Kidd v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Kidd v. State

486 So. 2d 41, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 813, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 7132

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 2, 1986

DocketNo. 85-1065

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 486 So. 2d 41 (Kidd v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Kidd v. State, 486 So. 2d 41, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 813, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 7132 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for sexual battery, kidnapping, and robbery. We reverse.

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in not allowing the exercise of peremptory challenges of jurors at a time when a full jury panel had been accepted but not yet sworn. We agree that a juror can be challenged up until the time he is sworn. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.310; Jackson v. State, 464 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1985).

The state contends that the defense motion was a request to challenge the jurors for cause, not a request to exercise the remaining peremptory challenges. However, the trial court had already stated that no juror could be challenged at that point because all jurors had already been accepted by the state and the defense. An attorney is “not required to pursue a completely useless course when the judge had announced in advance that it would be fruitless.” Bailey v. State, 224 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla.1969). See also Bell v. State, 338 So.2d 1328, 1329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Here, the defense attorney was not required to attempt to exercise any remaining peremptory challenges when the trial court had already stated that no such challenges would be allowed.

Our disposition of defendant’s first issue on appeal makes the remaining issues moot.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

RYDER, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for sexual battery, kidnapping, and robbery. We reverse.

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in not allowing the exercise of peremptory challenges of jurors at a time when a full jury panel had been accepted but not yet sworn. We agree that a juror can be challenged up until the time he is sworn. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.310; Jackson v. State, 464 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1985).

The state contends that the defense motion was a request to challenge the jurors for cause, not a request to exercise the remaining peremptory challenges. However, the trial court had already stated that no juror could be challenged at that point because all jurors had already been accepted by the state and the defense. An attorney is “not required to pursue a completely useless course when the judge had announced in advance that it would be fruitless.” Bailey v. State, 224 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla.1969). See also Bell v. State, 338 So.2d 1328, 1329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Here, the defense attorney was not required to attempt to exercise any remaining peremptory challenges when the trial court had already stated that no such challenges would be allowed.

Our disposition of defendant’s first issue on appeal makes the remaining issues moot.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

RYDER, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.

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486 So. 2d 41, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 813, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 7132, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kidd-v-state-fladistctapp-1986.

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