FILED SUPERIOR counr OF GUAM 2023 APR 20 PM 2: 07
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
HYUNG GON KIM and SOL YOUNG CIVIL CASE NO. CV0188-22 EUH,
Plaintiffs,
vs. DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ANTONIO A. SABLAN and PAUL ENTRY OF DEFAULT SABLAN
Defendants.
This matter came before the Honorable Dana A. Gutierrez on January 20, 2023 for
Defendant Antonio A. Sablan's ("Antonio Sablan") Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default
("Motion to Set Aside"). Present at the hearing were Plaintiffs Hyung Gon Kim and Sol Young
Euh's ("Kim & Euh") counsel Attorney Mitchell Thompson and Antonio Sablan with counsel
Attorney Charles McDonald. Based upon the arguments presented and for good cause shown, the
Court hereby GRANTS Antonio Sablan's Motion to Set Aside.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 28, 2022, Kim & Euh filed a Complaint for Trespass and Unjust Emichment
(the "Complaint") against Antonio Sablan and Defendant Paul Sablan ("Paul Sablan"). On April
18, 2022, Kim & Euh filed two Declarations of Service, one detailing service upon Antonio
Sablan ("Declaration of Service for Antonio Sablan") and the other detailing service upon Paul r r DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CVOl 88-22; Hyung Gon Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
Sablan. In the Declaration of Service for Antonio Sablan, Thomas S. Masga, a licensed process
server, stated that he served the Summons and Complaint "upon Frank Anderson, the Authorized
Agent for Service of Process of Antonio A. Sablan, at 152 Chalan Kantun Tutujan, Sinajana,
Guam, 96910." Deel. of Service for Antonio Sablan (April 18, 2022). On May 26, 2022,
Plaintiffs filed a Declaration and Application for Entry of Default Re Antonio Sablan
("Application for Entry Against Antonio Sablan") and a Declaration and Application for Entry of
Default Re Paul Sablan. In the Application for Entry of Default Against Antonio Sablan,
Attorney Thompson declared "that Defendant Antonio A. Sablan was served on April 18, 2022"
but, Antonio Sablan "has failed to answer or otherwise defend." App. for Entry Against Antonio
Sablan, at 1 (May 26, 2023). On May 27, 2022, Entry of Default was entered by the Clerk of
Court.
On June 21, 2022, the McDonald Law Firm filed an Entry of Appearance on behalf of
Antonio Sablan. On July 8, 2022, Antonio Sablan filed a Motion to Set Aside, and a Declaration
of Antonio Sablan in support of the Motion. On August 5, 2022, Kim & Euh filed their
Opposition to Motion to Set Aside ("Opposition") and a Declaration of Mitchell F. Thompson in
support. On August 19, 2022, Antonio Sablan filed a Reply to the Opposition. On November 22,
2022, Kim & Euh filed a Declaration of Terry Hyunggon Kim and a Request for Entry of
Judgment. On January 20, 2023, the Court held a hearing on the Motion to Set Aside. After
hearing from the parties, the Com1 took the matter under advisement
DISCUSSION
The issue before the Court is whether the Entry of Default against Antonio Sablan shall
be set aside.
2 r r DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CVOJ 88-22; Hyung Gon Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
A. An Entry of Default May Be Set Aside for Good Cause Shown
The Court has discretion to set aside an enhy of default for good cause shown. Guam
Rules of Civil Procedure ("GRCP") Rule 55( c) states:
(c) Setting Aside Default. For good cause shown, the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b ).
GRCP Rule 55( c). 1 The Supreme Court of Guam has held that "due to the parallels between
entries of default and default judgments," the Comi will consider the same factors in detennining
whether to set aside an entry of default or default judgment. Adams v. Duenas, 1998 Guam 15 ~
5. However, the Supreme Court notes that "the standard is less rigorous when examining a
motion to set aside entry of default than for default judgments, so these grounds are more
liberally construed." Id. (citing Hawaii Carpenters' Trust Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 513 (9th
Cir. 1986).
