Kim C. Kerrigan v. VRMTG ASSET TRUST et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 29, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00087
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 KIM C. KERRIGAN, CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00087-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 MOTION FOR TEMPORARY v. RESTRAINING ORDER 10 VRMTG ASSET TRUST et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Kim C. Kerrigan’s motion for 15 temporary restraining order. Dkt. No. 3. Kerrigan asks the Court to enjoin 16 Defendants from pursuing the nonjudicial foreclosure of her residence on January 17 30, 2026. The Court DENIES the motion for the reasons below. 18 2. BACKGROUND 19 As Kerrigan has litigated the foreclosure of her home, in state, federal, and 20 bankruptcy court since 2016, the Court summarizes only the more recent relevant 21 history below. 22 23 1 In May 2019, Kerrigan filed for bankruptcy and received a bankruptcy 2 discharge. Kerrigan v. James et al., Bankr. Pet. 19-bk-11828, Dkt. Nos. 1, 30.

3 Bayview Loan Servicing—the previous holder of the deed of trust for Kerrigan’s 4 residence—requested relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay so that it could 5 foreclose on the deed. Kerrigan, Bankr. Pet. 19-bk-11828, Dkt. No. 33. United States 6 Bankruptcy Judge Timothy W. Dore granted the motion, holding in relevant part: 7 “Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC is granted relief from the automatic stay under 11 8 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to enforce all of its rights in the [described] real property[.]”

9 Kerrigan, Bankr. Pet. 19-bk-11828, Dkt. No. 42 at 2. 10 Evidence shows that in 2022, Bayview Loan Servicing (under its new name 11 Community Loan Servicing, LLC) assigned the deed of trust to Nationstar Mortgage 12 LLC. Dkt. No. 10-8 at 2.1 Then, in January 2024, Nationstar assigned the deed of 13 trust to US Bank National Association in its capacity as owner trustee for VRMTG 14 Asset Trust. Dkt. No. 10-9 at 2–3. Defendants explain that NewRez LLC is 15 currently servicing the loan for US Bank in its capacity as trustee for the VRMTG

16 Asset Trust. Dkt. No. 9 at 3. The nonjudicial foreclosure of Kerrigan’s residence is 17 scheduled for January 30, 2026. 18 19 20

21 1 Defendants ask the Court to judicially notice the exhibits filed at Dkt. Nos. 10-1– 10-9. See Dkt. No. 10. On January 28, 2026, Kerrigan responded to the request. Dkt. 22 No. 11. The Court considers these documents on Kerrigan’s motion for temporary restraining order, but it will not decide whether to judicially notice the facts 23 contained therein before Defendants have an opportunity to reply. 1 3. DISCUSSION 2 3.1 Legal standard. Preliminary injunctive relief exists to preserve the status quo and the rights 3 of the parties during the litigation, before a final judgment. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. 4 KBC Bank N. V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). “[I]njunctive relief [is] an 5 extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 6 plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 7 22 (2008). “The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a 8 party to demonstrate [1] ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is 9 likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the 10 balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 11 interest.’” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 12 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 13 The Ninth Circuit takes a “sliding-scale” approach to preliminary relief, 14 under which “serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that 15 tips sharply towards the plaintiffs can support issuance of [preliminary injunctive 16 relief], so long as the plaintiffs also show that there is a likelihood of irreparable 17 injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & 18 Customs Enf’t, 16 F.4th 613, 635 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). This approach allows 19 a stronger showing of one Winter factor to offset a weaker showing of another. 20 Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Hawaii, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky v. Labrador, 21 122 F.4th 825, 843–44 (9th Cir. 2024). 22 23 1 In all circumstances, the moving party must make “a showing on all four 2 prongs” under Winter to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. All. for the Wild

3 Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 4 3.2 Kerrigan fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits. 5 Kerrigan argues that the Court must enjoin the upcoming, nonjudicial 6 foreclosure sale of her residence because no court has authorized the sale. Dkt. No. 7 3 at 2–3. But “Washington State’s deed of trust act permits trustees to foreclose on 8 some . . . deeds of trust without judicial supervision.” Schroeder v. Excelsior Mgmt. 9 Grp., LLC, 297 P.3d 677, 682 (Wash. 2013) (en banc). And Kerrigan fails to explain 10 why she believes the law requires judicial supervision in this case. 11 Next, Kerrigan claims that Defendants have failed to comply with the notice 12 procedures set out in Washington’s deed of trust act, and thus foreclosure is 13 unlawful. See id. at 686 (Trustees conducting nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings 14 must comply with that statute and may not exceed the authority vested by it.). She 15 asserts that the Washington State Department of Financial Institutions determined 16 that “the Notice of Default issued by Nationstar Mortgage LLC on or about 17 September 29, 2023, [was] legally defective and insufficient to support foreclosure.” 18 Dkt. No. 3 at 3. But Kerrigan provides no evidence to support this assertion, nor 19 does she submit the purportedly defective notice. Moreover, she fails to explain 20 what features of the notice made it legally deficient. 21 Kerrigan has not met her burden to show that she is likely to succeed on the 22 merits. See Matsumoto v. Labrador, 122 F.4th 787, 804 (9th Cir. 2024) (“We have 23 1 long recognized that likelihood of success on the merits is the most important 9 factor|.]’). The Court recognizes that Kerrigan faces the potential loss of her home, a

3 harm that courts have recognized as irreparable. See Sundance Land Corp. v. Cmty. 4 First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 840 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir. 1988). But a TRO is

5 extraordinary relief, and it requires more than just irreparable harm; it requires at

G minimum “serious questions going to the merits.” All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d

7 at 1135. On this record, Kerrigan has not raised such questions. Due to this failure, 8 a temporary restraining order is inappropriate. See All. for the Wild Rockies, 632

9 F.3d at 1135 (moving party must make “a showing on all four prongs” under Winter

19 || to obtain relief.). 11 4, CONCLUSION

12 Accordingly, Kerrigan’s motion for temporary restraining order is DENIED.

13 Dkt. No. 3. Defendants’ reply in support of their request for judicial notice is due

14 February 6, 2026.

15 16 Dated this 29th day of January, 2026.

17 18 C = N. Whitehead United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23