Kidde Fire Trainers, Inc. v. McCrea and Maley

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Kidde Fire Trainers, Inc. v. McCrea and Maley

221 So. 3d 756, 2017 WL 2562404, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 8692

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJune 14, 2017

Docket17-0636

StatusPublished

This text of 221 So. 3d 756 (Kidde Fire Trainers, Inc. v. McCrea and Maley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kidde Fire Trainers, Inc. v. McCrea and Maley, 221 So. 3d 756, 2017 WL 2562404, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 8692 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

ROTHENBERG, J.

The primary issue we must address in reviewing this petition for writ of certiorari filed by the defendant below, Kidde Fire Trainers, Inc. (“Kidde Fire”), is whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by imposing a particular sanction—the waiver of Kidde Fire’s work-product privilege as to numerous emails pertaining to Kidde Fire’s investigation and actions following an incident involving plaintiff Kevin Eddie McCrea— based on Kidde Fire’s, not counsel’s, serious and intentional discovery violations relating to the e-mails. 1 As there is competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the discovery violations were intentional and because the sanction imposed by the trial court was well within its discretion, we find no departure from the essential requirements of law. See Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 495 (Fla. 2004) (“It is well settled that determining sanctions for discovery violations is committed to the discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed ... absent an abuse of the sound exercise of that discretion.”); Toll v. Korge, 127 So.3d 883, 886-87 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (holding that a trial court’s determination of sanctions is committed to the trial court’s dis *757 cretion). We, therefore, deny Kidde Fire’s petition for writ of certiorari.

Denied.

1

. A party seeking certiorari relief must demonstrate that the trial court’s order "departfe] from the essential requirements of law, resulting in irreparable harm that cannot be adequately remedied on final appeal.” Millennium Diagnostic Imaging Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 So.3d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). The last two elements are often referred to as irreparable harm, see Stockinger v. Zeilberger, 152 So.3d 71, 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), and "[t]he establishment of irreparable harm is a condition precedent to invoking certiorari jurisdiction.” Id. Kidde Fire has established the jurisdictional prerequisites to certiorari relief.

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ROTHENBERG, J.

The primary issue we must address in reviewing this petition for writ of certiorari filed by the defendant below, Kidde Fire Trainers, Inc. (“Kidde Fire”), is whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by imposing a particular sanction—the waiver of Kidde Fire’s work-product privilege as to numerous emails pertaining to Kidde Fire’s investigation and actions following an incident involving plaintiff Kevin Eddie McCrea— based on Kidde Fire’s, not counsel’s, serious and intentional discovery violations relating to the e-mails. 1 As there is competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the discovery violations were intentional and because the sanction imposed by the trial court was well within its discretion, we find no departure from the essential requirements of law. See Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 495 (Fla. 2004) (“It is well settled that determining sanctions for discovery violations is committed to the discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed ... absent an abuse of the sound exercise of that discretion.”); Toll v. Korge, 127 So.3d 883, 886-87 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (holding that a trial court’s determination of sanctions is committed to the trial court’s dis *757 cretion). We, therefore, deny Kidde Fire’s petition for writ of certiorari.

Denied.

1

. A party seeking certiorari relief must demonstrate that the trial court’s order "departfe] from the essential requirements of law, resulting in irreparable harm that cannot be adequately remedied on final appeal.” Millennium Diagnostic Imaging Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 So.3d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). The last two elements are often referred to as irreparable harm, see Stockinger v. Zeilberger, 152 So.3d 71, 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), and "[t]he establishment of irreparable harm is a condition precedent to invoking certiorari jurisdiction.” Id. Kidde Fire has established the jurisdictional prerequisites to certiorari relief.

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Bluebook (online)

221 So. 3d 756, 2017 WL 2562404, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 8692, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kidde-fire-trainers-inc-v-mccrea-and-maley-fladistctapp-2017.

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