In determining whether to vacate an entry of default, the Court must consider whether
"(!) the defendant's culpable conduct led to the default, (2) the defendant has no meritorious
defense, or (3) the plaintiff would be prejudiced if the judgment is set aside." Midsea Industrial,
Inc. v. HK Engineering, Ltd., 1998 Guam 14, ~ 5. A finding of any of these factors supports
rejection of setting aside a default. See Adams, 1998 Guam 15 ~ 5; see also United States v.
Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[A]
1 "[B]ecause the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure are generally derived from, although not identical to, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), federal decisions that construe the federal counterparts to the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive authority." Gov't of Guam v. O'Keefe on behalf ofHeirs of Torres Est., 2018 Guam 4 ~ 9 (citing People v, Quitugua, 2009 Guam 10 ~ 10). Guam's Rule 55 was adopted from Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See GRCP Rule 55.
3 r r DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CV0188-22; Hyung Gan Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
finding that any one of these factors is true is sufficient reason for the district court to refuse to
set aside the default.").
1. Antonio Sablan Claims His Conduct Does Not Make Him Culpable for the Entry of Default Against Him
Antonio Sablan asserts that he did not engage in culpable conduct that led to an entry of
default and "was not aware of the Documents being served." Mot. to Set Aside, at 3. Instead,
Antonio Sablan alleges that the service of the Summons and Complaint was upon Frank
Anderson, who is "an air conditioner repai1man" that "does not reside" at Antonio Sablan's
residence. Id. at 2; Deel. of Antonio Sablan (July 8, 2022). Antonio Sablan further claims that
Frank Anderson "received the Documents without my knowledge and did not give me of [sic]
the Documents." Deel. of Antonio Sablan (July 8, 2022); Motion to Set Aside, at 2.
In the Opposition, Kim & Euh state that "it is striking that Defendant fails to offer any
explanation why he ignored the Complaint following service .... " Opp'n, at 4 (Aug. 5, 2022).
Kim & Euh claim that "Defendant failed to file any affidavit or declaration proffering any good
faith credible excuse for not responding to the Complaint in a timely manner." Id. Due to this
alleged failure, Kim & Euh argue that the Court should "take Defendant's omission as a
concession that culpable conduct was present." Id. Further, "Kim and Euh suggest that defendant
Antonio's behavior is consistent with an improper attempt to retain possession of the soil and
material from Kim and Euh's real property" and "Defendant's bad faith in this regard constitutes
culpable conduct." Id. at 5.
In the Reply, Antonio Sablan claims that Kim & Euh's argument regarding the failure to
file any affidavit or declaration to be "misleading." Reply, at 2. Antonio Sablan claims that it
"clearly states in his Declaration that he was not personally served with the Summons and
4 C C DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CVOJ 88-22; Hyung Gan Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
Complaint." Id. at 2. Antonio Sablan argues that Kim & Euh 's "failure to serve Antonio in
conformance with the [GRCP] facilitated the entry of default." Id. Thus, Antonio Sablan argues
that "it was Plainiffs' conduct that led to the entry of default" and that good cause exists to set
aside entry of default. Id.
At the hearing, Kim & Euh's counsel admitted that "[p]erhaps we were not clear in our
opposition" and clarified that "[ o]ur concern with the declaration of Mr. Sablan goes to the
second prong of the three part test ... the lack of a meritorious defense." Min Entry, I 0:09:50-
10:10:03 AM (Jan. 20, 2023). When asked directly by the Court about whether anything else
could be regarded as culpable behavior, Kim & Euh's counsel noted that it "took quite an effort
to effect service" upon Antonio Sablan. Id. at 10: 11 :30 AM. In response, Antonio Sablan's
counsel argued that the alleged personal service was not proper and that they left it with a person
who "did not give [the documents] to [Antonio Sablan]" Id. at 10:12:30-10:12:44 AM. Antonio
Sablan's counsel. claimed that "the biggest reason for the entry of default was the improper
service" by Kim & Euh. Id. at 10:12:50-10:12:55 AM.
a. Antonio Sablan's Conduct Was Not Culpable for the Entry of Default
With regard to culpable conduct, "a defendant's conduct is culpable if he has received
actnal or constructive notice of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer." Mesle,
615 F.3d at 1092 (citing TC! Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2001))
"[I]n this context the tem1 'intentionally' means that a movant cannot be treated as culpable
simply for having made a conscious choice not to answer; rather, to treat a failure to answer as
culpable, the movant must have acted with bad faith, such as an 'intention to take advantage of
5 r r DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CV0188-22; Hyung Gon Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
the opposing party, interfere with judicial decisionmaking, or otherwise manipulate the legal
process."' Id.
