2019 IL App (2d) 180601-U No. 2-18-0601 Order filed October 22, 2019
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
J. LAURENCE KIENLEN, P.C., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Du Page County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 17-AR-447 ) JOHN GOLEGOS, MICHELE GOLEGOS, ) and GOLREN ENTERPRISES, INC., ) Honorable ) Robert W. Rohm, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Jorgenson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The manifest weight of the evidence supports the trial court’s judgment in all respects except its findings that Kienlen performed estate planning services in violation of the Fraudulent Transfer Act (Act) and that the parties had no agreement for estate planning services. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not including costs of deposition transcripts in the judgment. Affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.
¶2 Plaintiff, J. Laurence Kienlen, P.C., sued its former clients, defendants, John and Michele
Golegos, and Golren Enterprises, Inc., for the recovery of attorney fees billed by plaintiff from two
invoices dated October 14, 2016, and October 26, 2016. The trial court ruled that none of the fees
were owed from the October 26 invoice, as there was no agreement between the parties. As to the 2019 IL App (2d) 180601-U
October 14 invoice, the court reduced the balance amount of $33,673 by adopting defendants’
summary of objections, and it granted judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $18,419.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s judgment concerning the amount of attorney fees owed to it by
defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause with directions.
¶3 I. FACTS
¶4 Plaintiff filed a four-count complaint. Count I alleges breach of contract against
defendants for attorney fees and expenses of $33,673, and count III alleges breach of contract
against Michele for attorney fees and expenses of $3862. Counts II and IV alleged account stated,
but plaintiff’s appeal rests only on the breach of contract counts.
¶5 All 12 of plaintiff’s exhibits, including plaintiff’s two invoices were entered into evidence
by agreement of the parties. The court heard the following evidence at trial.
¶6 A. October 14, 2016, Invoice
¶7 John and Michele are the shareholders of Golren, which operates the Corfu Restaurant in
St. Charles, Illinois. George Alimisis was a shareholder. Defendants and George (who is no
longer involved in the matter as he was later discharged in bankruptcy) were sued in federal court
by some of their former employees in 2012 (the Maldonado lawsuit). The Maldonado suit
alleged various violations of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law and the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act. Defendants were represented by George Bellas and William Boznos of the law
firm of Bellas & Wachowski (B & W). The plaintiffs in the Maldonado suit were represented
by attorney John Ireland.
¶8 On November 4, 2014, Michele contacted Kienlen, stating that she and defendants
terminated B & W because the firm had entered into a settlement agreement that she and the
other defendants had not authorized. They wanted to retain the services of plaintiff to vacate
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the settlement that they had not authorized. The matter had been settled in the amount of
$66,000 for the federal plaintiffs, but the issue of Ireland’s fees had been continued for further
determination. It was subsequently determined that he was requesting fees of $276,000.
¶9 During his initial conversation with Michele, Kienlen reviewed the federal court’s docket
via the internet, advised Michele that almost 200 documents had been filed in the case, discussed
that Ireland had obtained leave of court to file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, and
discussed that Kienlen would bring in additional legal representation of James H. Wolf (JHW)
and James M. Wolf (JMW), and discussed that the attorneys’ hourly rates were $300, which
would begin immediately. According to Kienlen’s testimony, Michele agreed to everything
discussed during the conversation.
¶ 10 A meeting was scheduled for November 6, 2014, which was attended by Kienlen, JMW,
Michele, and John. They talked about the Maldonado suit and the anticipated course of action,
including the substitution of Kienlen, JHW, and JMW for B & W. They also talked about the
fact that B & W had billed defendants about $84,000 to represent them, that another invoice was
pending for fees in the additional amount of $86,317, and that they feared Ireland would be
claiming fees far in excess of the fees billed by B & W.
