Kight v. Claude

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

WYNONE STACEIE KIGHT, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

TRAVIS LEE CLAUDE, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0780 FC

FILED 09-16-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. FC2022-090350, FC2022-090659 The Honorable Quintin H. Cushner, Judge

DISMISSED

COUNSEL

The Omni Firm, Mesa By Maricela Moffitt-Brown Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Duenas Eden Cravatta, PLC, Phoenix By Dorian L. Eden Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

KIGHT v. CLAUDE Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Travis Claude (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s order granting Wynone Staceie Kight (“Mother”) sole legal decision-making and child support and establishing Father’s parenting time. Father seeks reversal of the legal decision-making order, recalculation of child support and additional parenting time. Because Mother’s death moots the issues raised, this Court dismisses Father’s appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father had two minor children in common (“Children”). In January 2022, Mother petitioned to establish paternity, legal decision-making, parenting time and child support. Her petition alleged Father committed domestic violence against her. She also alleged that Father abused drugs. On the same day, Mother moved for temporary orders regarding legal decision-making and parenting time. Father filed a duplicate petition about two weeks later. The superior court consolidated the cases.

¶3 After an evidentiary hearing, and without making specific findings, the court issued temporary orders granting Mother sole legal decision-making and implementing a parenting plan. Father tested positive for drugs, and Mother moved for reconsideration of the temporary orders a month later. The court granted Mother’s motion for reconsideration and amended the parenting plan, which still allowed Father parenting time.

¶4 Three separate times over the course of the next two years, Father asked the court to find Mother in contempt for failing to follow the temporary orders. He argued that Mother would not allow him to exercise his parenting time. He also filed an expedited motion for unsupervised parenting time. Mother responded. Father also responded to Mother’s petition to establish paternity, legal decision-making and parenting time, suggesting equal parenting time and decision-making but seeking final decision-making authority on all decisions.

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KIGHT v. CLAUDE Decision of the Court

¶5 The superior court held a one-day consolidated trial to resolve Mother’s initial petition and Father’s three contempt petitions. Both parties presented witness testimony and evidence. After the hearing, the court awarded Mother sole legal decision-making, awarded Father unsupervised parenting time, ordered Father to pay Mother $992 per month in child support and found Mother in contempt. Because the court found Father engaged in a significant history of domestic violence, it determined he could not have sole or joint legal decision-making. Father timely appealed.

¶6 After Father appealed, Mother died. Mother’s adult daughter, Kyleie Kight (“Daughter”), filed a Motion to Substitute Party asserting her authority as the personal representative of Mother’s estate. This Court ordered supplemental briefing to address the effect of Mother’s death on this appeal.

¶7 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12- 120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Mother’s death mooted Father’s appeal.

¶8 Mother’s death prompts this Court to address a threshold question—whether this Court should dismiss Father’s appeal as moot? Father’s appeal questions whether the evidence of domestic violence and substance abuse was sufficient to award Mother sole legal-decision making authority. Because Mother died, Father’s status in this case is of the only surviving legal parent. See Woodford v. Superior Ct., 82 Ariz. 181, 184 (1957) (explaining the “well-settled proposition” that upon the death of a parent who holds legal custody, the right of legal custody automatically passes to the surviving parent). Father asserts that “[a]s the sole surviving parent, all parenting time and legal decision-making rights flow to Father, absent further court orders to the contrary.”

¶9 A case is moot when a court’s action “will have no effect on the parties.” Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 616–17, ¶ 5 (App. 2012) (citing Bank of New York Mellon v. De Meo, 227 Ariz. 192, 193–94, ¶ 8 (App. 2011)). Mootness is not derived from the Arizona Constitution, “but is a matter of prudential or judicial restraint” subject to this Court’s discretion. Id. at 617, ¶ 5. This Court has considered issues that have become moot when they present (1) an issue of “great public importance,” id. at 617, ¶¶ 5–6; (2) “capable of repetition yet evading review,” id. at 617, ¶¶ 5, 7; or (3) would result in collateral consequences, id. at 617–18, ¶ 9. None of these exceptions apply to Father’s appeal.