In this case, Kim & Euh have failed to demonstrate that Antonio Sablan was personally
served the documents. Although Kim & Euh filed a Declaration of Service for Antonio Sablan, it
states the person served was Frank Anderson, the "Authorized Agent for Service of Process of
Antonio A. Sablan." See Deel. of Service for Antonio Sablan (April 18, 2022). However,
Antonio Sablan refutes this Declaration and claims that Frank Anderson was an air conditioner
repainnan who was not authorized to receive the documents for him and "did not give" the
Summons or Complaint to him. Id.
Despite having multiple opportunities to respond to Antonio Sablan's claim that it was
improper service, Kim & Euh did not clarify how service on Frank Anderson, an alleged air
conditioner repairman, properly effectuated personal service upon Antonio Sablan. See Deel. of
Antonio Sablan (July 8, 2022); Reply, at 2; Deel. of Service for Antonio Sablan (April 18, 2022).
In their Opposition, Kim & Euh state that Antonio Sablan never filed a declaration or affidavit
refuting this service but when asked to clarify this position at the hearing, Kim & Euh's counsel
did not give a clear response but admitted that their concern was not towards the lack of a
declaration, but rather lack of a meritorious defense in Antonio Sablan's filings. Min Entry (Jan.
20, 2023); see Opp'n 3-5; Deel. of Antonio Sablan (July 8, 2022).
Based upon the evidence provided, the Court is not persuaded that Kim & Euh
effectuated proper service upon Antonio Sablan or thatAntonio Sablan had actual or constructive
notice. See Pineda v. Pineda, 2005 Guam 10 ,r IO ("It is well settled that when a default
judgment is entered without proper service, such default is void."). Thus, while the Court
6 r DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CV0188-22; Hyung Gon Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
recognizes that Antonio Sablan did not timely answer the Complaint, the Court does not find that
it was due to his culpable conduct.
2. Antonio Sablan Claims To Have Meritorious Defenses
Antonio Sablan claims that he has a meritorious defense against the trespass claim and
unjust enrichment claim. In order to establish a meritorious defense, the Court "must determine
'whether there is some possibility that the outcome of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to
the result achieved by the default."' Midsea, 1998 Guam 14 ,i 10 (citing Hawaii Carpenters'
Trust Funds, 794 F.2d at 513) (emphasis added). The burden on the defendant "is not
extraordinarily heavy; the only requirement is that a sufficient defense is asse1iible and litigation
of the claims would not be a wholly empty exercise." Pac. Renewable Energy, 2013 WL
1352063 *6 (citing TC! Group, 244 F.3d at 701) (internal quotations omitted). All that is
necessary is for the moving party to "allege sufficient facts that, if trne, would constitute a
defense." Mes le, 615 F.3d at 1094; see also Upper Deck Co. v. Flores, 569 F. Supp. 3d 1050,
1059 (S.D. Cal. 2021) ("Defendants have a 'minimal' burden in establishing a meritorious
defense."). The Court need not consider the trnth of those factual allegations and assumes their
truth at this stage. Upper Deck Co., 569 F. Supp. 3d at 1059; see Schwab v. Bullocks, Inc., 508
F.2d 353, 374 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that "[a]llegations are meritorious if they contain even a
hint ofa suggestion, which, if proven at trial, would constitute a defense.").
With regard to his meritorious defenses, Antonio Sablan claims that he "is prepared to
provide evidence to the Court that Antonio did not trespass onto the property and that if a
trespass did occur, it was Paul Sablan that committed the trespass." Mot. to Set Aside, at 4.