¶ 11 On November 7, 2014, John, Michele, Golren, and George executed an engagement letter,
retaining plaintiff’s legal services, as well as the legal services of JHW and JMW. The letter
stated in relevant part:
“We have agreed that we will be representing you in all matters pertaining to your
disputes with attorneys George S. Bellas, William P. Boznos and/or their firm, [B & W]
with regard to their representation of you concerning the [Maldonado] ‘lawsuit’ filed ***
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against you in the United State District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, *** as
well as representing you, going forward, in all matters pertaining to said lawsuit.
As you know from our initial conversations, I will be working with lawyers from a
law firm located in Chicago, Wolf & Tennant. The lawyers are [JMW], whom you met
yesterday, and his father, [JHW]. We will charge you for our fees on an hourly basis by
the actual time expended by us. Our current rates are $300.00 per hour. In any event, we
will endeavor to provide you with cost effective representation.
***
We will send you periodic statements for services rendered and you agree to pay
the amount due immediately upon receipt. If you have any questions about a statement,
please call them to our attention promptly, but in no event no later than 30 days after you
receive the statement. Your statement will reflect day, task, and time of attorney.”
¶ 12 On December 12, 2014, defendants executed a written settlement authorization to settle
the Maldonado suit for $132,000.
¶ 13 The October 14, 2016, invoice submitted into evidence stated that from November 4, 2014,
to October 13, 2016, plaintiff provided 144.50 hours of legal services and incurred $323 of
expenses. After crediting defendants for all money plaintiff had received, the invoice totaled
$33,673 for legal services.
¶ 14 As defendants questioned a majority of the charges on plaintiff’s October 14 invoice, their
counsel cross-examined Kienlen regarding the reasonableness of many of the charges. Counsel
questioned Kienlen as to the amount of time it took to review certain documents. Counsel also
questioned him regarding whether Kienlen had inflated some of the charges by double billing for
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such items as phone calls between Kienlen and JMW or JHW, or whether it was “cost effective”
for such things as Kienlen’s review of work already prepared by JMW or JHW.
¶ 15 Defense counsel questioned Michele regarding the October 14 invoice. Michele clarified
that she did not understand that she would be paying $900 an hour for all of the attorneys working
on the case and that she never saw any one of the bills through the course of two years of working
on the matter, and therefore, she was never able to review what work was completed to support the
fees.
¶ 16 Another item questioned by defense counsel concerned the purpose for plaintiff’s charges
for estate planning. Those charges ranged from August 15, 2016, to October 13, 2016.
Kienlen testified that he had a conversation with Michele in which she told him that, “if
somebody got a judgment against John,” it was possible that they could go after assets. Kienlen
explained that the Maldonado suit had already been settled, but defendants were aware that other
employees could file similar lawsuits, although nothing had been filed or was pending yet.
Kienlen stated: “So it was kind of an attempt to protect the assets.” The home was already in
a land trust, but Kienlen changed the beneficial interest of the land trust and transferred
restaurant property John owned in Elgin into the trust, removed John as the beneficiary, and
made Michele the sole beneficiary.
¶ 17 B. October 26, 2016, Invoice
¶ 18 In July 2016, Kienlen stated that he received an email from Ireland that he had another
client, Irene Baykan, another of defendants’ former employees, who was prepared to file suit
against defendants with charges similar to the Maldonado suit. Kienlen met with Michele and
George and prepared an engagement letter. Kienlen testified that Michele wanted representation
no matter what, regardless of what John wanted. But John did not want to be represented.
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Kienlen explained to Michele that his fees had increased to $350 per hour. He stated that Michele
agreed to pay him for legal services rendered with regard to the matter at the rate of $350 per hour.
Kienlen drafted an agreement in September, 2016, and presented it to Michele, but she never
signed it. Although no agreement was signed, counsel for defendants pointed out that the October
26, 2016, invoice submitted by Kienlen, charged defendants from July 20, 2016, to October 18,
2016, for 16.75 hours of legal services for a total of $3,862.
