The court entered summary judgment for Credit Union for $177,667.88 and set

aside the Kentucky Property transfer to Woodsmoke pursuant to KRS2

378A.040(1)(b). The court also awarded Credit Union $72,056.44 in attorney’s

fees and costs. Borrowers raise several issues. Each will be discussed in turn.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” CR3 56.03. “Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and

the existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not

defer to the trial court’s decision and will review the issue de novo.” Lewis v. B&R

Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001) (citation omitted). With this standard

in mind, we return to the record at issue in the present case.

2 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

-3- ANALYSIS

Borrowers argue that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the

foreclosed property is in Pennsylvania. “[T]he issue of personal jurisdiction is a

legal question, and hence, we review the issue de novo.” Worrell v. Stivers, 523

S.W.3d 436, 439 (Ky. App. 2017). Similarly, a “challenge to the trial court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the case below presents solely an issue of

law, which we review de novo.” St. Joseph Cath. Orphan Soc’y v. Edwards, 449

S.W.3d 727, 734 (Ky. 2014). There is no indication that Borrowers reside or are

domiciled outside of Kentucky. To the contrary, it appears that they reside at the

Kentucky Property and have received service there, including the order from which

they now appeal. Thus, jurisdiction was proper under KRS 452.480. And

although not a party to the present appeal Woodsmoke was organized as a

Kentucky LLC. Thus, jurisdiction was proper under KRS 452.450.

The remainder of Borrowers’ arguments arise from alleged

noncompliance with the Loan Agreement.

Absent an ambiguity in the contract, the parties’ intentions must be discerned from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence. A contract is ambiguous if a reasonable person would find it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations.

Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Ky. App. 2002)

(citations omitted). Appellants have not sufficiently identified any provision of the

-4- Loan Agreement or attendant documents that have been violated here. In contrast,

Credit Union has detailed its compliance with the Loan Agreement and Borrowers’

rights thereunder. Absent some clear contractual or other legal directive to the

contrary, Credit Union is not barred from proactively seeking to reduce its

exposure to Borrowers’ loan through lawful transactions—which appear to have

reduced the amount Borrowers would otherwise owe. Credit Union is entitled to

pursue a deficiency judgment for that sum in Kentucky.4 Any additional

arguments raised by Borrowers either lack preservation, merit, or are otherwise

unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Lewis Circuit Court’s summary

judgment orders are hereby AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kimberly A. Goodman, pro se Chrisandrea L. Turner David W. Hill, pro se Lexington, Kentucky Vanceburg, Kentucky Joshua G. Wolford Louisville, Kentucky

4 Although the Loan Agreement appears to have a Pennsylvania choice of law clause, we have not been directed to any forum selection clause that would mandate that this case be pursued in our sister Commonwealth, or any other forum.

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