7 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CVOJ88-22; Hyung Gon Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
Antonio Sablan also argues that "it is also unclear how Antonio was enriched and Antonio will
put on evidence concerning the value of the property." Id.
In their Opposition, Kim & Euh argue that "Antonio fails to cite to any specific facts in
his declaration to support any purported defenses" and "merely offers up conclusory claims ...
." Opp'n at 6. Further, Kim & Euh allege that Antonio Sablan's "suggestion that he did not
personally enter onto Kim and Euh's real property is no defense to a trespass claim" and Antonio
Sablan's claim that it is unclear how the soil was placed on his property "is inadequate to fonn a
meritorious defense" to the unjust enrichment claim. Id. at 5-7.
In his Reply, Antonio Sablan contended that"[e]valuating the likelihood of the success of
the defense is not the standard" to set aside an entry of default. Reply, at 2. Instead, Antonio
reasserts his points that he did not trespass and that "he did not receive a benefit at the expense of
Plaintiffs," which is a "necessary" element to an unjust enrichment claim. Id. At the hearing,
Antonio Sablan's counsel further elaborated on the defense to the unjust enrichment claim and
asserted that "maybe there was not a benefit conferred onto my client." Min Entry, 10:14:50 AM
(Jan. 20, 2023). Counsel further stated that Antonio Sablan planned to complete an "evaluation"
regarding the soil on his property to refute this unjust enrichment claim. Id. at 10: 14:54 AM.
a. Antonio Sablan Provides a Meritorious Defense Against the Trespass Claim
In Guam, "[a] party claiming trespass must prove the following elements: a) the
tortfeasor intentionally; b) enters land in possession of another, or causes a thing or a third person
to do so; or c) remains on the land; or d) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under
a duty to remove." Guerrero v. DLB Const. Co., 1999 Guam 9 "ii 16 (citing Restatement (Second)
Torts § 158 (1988)).
8 r r DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CV0188-22; Hyung Gan Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
In this case, Antonio Sablan is attempting to prove a negative-that he was not involved
in the trespassing and if anyone was, it was Paul Sablan. While Kim & Euh argue that Antonio
Sablan's claims are not "necessarily" a defense to trespassing, Antonio Sablan has provided
sufficient facts, assuming his claims are true, that he was not involved in the alleged trespassing.
See Mot. to Set Aside, at 4; Upper Deck Co., 569 F. Supp. 3d at 1059. Based upon these claims
that he did not trespass and that if there was a trespasser, it was Paul Sablan, there is a possibility
that the outcome of the matter would be different if it was brought to trial. See Midsea, 1998
Guam 14 ,r 10. Thus, the Court finds that Antonio Sablan has provided enough infonnation to
meet the minimal burden of presenting a meritorious defense to the trespass claim.
b. Antonio Sablan Provides a Meritorious Defense for the Unjust Enrichment Claim
In Guam, "in determining whether a person has been unjustly enriched, one examines
whether there was: (I) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an appreciation or
knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of
the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the
benefit without payment of its value." In re Moylan, 20 II Guam 16 ,r 69 (citing Rawlings v.
Rawlings, 240 P.3d 754, 763 (Utah 2010)).
Antonio Sablan claims that it is unclear how he was enriched and that it is possible that
Paul Sablan put the soil on his property. Mot. to Set Aside, at 4. He further argues that he did not
receive a benefit from the soil being put on his property. Id.; see Min Entry, at I 0: 14:50-10: 14:54
AM (Jan. 20, 2023). Although Antonio Sablan's claim of not intentionally receiving the soil is
not a meritorious defense to unjust enrichment, Antonio Sablan's claim that the soil might not be
an actual benefit received is a possible meritorious defense. Assuming it is true, the claim that
9 r r DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CV0188-22; Hyung Gon Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
the soil is not a benefit could be a meritorious defense. Antonio Sablan further claims that he is
seeking an evaluation to determine the value of the soil on his property to prove this claim. These
claims raise the possibility that no benefit was conferred on Antonio Sablan by another, which
lends itself to affecting the determination of whether a benefit was conferred and therefore,
whether Antonio Sablan was unjustly enriched.