¶ 19 Michele testified that John wanted to represent himself in the Baykan matter. Michele
stated that Kienlen did give her a new engagement letter to sign regarding the Baykan matter, but
she did not sign it. She remembered meeting Kienlen in his car, that he wanted her to sign it, but
she did not have the money to go forward with the Baykan matter. At that time, she did not know
how much she owed on the October 14 bill, she had already paid an “excruciatingly large amount
of money” in the other case, and she was not sure what she was going to do, although she knew she
wanted representation regarding the Baykan matter. Michele just was not “sure if it was going to
be Larry.”
¶ 20 John testified, denying that a $2000 check he gave to plaintiff was payment toward the
Baykan matter. He stated that he wrote the check at Michele’s request to pay for the estate
planning that plaintiff had suggested. John also testified that he never had a conversation with
Kienlen about the conflict of interest the assignment of the beneficial interest in their house
presented to his interest in the property.
¶ 21 Kienlen testified in rebuttal. He stated that he did meet John at Michele’s suggestion.
Kienlen went to their restaurant and talked about the case, that John reviewed both bills and he had
no specific objection to either one. John told Kienlen that he would pay him $2000 a month
beginning in June. As far as Michele was concerned, Kienlen testified that she asked him to hold
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off on paying the bill because John was so upset about the settlement. Because she was so upset
about the settlement amount, Kienlen held off, but he stated that he should have billed her right
away. He “was trying to be nice.”
¶ 22 C. Trial Court’s Findings
¶ 23 At the conclusion of the trial, the judge stated:
“I didn’t require any pretrial memo or anything like that, but I really don’t—it’s
not really for the Court—absent an expert testifying as to the reasonableness and
customary charges for the community in which the services were rendered, it’s really not
up to me to go through there and impose my—you know, just pick them out of the air
because I might find things that are—what I believe are inappropriate that you might be
okay with.
So what I’d like you to do is I’d like you to go through both of those bills and tell
me why various entries are not reasonable and not customary. Okay?”
¶ 24 Defendants submitted a summary of objections to the trial court, detailing their objections
as to why they believed many of the charges were unreasonable and not customary. For the
October 14 bill, defendants asked it to be reduced by $15,960 for a total of $17,713. As to the
October 26 bill, defendants asked the court to deny the invoice of $3862 and relieve defendants
of responsibility for paying it. Plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ objections.
¶ 25 Following the submission of the posttrial objections, the trial court made the following
findings. The trial court first found that sending one bill (the October 14 invoice) two years
later was a breach of contract. The trial court next regarded the complexity of the federal court
case. The court understood that the underlying case was potentially complicated. However,
the court noted that the issue plaintiff was hired for, based on Kienlen’s own testimony, was to
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vacate a settlement with which defendants were unhappy. The court further noted that Kienlen
had testified that the prior lawyer who had entered into the agreement was prepared to say that he
did not have the authority to settle the federal matter. To the trial court, this made it a “very
easy procedure. You either—you either get the judge to believe it or you don’t. You put on
your witness, you put on the attorney, you put on your two clients and they say—your clients
say, I didn’t give my attorney authority to settle that, and you have the attorney saying, I
misunderstood.” The court stated further that it appreciated “an attorney being prepared, but,
frankly, given that you have the attorney that entered into the agreement a hundred percent on
board, which is not always the case, there was no need, no need whatsoever,” to do the work that
was done on this file. “Certainly no need to bring in three lawyers.”
¶ 26 With respect to the trust transaction, the court next appeared to have a problem with
plaintiff setting up a trust with the intent to avoid potential judgment creditors, which the court
questioned whether it was a violation of the Fraudulent Transfer Act. The court further found
that plaintiff “had no agreement to do that.”
¶ 27 The court ruled that there was no agreement for the October 26, 2016, bill and that
defendants would not be responsible for any of it. The court credited defendants the $2000
payment towards the October 14 bill.
¶ 28 The court then adopted “[e]ach and every suggestion” of defendants, “which means the
two of you (Kienlen and defendants’ counsel) have to go through that response, go through the
bill.” The court stated that it had “some questions on some of them,” because some of the math
was incorrect and some of it the court did not quite understand. So, the judge sent the attorneys
out to go through the summary of defendants’ suggestions to “figure out how much is owed
because I am adopting [defendants’] request.” The judge further stated that “if there’s a
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dispute, I’ll make the decision on which—number is accurate.” After inviting the attorneys to
step out into the anteroom to work it out, the judge stated, “I’ll be here all day, so if you can’t
that’s fine.” Thereafter, an order entered by the trial court granting judgment in favor of
plaintiff in the amount of $18,419.
