Kimball v. McKee

86 P. 1089, 149 Cal. 435, 1906 Cal. LEXIS 264
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 12, 1906
DocketS.F. No. 3421.
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 86 P. 1089 (Kimball v. McKee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kimball v. McKee, 86 P. 1089, 149 Cal. 435, 1906 Cal. LEXIS 264 (Cal. 1906).

Opinions

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 437 This is an action of trespass in which the defendant is charged with having stripped the bark from a large number of trees growing on plaintiff's land, described as lots 1, 3, and 4, in section 31, township 5 south, range 2 east, Humboldt meridian, and the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section 30 of the same township. The shaded portion of the accompanying map shows the position *Page 438 of these lots in their relation to each other as well as in relation to the township lines and the principal natural objects and artificial monuments delineated and noted on that portion of the official map of the township survey, to which reference must be had in construing the patent and determining the location of the land. The plaintiff, as successor in interest to the original patentee, is the unquestioned owner of the lots of land thus delineated and described, and the only serious question in the case is as to their real boundaries on the ground. Whether, in other words, the stripping of the bark, which is not denied, was done upon plaintiff's land or upon other subdivisions of the said section 31, or in an adjoining section. The plaintiff succeeded in convincing the jury that the defendant had trespassed upon his land, and was awarded damages in the sum of five thousand dollars. The appeal by the defendant is from the order of the superior court overruling his motion for a new trial.

[EDITORS' NOTE: MAP IS ELECTRONICALLY NON-TRANSFERRABLE.] *Page 439

The cause was first submitted in Department, where the order of the lower court was affirmed. The opinion then rendered contains a very full and generally satisfactory discussion of numerous alleged errors in the rulings of the superior court upon objections to evidence, and in the instructions given to the jury, and with a few trifling exceptions, hereinafter noted, is here readopted as to those points. The rehearing, indeed, was granted only because we desired to consider more carefully the question whether the verdict of the jury was supported by the evidence, or to state the question more specifically, whether the plaintiff's land was correctly located by the survey upon which he rested his case. With the opportunity of examining and comparing the voluminous and somewhat confusing evidence contained in the record, in the light of the additional argument on that point, we are convinced that the location contended for by plaintiff, and upon which his case depends, was not correctly made, and that in this respect the verdict of the jury is wholly unsupported.

In disposing of its public lands the government causes them to be laid off into townships six miles square, bounded by meridian lines on the east and west and by parallels of latitude on the north and south. This, at least, is the ideal township, but owing to faulty location of the boundary lines or to proximity to the seacoast, or to both causes, as in this case, and to the convergence of meridian lines — as in all cases — a township never contains thirty-six sections each exactly a mile square, into which they are supposed to be divided. The rules for making the subdivisional surveys, however, are well understood, and there is a uniform method of numbering and designating the sections and their smaller subdivisions, of all of which matters the courts take judicial notice. Section 31 is at the southwest corner of the township, next on the east is section 32, and so on to section 36 at the southeast corner. We also take judicial notice that under the laws of the United States and the regulations of the land office no sales of public lands are made until the plat and field-notes of the subdivisional survey of the township in which they lie have been returned and approved, and that the patents issued to purchasers describe the lands patented as they are delineated on the approved plat — which remains a public record in the office of the surveyor-general, and copies *Page 440 of which, officially certified, are deposited in the local land office. We also know that it is made the duty of the surveyors employed to make these subdivisional surveys to mark the section corners with posts properly lettered, or other monuments, and also the intersection of quarter-section lines with the section lines, and more especially to preserve accurate field-notes of their surveys showing the natural features of the country, such as streams, mountain ridges, the ocean shore, nature of the soil, whether barren or fertile, wooded or meadow; distance and bearing of witness-trees from section and quarter-section corners, etc.

These field-notes are, like the township plat, preserved in the office of the surveyor-general as a public record, and their principal purpose is to enable the purchasers of public lands and their successors to correctly relocate the section and quarter-section corners within the township when by accident or design the artificial monuments placed by the official surveyor have been removed or destroyed, — a very common occurrence, as the records of this court and the decisions of other courts abundantly prove.

And so in this case, when the plaintiff came to the conclusion that the defendant was collecting tanbark by stripping his trees, he found himself under the necessity of employing a private surveyor to find the corners of section 31, in which his land is situate. The evidence offered by him at the trial (the map and field-notes of the official surveyor) shows that these corners, as well as the quarter-section corners, were marked by posts or other monuments, properly lettered at the time of the survey, and many of them identified by the distance and bearing of witness-trees as well as by their relation to the shore of the ocean, the stream known as Whale Gulch, and the crest of the high ridge dividing that stream from the ocean. There is no evidence in the record that any search was made for the corner posts or witness-trees, which, if found, would have ended the question as to the true location of plaintiff's land. But assuming that the proper effort was made to find the corner posts and witness-trees, and that it was fruitless, the most obvious alternative was to trace the township line to its intersection with the line of ordinary high tide on the ocean shore, — that being the southwest corner of the township, — then measure 1.80 chains east from that point *Page 441 and thence twenty chains north for the southeast corner of plaintiff's land, thence eighty chains on the same course for the northeast corner, thence twenty chains west for its northwest corner, thence south to the ocean shore, thence along the shore to a point due west of the southeast corner, and then close upon that.

This, indeed, is precisely what plaintiff's surveyor (Chapman) undertook to do, but did not do. There is a very serious question in the case, whether he ever found the line which bounds the township on the south. He places it in utter disregard of the field-notes and plat of the official survey, which he had in his hands and assumed to follow. But conceding for the moment that he may have found the true south boundary of the township, his method of tracing it to the ocean and his views as to what constitutes the shore of the ocean are most peculiar.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
86 P. 1089, 149 Cal. 435, 1906 Cal. LEXIS 264, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kimball-v-mckee-cal-1906.