Therefore, without making a final determination on this issue or analyzing the other
elements of the cause of action, the Court finds that Antonio Sablan has presented sufficient facts
for a meritorious defense against unjust enrichment if the Court sets aside the entry of default.
3. Kim & Euh Will Not Be Prejudiced By Setting Aside the Entry of Default
To determine whether setting aside a default is prejudicial to the plaintiff, "the standard is
whether [plaintiff's] ability to pursue his claim will be hindered." Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461,
463 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). A plaintiff cannot simply "say that lapse of time resulted in
prejudice, but instead there must be the presentation of evidence to support those allegations."
Midsea, 1998 Guam 14 ,r 16. Similarly, the Defendant may not just "sit back and claim that the
delay in time was inconsequential and presume no prejudice resulted." Id. For a delay to be
prejudicial, the delay must "result in tangible hann such as loss of evidence, increased
difficulties of discovery, or greater opportunity for fraud or collusion .... Being forced to
litigate on the merits cannot be considered prejudicial because the plaintiff would have had to
litigate the merits of the case had there been no default." Pac. Renewable Energy, 2013 WL
1352063 *6 (D. Guam 2013) (citing TC! Group, 244 F.3d at 701) (internal citation omitted); see
also Capital Yacht Club v. Vessel AVIVA, 228 F.R.D. 389, 394 (D. D.C. 2005) ("[D]elay and legal
10 r DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CV0188-22; Hyung Gon Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
costs are part and parcel of litigation and typically do not constitute prejudice for the purposes of
Rule 55(c).").
Antonio Sablan claims that Kim & Euh will not be prejudiced if the entry of default is set
aside because "[a]ll relevant evidence and witness that were present and available at the time
default was entered in this matter remain present and are still attainable without any undue
burden." Mot. to Set Aside, at 4. In the Opposition, Kim & Euh claim that "Antonio's antics ...
have prejudiced Kim and Euh in that Antonio continues to remain in possession of the soil and
materials from their real property in question." Opp'n at 7. In the Reply, Antonio Sablan
reiterated the claim that Kim & Euh "have not alleged any loss of evidence ... have not alleged
any increase of difficulties of discovery, nor have Plaintiffs alleged the reasonable possibility that
fraud or collision may occur should the Motion be granted." Reply, at 3.
At the hearing, Kim & Euh's counsel emphasized that prejudice is "ongoing" due to the
soil removal and placement on Antonio Sablan's property, which has continually prevented the
Plaintiffs from using it and left them unable to restore their lot to its former condition. Min Entry,
10:19:20 AM (Jan. 20, 2023). In response to this claim, Antonio Sablan's counsel argued that
this inconvenience does not make setting aside the entry of default prejudicial because "all
evidence is there" and "quite frankly, the delay in time is not enough prejudice to uphold the
entry of default." Id. at 10: 19:45-20:00 AM.
The Court is not persuaded by Kim & Euh's claim of prejudice. Kim & Euh have not
presented any evidence-aside from the expense of the soil being removed from their property
and Kim & Euh's inability to restore their lot to its former condition- that their case would be
hindered due to this delay in the proceedings. The Court does not find that the delay in the
11 r DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CVOl 88-22; Hyung Gan Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
proceedings or the soil remaining on Antonio Sablan's property to be sufficient evidence
necessary to prevent setting aside the entry of default due to prejudice.
4. The Court Will Not Grant Plaintiffs' Request for Legal Fees
Kim & Euh claim that "Antonio's antics" have caused prejudice and harm in this matter.
Opp'n at 7. Due to this prejudice, Kim & Euh claim that "if Court is inclined to grant the Motion,
it should condition such grant on the payment by Defendant of Kim and Euh's legal fees within
twenty-one (21) days .... " Opp'n at 8. Kim & Euh allege that "federal courts have routinely
ordered that the defendant pay plaintiff's legal fees incurred in opposing a motion to set aside
entry of default as a condition of granting such motion." Id. at 7-8.
To support this claim for attorney's fees, Kim & Euh first cite to Nilsson, Robbins,
Dalszam, Berliner Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydroiec., 854 F.2d 1538, 1546-47 (9th Cir.