¶ 29 Plaintiff timely appeals the trial court’s decision concerning the amount of attorney fees
owed to it by defendants.
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 A. Standard of Review
¶ 32 Unlike findings in a fee petition case, which rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge,
the reasonableness of attorney fees in a common law breach of contract action, like in this case,
presents a question to be resolved by the trier of fact, following a fair and impartial trial. Laff v.
Chapman Performance Products, Inc., 63 Ill. App. 3d 297, 308 (1978). In civil actions brought
by attorney-plaintiffs to recover compensation for professional services performed under an
alleged contract, the usual rules governing breach of contract actions apply because “[t]he
liability to pay for legal services stands upon the same footing as other agreements.” Wildman,
Harrold, Allen and Dixon v. Gaylord, 317 Ill. App. 3d 590, 597 (2000) (quoting Sokal v.
Mortimer, 81 Ill. App. 2d 55, 64 (1967)). However, a reviewing court is free to set aside an
oppressive verdict for attorney fees as it would “any other verdict which is contrary to the
‘manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” Slater v. Jacobs. 56 Ill. App. 3d 636, 643 (1977). In a
breach of contract action seeking attorney fees, it is not the province of this court to substitute its
judgment for that of a jury unless there is a patent error wherein the weight of the evidence
demands a contrary conclusion. Sokal, 81 Ill. App. 2d at 64.
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¶ 33 Whether a judgment is rendered after a bench trial with the judge sitting as the “trier of
fact” as opposed to a jury does not alter this standard of review. A trial judge’s conclusions on
factual issues are entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict. Johnson v. Abbott Laboratories,
Inc., 238 Ill. App. 3d 898, 905 (1992). Additionally, when a judge sits as the trier of fact in a
bench trial, the judge is presumed to have considered only competent evidence presented by the
parties at trial. Buckner v. Causey, 311 Ill. App. 3d 139, 145 (1999). A court’s consideration
of matters outside of the trial record is prejudicial error which can result in a reversal of its
judgment. Id.
¶ 34 In determining the reasonableness of attorney fees in a bench trial, the judge does not
exercise ‘broad discretionary powers.” Id. at 142. A trial judge cannot abuse his discretion by
determining that attorney fees are reasonable in a civil trial on the merits because “discretion has
nothing to do with the issue.” Id. Thus, as in any other civil breach of contract actions, the
sole question on review is whether the trial court’s judgment for attorney fees and costs was
against the “manifest weight of the evidence.” Wildman, Harrold, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 598.
¶ 35 In an action for attorney fees based on a breach of contract theory or quantum meruit
theory, the plaintiff-attorney’s prima facie case includes proof of the following: (1) the existence
of an attorney-client relationship, (2) the nature of the services rendered, (3) the amount of time
expended, and (4) the result, if any, obtained for the client. Greenbaum & Browne, Ltd. v.
Braun, 88 Ill. App. 3d 210, 213-14 (1980). A plaintiff-attorney must also furnish sufficient
facts and computations to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the services
rendered were necessary and that the amount of fees sought is fair, just, and reasonable. Laff,
63 Ill. App. 3d at 308 (plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to justify the hours spent and the
resulting fee).
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¶ 36 In a civil trial, the necessity of legal services performed and the reasonableness of the
amount charged are questions of fact. Wildman, Harrold, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 599. The trial
judge, sitting as the trier of fact, decides these issues based on the weight of the competent
evidence. Evidence sufficient to support a civil judgment for attorney fees may be comprised
solely of witness testimony. Id.
¶ 37 B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
¶ 38 Plaintiff presents several issues regarding whether the trial court’s judgment was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. A trial court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of
the evidence when its findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.
