KIARA S. JONES v. CHAD CHRONISTER, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJanuary 12, 2026
Docket8:25-cv-02096
StatusUnknown

This text of KIARA S. JONES v. CHAD CHRONISTER, et al. (KIARA S. JONES v. CHAD CHRONISTER, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KIARA S. JONES v. CHAD CHRONISTER, et al., (M.D. Fla. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION KIARA S. JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:25-cv-02096-WFJ-NHA

CHAD CHRONISTER, et al.,

Defendants. /

ORDER

Before the Court is the United States Magistrate Judge Natalie Hirt Adam’s Report and Recommendation that Plaintiff Kiara Jones’ renewed motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 9) be denied, and Plaintiff’s pro se Amended Complaint (Dkt. 12) be dismissed with prejudice. Dkt. 15. The time for filing objections has passed. Absent objection, the Court conducts a “careful and complete” review of the report and recommendation. Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982 (per curiam) (citation modified). “Clear error” review applies to portions of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citation modified). Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo in the absence of an objection. See LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 F. App’x 554, 556 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994). The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams, 681 F.2d at 732. The Magistrate Judge, in a thorough and well-reasoned analysis, found that the motion to proceed without pre-paying the filing fee (Dkt. 9) should be denied

and that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 12) should be dismissed with prejudice for two reasons. First, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this Court from sitting in review of the state trial court’s order. Dkt. 15 at 5. Second, even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply here, it does not appear that the state

court’s action was improper. Id. at 5–6. The Court agrees. Concerning the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that “Plaintiff challenges the state court’s order issuing a writ of possession

while the underlying order of possession was on appeal. A writ of possession is considered a judgment to which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies.” Id. at 6 (collecting cases). As such, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests this Court of jurisdiction over her claims.

Second, the Amended Complaint does not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it failed to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Again, as the

Magistrate Judge correctly determined, the state court acted within its power by issuing a writ of possession while Plaintiff appealed the order of possession. Dkt. 15 at 7–8. Indeed, Florida law is clear that even during an appeal, trial courts retain

jurisdiction to enforce judgments by issuing a writ of possession. See Mann-Stack v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 982 So. 2d 72, 74 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2008). Because the Amended Complaint does not comply with the Federal Rules, it presently has no

chance of success. Thus, the Court cannot allow Plaintiff to proceed and dismisses the Amended Complaint. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit is clear that courts must give a pro se plaintiff, like Plaintiff Jones, “at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district

court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018). However, Plaintiff has already been afforded an opportunity to amend her complaint to properly state a claim. Dkts. 7, 11. Because

Plaintiff’s subsequent complaint failed to state a claim, it will be dismissed with prejudice. See Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019); Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291. Further, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that any further amendment would be futile, as Plaintiff’s claims are also

jurisdictionally barred. Dkt. 15 at 9. CONCLUSION Having performed a de novo and independent review of the file, and for the

sound reasons explained in the Report and Recommendation, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that: 1. The Report and Recommendation, Dkt. 15, is ADOPTED, CONFIRMED,

and APPROVED in all respects and made a part of this order. 2. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Dkt. 12, is DISMISSED with prejudice. 3. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 9, is DENIED. 4. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE all pending deadlines and CLOSE

this case. DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on January 12, 2026.

s/William F. Jung WILLIAM F. JUNG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Copies furnished to: Plaintiff, pro se

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Related

Colleen Macort v. Prem, Inc.
208 F. App'x 781 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Cleo Douglas LeCroy v. Walter McNeil
397 F. App'x 554 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Marina Cooper-Houston v. Southern Railway Company
37 F.3d 603 (Eleventh Circuit, 1994)
Mann-Stack v. Homeside Lending, Inc.
982 So. 2d 72 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2008)
Damene W. Woldeab v. DeKalb County Board of Education
885 F.3d 1289 (Eleventh Circuit, 2018)
Charles Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit
927 F.3d 1123 (Eleventh Circuit, 2019)

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KIARA S. JONES v. CHAD CHRONISTER, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kiara-s-jones-v-chad-chronister-et-al-flmd-2026.