1988). Kim & Euh claim in this case that "the court held that the trial court properly conditioned
the grant of a motion to set aside a default upon defendant paying plaintiff's legal fees incurred
as a result of that motion." Opp'n at 8.
However, this case is distinguishable from the present matter. First, in Nilsson, the matter
involved setting aside an entry of default judgment, not an entry of default like in the present
matter. Nilsson, 854 F.2d. at 1541. Furthennore, in Nilsson, the Court denied the defendant's first
motion to vacate the default due to the defendants' "failure to comply with local rules requiring
sworn evidence of a meritorious defense." Id. On their "resubmission of the motion," the Court
then granted the motion to vacate the default judgment with conditions to pay attorney's fees and
costs and for defendants to fully obey discovery requests and federal and local rules. Id. Thus,
unlike Nilsson, in this matter, the Defendant has only filed one motion to vacate an entry of
12 r r DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CVOJ 88-22; Hyung Gan Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
default, and has not shown the same disregard to the local rules or having to resubmit the
Motion.
The other cases cited by Kim & Euh are also distinguishable from the present matter.
Gustafson v. Bowman, 2018 WL 2422311 (D. Alaska May 28, 2018) (granting attorney's fees to
plaintiff after court found that "the parties are equally responsible for the circumstances which
led to the motion to set aside the default"); Villagordoa Bernal v. Rodriguez, 2016 WL 4267942
at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (finding that the motion to vacate the entry of default should be granted
but attorney's fees should be awarded to the plaintiff "due to defendants' culpable conduct in
repeatedly failing timely to file their respective Answers in this action"); USAA Life Ins. Co. v.
Poolat, et al, 2008 WL 11340057 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2008) (awarding attorney's fees to
cross-complainant Poolat to "rectify 'any prejudice suffered by [Poolat] as a result of the default
and the subsequent reopening of the litigation" after the cross-defendant West refused to accept
Poolat's stipulated offer to vacate the entry of default); Stelax Indus., Ltd. v. Donahue, 2004 WL
733844 at *10 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (awarding attorney's fees after defendant moved the case to
federal court with consent of co-defendants and then failed to respond, resulting in entry of
default); Corso v. First Frontier Holdings, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 420, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting
attorney's fees to plaintiff after granting motion to vacate entries of defaults because "defaults
were, nevertheless, due to [defendants'] inattentiveness to the present action.").
Based upon the cases and arguments presented so far, the Court does not find that the
present situation merits granting attorney's fees to the Plaintiffs, and therefore, the Court denies
the Plaintiffs request.
13 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTONIO SABLAN's MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT CV0188-22; Hyung Gan Kim and Sol Young Euh v. Antonio A. Sablan and Paul Sablan
5. Kim & Euh's Request for Entry of Judgment Is Moot
Kim & Euh also filed a Request for Entry of Judgment (the "Request") on November 22,
2022, seeking "Judgment be entered in favor of them .... " Request for Entry of Judgement, at 1
(Nov. 22, 2022). Kim & Euh state that this request is "based on the default of the Defendants
having been previously entered and upon the accompanying declaration of Terry Hyunggon
Kim." Id.
As stated above, the Court finds that the grounds have been met to grant Antonio
Sablan's Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default. Therefore, the Entry of Default that Kim & Euh
refer to in their Request shall be vacated, and thus, the Court finds that the Request is now moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant Antonio Sablan's
Motion to Set Aside. The Court's May 27, 2022 Entry of Default is hereby VACATED. Kim &
Euh's Request for Entry of Judgment is MOOT. Antonio Sablan must file an Answer to the
Complaint within fifteen ( 15) days from the filing of this Decision and Order.
SO ORDERED, _ _A_P_R_2_0_202_3_ _
HO Jud
51:RVICIE VIA E-MA!L 1 acknowledge that an electronic C.£Pl of the original was e-mailed to: ·/YI. 7}fDr1/f?/i11J r??:)()n'l/Jb ~ate: Time:~/za JoseRh Bamba, Jr. Deputy Clerk, Superior Court of Guam 14