Wildman, Harrold, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 599. On appeal, the reviewing court must take questions
of testimonial credibility as resolved in favor of the prevailing party and must draw from the
evidence all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. Id. A reviewing court will not
reverse a trial court’s decision if different conclusions can be drawn from contradictory
testimony unless an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id.
¶ 39 We must give great deference to the trial court’s findings because the trial court, as the
trier of fact, is in a superior position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, to
judge their credibility and to determine the weight their testimony and other evidence should
receive. Buckner v. Causey, 311 Ill. App. 3d 139, 144 (1999). Where the determination of the
case depends largely upon the facts found in the record, the findings and judgment of the trial
court “will not be disturbed by the reviewing court, if there is any evidence in the record to
support such findings.” (Emphasis added.) Wildman, Harrold, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 599
(quoting Schioniger v. Cook County, 116 Ill. App. 3d 895, 899 (1983)). In order to warrant
reversal, “the appellant must present evidence that is so strong and convincing as to overcome,
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completely, the evidence and presumptions, if any, existing in the appellee’s favor.” Raclaw v.
Fay, Conmy & Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 764, 767 (1996). Moreover, this court may affirm the
judgment upon any ground warranted, regardless of whether it was relied on by the trial court
and regardless of whether the reasons given by the trial court are correct. Cronin v. McCarthy,
264 Ill. App. 3d 514, 523 (1994). Using these standards as our guide, we address plaintiff’s
manifest weight of the evidence arguments on appeal.
¶ 40 1. Trial Court’s Finding that Plaintiff was Hired to Perform an Easy Legal Matter
¶ 41 Plaintiff first contends that the trial court’s finding that it was hired to accomplish a
straight-forward and easy legal matter without the need of three lawyers was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Kienlen testified that “first and foremost” his firm was hired by
defendants to negate the settlement agreement that defendants’ previous attorney, Bellas, had
entered into on their behalf. Kienlen also acknowledged that “Bellas turned out to be a very
helpful witness.” While the judge recognized that such a task was “potentially complicated,” it
found that plaintiff’s services were made easier by the co-operation of defendants’ former
attorney. With the co-operation of defendants’ former attorney, plaintiff did not necessarily
need to engage in additional work to enforce the settlement. Even though the trial court
overstated the evidence when it said that Bellas was prepared to say that he exceeded his
authority, Kienlen nevertheless did testify that Bellas was a co-operative witness.
¶ 42 The trial court took issue with the need to have multiple attorneys involved in this
straight-forward case. Most of the reductions from the invoice related to the additional
attorneys working on the case. These findings do not appear to be against the manifest weight of
the evidence based on how the motion to enforce the settlement agreement played out in the
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federal case. Accordingly, there is evidence to support the trial court’s finding that plaintiff was
hired to accomplish a straight-forward legal matter without the need of three lawyers.
¶ 43 2. Trial Court’s Finding Precluding Fees for Estate Planning
¶ 44 Plaintiff next contends the trial court’s ruling that the Act precluded attorney fees for the
estate planning services rendered by plaintiff was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court made unreasonable and arbitrary conclusions from Kienlen’s
testimony. The court found that the estate planning services by plaintiff included setting up a
trust with the intent to avoid judgment creditors or avoid potential exposure in violation of the
Act. The court then ruled that plaintiff had no agreement to do that.
¶ 45 Kienlen testified that it was John’s idea to transfer assets into Michele’s name. John and
Michele’s home was already in a land trust. They also owned another restaurant in Elgin as
joint tenants. The estate planning services performed by plaintiff included transferring title to
the Elgin restaurant by quit claim deed to the same trust which already held title to the couple’s
marital home and changing the beneficial interest in the land trust from John and Michele as joint
tenants to Michele. At the time the estate planning work was performed, the Maldonado suit
had been dismissed.
