Khoza v. District of Columbia

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BONTLE SIPHO KHOZA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-02931 (UNA) v. ) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The

Court grants the in forma pauperis Application, and for the reasons discussed below, dismisses

this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), by which the Court is required to dismiss an

action at any time if it determines that it is frivolous.

“A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis either in

law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and a “complaint plainly

abusive of the judicial process is properly typed malicious,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305,

1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff, who associates with “omniverse industries,” sues the District of Columbia and its

“construction workers” and “industrialists.” See Compl. at 1–3. He does not provide addresses

for the Defendant, nor any of his own contact information beyond his email address, all of which

contravenes D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(c)(1), (g). Plaintiff indicates that he is currently unhoused, see id. at 1, and while the Court is certainly sympathetic to his circumstances, there is no way to

communicate with Plaintiff regarding this case without some sort of address, particularly given his

pro se status.

The allegations themselves fare no better, as they are largely, if not entirely, unintelligible.

Plaintiff states, for example, that “the segment of events, later into the morning as the economic in

social validation of individuals, I either pass or respond to in socio-networking of just being around

other types of people, was direct of the rush in my own verbal as the non-verbal in anatomical

commotion of my person, being violated using intellect and force.” Id. at 4. The remainder of the

Complaint consists of more of the same, namely, puzzling ruminations appearing to arise from

Plaintiff’s belief that individuals have infiltrated his mind and body, and causing him to experience

“thought-provoking imagery of murder; manslaughter upon [his] being.” See id. at 4–5. The relief

sought is unclear.

As here, the Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a frivolous complaint.

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (“Over the years, this Court has repeatedly held

that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if

they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”); Tooley v.

Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent

insubstantiality,” including where the plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of

surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins”). A court may dismiss a complaint

as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992), or “postulat[e] events and circumstances of a wholly

fanciful kind,” Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1307–08. The instant Complaint falls squarely into this

category. Accordingly, the Complaint and this case are dismissed without prejudice. A separate

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/ ANA C. REYES Date: December 15, 2025 United States District Judge