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KIGHT v. CLAUDE Decision of the Court

¶10 An issue is of “great public importance” when it will impact the public broadly “beyond resolution of the specific case.” Cardoso, 230 Ariz. at 617, ¶ 6. Here, Father’s appeal is not a matter of broad public importance but rather a custody dispute that involves facts specific to his case. See id. (rejecting application of the public-importance exception where the asserted constitutional and statutory claims arose from the particular facts of appellant’s case).

¶11 Similarly, Father’s appeal is not “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Cardoso, 230 Ariz. at 617, ¶ 7. Because Mother died while this appeal was pending, Father is now the sole living parent and the custody issues presented between Mother and Father no longer exist.

¶12 Lastly, the “collateral consequences” exception applies when a decision on an otherwise moot issue “continue[s] to affect a party.” Cardoso, 230 Ariz. at 617, ¶ 9. For instance, a domestic violence conviction may result in collateral consequences such as a ban on possessing firearms and the offender’s ability to secure legal decision-making authority and parenting time in a dissolution proceeding. Fuentes v. Cranshaw, 256 Ariz. 502, 506, ¶¶ 13–14 (App. 2023). Or a parent’s death may result in collateral consequences related to spousal maintenance and child support if the deceased parent was obligated to provide such payment. See A.R.S. § 25- 327(C).

¶13 Here the superior court found Father engaged in significant domestic violence, and at first glance that determination could result in collateral consequences. See Fuentes, 256 Ariz. at 506, ¶¶ 13–14. But Father does not argue the court’s findings result in any collateral consequences. Thus, the collateral consequences exception is inapplicable.

¶14 And while this Court has held that an issue is not moot if it affects a child’s best interests, In re G.L., 259 Ariz. 463, 465, ¶ 14 (App. 2025), the question Father presents is not related to termination of parental rights. In G.L., this Court considered whether a father’s death, whose parental rights were terminated before he died, mooted his appeal. See 259 Ariz. at 464, ¶¶ 4–5. This Court held that Father’s termination appeal was not moot because the court’s order terminating his rights could affect a child’s property interests and thus alter the best interests analysis. Id. at 465, ¶ 13.

¶15 But the facts of this case are distinguishable from In re G.L. Here, Father’s parental rights remain intact. The law presumes Father a fit parent able to exercise his rights absent a court finding otherwise. In re Marriage of Friedman and Roels, 244 Ariz. 111, 119, ¶ 33 (2018). And findings

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KIGHT v. CLAUDE Decision of the Court

related to child custody matters only consider the best interests of a child between two parents considering statutory presumptions, not whether one of those parents is unfit. See Morales v. Glenn, 114 Ariz. 327, 329–30 (1977). Here, the superior court granted Father unsupervised parenting time and there is no reason to suggest on this record that Father is unfit.1 Thus, since no mootness exception applies, this Court dismisses Father’s appeal.

II. Daughter’s motion to substitute is denied as moot.

¶16 Following Mother’s death, Daughter, as Mother’s personal representative, submitted a supplemental brief asserting she has standing “to stand in loco parentis” of the minor children at issue in this appeal under A.R.S. § 25-409(A). Because this Court dismisses Father’s appeal as moot, Daughter’s motion is also moot and therefore denied.

III. Attorneys’ fees.

¶17 Both parties request attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25- 324. Under that statute, this Court may award attorneys’ fees “after considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” A.R.S. § 25-324(A). After considering these factors, this Court declines to award either party attorneys’ fees.

CONCLUSION

¶18 This appeal is dismissed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR

1 Since Father filed his appeal, the superior court considered Daughter’s

request to intervene for the purpose of obtaining legal decision-making and maintaining the children’s living arrangements with her. This Court takes judicial notice of the trial court’s record in that case where the superior court awarded Father legal decision-making and he agreed to have the children remain in Daughter’s home. See In re the Matter of Kight v. Claude, FC2022- 090350, Minute Entry at 6 (Maricopa County Superior Court, June 12, 2026).