Kielbasa v. Reynolds

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided November 17, 2023·No. 2:23-cv-00817·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ CASIMIR E. KIELBASA,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-cv-817-pp

STEPHANIE (Jane Doe #1), et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Casimir E. Kielbasa, who is incarcerated at Racine Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights when he was incarcerated at the Racine County Jail. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On August 9, 2023, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $61.44. Dkt. No. 8. The court received that fee on August 29, 2023.

The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must

dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d

714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by

plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff has sued Stephanie, a psychologist at the Racine County Jail; Latisha, a “medical provider” at the jail; Captain Friend; the jail’s “subcontracted Medical Providing Company” and Aramark Corporation. Dkt.

No. 1 at 2-3. When he filed his complaint, the plaintiff was incarcerated at Dodge Correctional Institution. Id. at 2. He alleges that from June 21, 2021 until May 9, 2023, he was incarcerated at the Racine County Jail; the events he describes in the complaint occurred there. Id. at 2. The plaintiff says that before he entered the jail, he “was prescribed an opiate ‘Buprenorphile’, aka ‘Subutex and/or Suboxone’, to treat severe pain, and bodily maintenance.” Id. He alleges that he took this medication daily, as prescribed, for over ten years. Id.

When the plaintiff arrived at the jail in June 2021, defendant Stephanie allegedly “informed [him] the medicine he had been taking for the past 10+ years was not going to be administered [] because [] it was against facility policy at the [jail].” Id. The plaintiff states that this “[was] totally contrary to proper medical procedure of weaning a patient off buprenorphine[]” and that this “is evident by the warnings which come on the individual bottles of buprenorphine, and also the medications pharmokenesis.” Id. The plaintiff asserts that he “suffered greatly” the first couple of months at the jail as a

direct result of not receiving the medication “nor we[a]ning a patient off this powerful opiate on a tapered dose.” Id. He says he suffered, and continues to suffer, severe pain, depression, anxiety and hallucinations. Id. The plaintiff says he filed numerous requests to jail medical staff. Id. In late 2021, defendant Latisha allegedly examined the plaintiff and informed him that his medication would not be administered to him. Id. He says he continued to suffer and on an unknown date in late 2021, he got defendant

Captain Friend’s attention through “the secure glass of [the plaintiff’s] pod” and asked Friend for his medicine. Id. Captain Friend allegedly responded, “that drug is not permitted in my jail.” Id.

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