¶ 46 On cross-examination, Kienlen testified that in discussing the transfers with Michele, he
advised her that “if somebody got a judgment against John, it’s possible that they could go after
the assets saying that the transfer was somehow to defraud their creditors.” When asked further
if the transfers were an attempt to protect the assets, Kienlen stated, “Yeah, put their assets one
step removed from them able to get it if they got a lawsuit judgment against John.” No
evidence was introduced about John or Michele’s other assets, or Kienlen’s knowledge of their
other assets, except for John’s sole ownership of Golren.
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¶ 47 The intent of the Act is to provide a creditor with a cause of action to make the transfer
voidable where a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to the creditor. As pointed out by
plaintiff, the basis of any suit to set aside a fraudulent transfer is the debtor’s voluntary depletion
of his own net worth to a point at which he cannot fully repay the claims of creditors. A
requirement of the Act is that the debtor was either insolvent at the time of the transfer or became
insolvent as the result of the transfer. See 740 ILCS 160/6(a) (West 2018). Here, there is
nothing in the record of the solvency or insolvency of John. No evidence was introduced that
as the result of the transfer and change in the trust’s beneficial interest that John was either
insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as the result of the transfer as required
by the Act.
¶ 48 Furthermore, no evidence was introduced which would have permitted the trial court to
conclude that Kienlen placed John in a position whereby his assets could not be reached by
creditors. In fact, the issues raised by the Act simply were not raised by either party during the
trial and the trial court’s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 49 Additionally, aside from the trial court’s erroneous ruling regarding the Act, here, the
record clearly indicates that the parties entered into a verbal agreement for plaintiff to perform
the estate planning services for John and Michele. Kienlen testified that it was John’s idea to
transfer the assets into Michele’s name. He stated that John’s and Michele’s home was already
in a land trust, but he changed the beneficial interest of the trust and transferred the Elgin
property into the trust. Kienlen, for the most part, communicated about the real estate planning
with Michele, and then he met them to execute the documents. Michele testified that she signed
the trust documents. This is also evidenced by John’s and Michele’s signatures on the exhibits,
which were entered into evidence. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment concerning
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plaintiff’s estate planning fees was against the manifest weight of the evidence as its findings
appear to not be based on the evidence.
¶ 50 3. The Trial Court’s Finding Denying Plaintiff’s Fee for the October 26 Invoice
¶ 51 Plaintiff next contends the trial court’s finding that there was no agreement with Michele
for legal services rendered with regard to the Baykan matter as set forth in the October 26
invoice was against the manifest weight of the evidence. At trial, Kienlen testified that he had a
verbal agreement with Michele to retain his firm to defend her against the lawsuit filed by
Baykan. Michele testified at trial to the contrary. She also testified that, although she
received an engagement agreement from plaintiff, she never signed it. No signed engagement
agreement was produced or entered into evidence. The trial court ruled that none of the fees
from the October 26, 2016, invoice was owed as there was no agreement for it.
¶ 52 In Michele’s discovery deposition, which was introduced into evidence by agreement of
the parties, Michele admitted that she contacted plaintiff and requested that it represent her with
regard to the lawsuit being contemplated by Baykan. Although Michele told Kienlen that she
was thinking about hiring his firm to represent her, she testified at trial that she told him that she
did not think she could go forward with this. As stated, we will not reverse a trial court’s
decision if different conclusions can be drawn from contradictory testimony unless an opposite
conclusion is clearly apparent. Wildman, Harrold, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 599. The determination
here depends upon the facts found in the record and the judgment will not be disturbed if there is
any evidence in the record to support such findings. Id. Since there is evidence in the record
to support the court’s ruling that there was no agreement, we cannot say that it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
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¶ 53 Plaintiff points out Kienlen’s trial testimony that there was an agreement regarding the
Baykan matter was corroborated by Michele’s discovery admission, as well as by numerous
telephone and in-person conferences held between Kienlen and Michele. However, plaintiff
never used Michele’s discovery deposition as impeachment at trial.
¶ 54 4. The Trial Court’s Ruling Allowing Defendants’ Posttrial Objections to Plaintiff’s
Invoices
¶ 55 We next turn to the trial court’s ruling allowing all of defendants’ posttrial objections to
plaintiff’s invoices. Because we determined that the manifest weight of the evidence supported
the trial court’s finding that defendants did not owe any of the fees from the October 26, 2016,
invoice, we need only focus on the October 14 invoice.
¶ 56 During the trial, defendants’ attorney submitted a summary of objections to the October
14 invoice. Plaintiff submitted a response to the objections. The trial court adopted “each and
every suggestion set forth by the defendants.” The court had questions on some of the
suggestions regarding the calculation so it asked the attorneys to go through the summary of
objections to figure out the total owed to plaintiff.
¶ 57 Plaintiff now complains that no hearing was conducted in which evidence was introduced
regarding the summary. He also argues that he was not given the opportunity to introduce
evidence or to cross-examine defendants’ counsel concerning the objections. Plaintiff’s
argument misses the point. Plaintiff had the burden at trial to supply sufficient facts and
computations to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the services rendered were
necessary and that the amount of fees sought was fair, just, and reasonable. See Laff, 63 Ill.
App. 3d at 308.
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¶ 58 Regardless, the question remains whether there is “any” evidence in the record to support
the trial judge’s determination that $18,419 was the amount owed to plaintiff pursuant to its
contract for legal representation of defendants. Where an attorney and client enter into an
express contract for representation, the terms of the express contract control the compensation
due the attorney. Wildman, Harrold, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 601. “Clearly, when an express
contract exists, a resort to quantum meruit principles is unnecessary because the attorney and
client have already agreed on the value of the services.” Laff, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 310.
Nonetheless, compensation due an attorney pursuant to an express contract must still satisfy
certain professional standards applicable to attorneys. See Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 397
(1996). Rule 1.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct requires that all fees for legal
services be reasonable. Ill. S. Ct. Code of Prof. Res., R. 1.5(a) (eff. Jan.1, 2010).
¶ 59 The trial court based its determination on defendants’ objections, which detailed what
defendants believed was unacceptable in plaintiff’s statement and their suggestions as to what
they believed was more reasonable times and charges. Plaintiff disputed these objections also
giving its explanations of the billings and its context and never requested the opportunity to
present further evidence concerning the objections. The trial court reviewed these objections
and responses and used them as a form of closing argument, which commented on the trial
evidence, and the court made a determination as to what was reasonable. The trial court’s
conclusion regarding the amount of time expended and the necessity and reasonableness of the
legal services rendered are factual determinations. Laff, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 308. It is the
function of the trier of fact to weigh contradictory evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, and
draw ultimate conclusions as to the facts of a case. Wildman, Harold, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 606.
We find that there is evidence to support the trial court’s determination, except regarding
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plaintiff’s fee for the estate planning services. Accordingly, we vacate the award and remand
for a recalculation to include compensation for the estate planning fees. On remand, the trial
court should make a determination as to the reasonableness of those fees.
¶ 60 C. Costs
¶ 61 As a final matter, plaintiff argues that its costs should have included Michele’s discovery
deposition transcripts. At first, the trial court stated that the deposition was not admitted at trial.
However, as plaintiff points out, it was admitted by stipulation as Exhibit 5. The court then
stated that simply admitting it was not enough.
¶ 62 Costs are allowances of incidental damages awarded by law to reimburse the prevailing
party to some extent at least for expenses necessarily incurred in the assertion of his or her rights
in court. Therefore, Supreme Court Rule 208(d) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) is interpreted as authorizing
a court to tax as costs, in its discretion, the expenses only of those depositions necessarily used at
trial. Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 92 Ill. 2d 157, 165-66 (1982).
¶ 63 Here, the record shows that plaintiff never impeached Michele with the discovery
transcript and plaintiff never argued it as an admission. We therefore cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion by not including this in the judgment as plaintiff’s costs.
¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 65 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County
insofar as its findings regarding the estate planning services were against the manifest weight of
the evidence, and remand the cause for the court to recalculate the award to include
compensation for the estate planning matter. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment in all other
respects.
¶ 66 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.
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