Khoury v. Intermountain Health Care Inc.

District Court, D. Utah·Decided June 14, 2024·No. 2:20-cv-00372·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND MEMORANDUM AND DECISION STATE OF NEVADA EX REL. MICHAEL ORDER GRANTING IN PART D. KHOURY, M.D., RELATOR’S [210] MOTION FOR AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER; Plaintiffs, GRANTING [214] DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SHORT FORM v. DISCOVERY; AND DENYING RELATOR’S [215] & [216] MOTIONS MOUNTAIN WEST ANESTHESIA, L.L.C.; FOR SHORT FORM DISCOVERY DAVID A. DEBENHAM, M.D.; ERIC A. EVAND, M.D.; JOSHUA J. LARSON, M.D.; JOHN E. MINER, M.D.; TYLER W. Case No. 2:20-cv-00372-TC-CMR NELSON, M.D.; AND DOE ANESTHESIOLOGISTS 1 THROUGH 150, Judge Tena Campbell Defendants. Magistrate Judge Cecilia M. Romero

I. BACKGROUND This matter is referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (ECF 22). Before the court are four motions for which the court heard oral argument on May 21, 2024 (ECF 222). These motions are Plaintiff Relator Dr. Michael Khoury’s (Relator) Motion for Amended Scheduling Order (ECF 210), Defendant Mountain West Anesthesia LLC’s (MWA) Motion for Short Form Discovery for a protective order to stay a 30(b)(6) deposition of MWA (ECF 214), Relator’s Motion for Short Form Discovery to compel the 30(b)(6) deposition of MWA (ECF 215), and Relator’s Motion for Short Form Discovery to compel complete production of PED data from all Defendants (ECF 216). The court also considers the Responses to all four motions (ECF 212, 218, 219, 221), the Reply for the Motion for Amended Scheduling Order (ECF 213), and previous rulings and hearings on related issues (ECF 163, 165, 196 & 207). For the reasons stated in the record at the supplemental hearing on May 28, 2024 (ECF 223), the court GRANTS IN PART Relator’s Motion for Amended Scheduling Order (ECF 210), GRANTS MWA’s Motion to stay the 30(b)(6) deposition (ECF 214), and DENIES Relator’s motions to compel (ECF 215 & 216). II. LEGAL STANDARDS "Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for ‘discovery regarding any

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. . ..’” Dutcher v. Bold Films LP, No. 2:15-CV-110-DB-PMW, 2017 WL 1901418, *1 (D. Utah May 8, 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). “‘Relevancy is broadly construed at the discovery stage of the litigation and a request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is any possibility the information sought may be relevant’ to a party’s claim or defense.” Id. (quoting Smith v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 137 F.R.D. 25, 27 (D. Kan. 1991)). However, “if the requested discovery is ‘unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from a source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,’ the court is required to limit the frequency or extent of discovery.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)). “‘[A] person may seek a protective order by a showing of good cause pursuant to’ Rule

26(c).” Cloward v. Race, No. 220CV00165RJSDBP, 2023 WL 4268944, at *4 (D. Utah June 29, 2023) (quoting Denson v. Corp. of the President, No. 2:18-cv-00284, 2018 WL 10247390 at *1, (D. Utah Dec. 4, 2018)). “This burden is ‘not satisfied by conclusory statements. Rather, the party seeking a protective order must show that disclosure will result in a clearly defined and serious injury.’” Id. (quoting Klesch & Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 217 F.R.D. 517, 524 (D. Colo. 2003)). Good cause for a protective order may be met when needed to “protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,’ by ‘forbidding the disclosure or discovery . . ..’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); see also DUCivR 26-2. “Barring extraordinary circumstances, courts will rarely grant a protective order that completely prohibits a deposition.” Cloward, 2023 WL 4268944, at *4 (quoting Denson, 2018 WL 10247390 at *1). Courts also have “broad discretion to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Id. (quoting Lipari v. U.S. Bancorp, N.A., No. 07-2146, 2008 WL 4642618, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2008)).

Under DUCivR 30-2, a 30(b)(6) “notice must not exceed 20 topics, including subparts.” While DUCivR 30-2 does not define “topics, including subparts,” the courts looks to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 as a guide and the definition of subparts relating to a “common theme.” SMHG Phase I LLC v. Eisenberg, No. 1:22-cv-00035-DBB-JCB, 2023 WL 2275182, at *1 (D. Utah Feb. 28, 2023) (quoting Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 8B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2168.1 at 261 (3d ed. April 2022 update)). A 30(b)(6) deposition topic with subparts is considered a single topic when the subpart “elicit[s] details concerning a common theme.” Id. While topics “inquiring into discrete areas [are] likely to” count as more than one. Id. Finally, a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).

III. DISCUSSION a. The court grants the motion to stay the 30(b)(6) deposition on MWA and also finds that the served deposition notice exceeds the allowed number of topics.

MWA requests this court to stay Plaintiff’s 30(b)(6) deposition of MWA (ECF 214), and Relator requests the court compel said deposition (ECF 215). The court GRANTS MWA’s motion to stay and DENIES Relator’s motion, for the reasons set forth below. 1. Relator’s 30(b)(6) deposition would be unduly burdensome and costly at this time. At the hearing on May 21, 2024, the parties stated that the scheduled 30(b)(6) deposition of MWA was no longer taking place as scheduled on May 22, 2024. However, given Relator’s indication to reschedule MWA’s 30(b)(6) deposition, the court find this issue is still live and will address the pending motions related to the deposition herein. MWA argues this court should stay the 30(b)(6) deposition on it until after Relator deposes CMS because having to prepare for this 30(b)(6) deposition would be unduly burdensome and

cause undue expense given the recent extensive data production and what MWA deems dispositive testimony from CMS (ECF 214 at 2), along with Relator’s acknowledgment that if CMS does not change its testimony, the course of this litigation may change (ECF 163 54:13). In addition, MWA argues that the proposed deposition notice exceeds the local rule on topic limits (id.). Relator responds and argues the court has rejected past attempts to stay and/or limit any discovery until CMS has been deposed (ECF 215 at 2) and should continue to do so again and argues that the raised topics are either all part of the same “common theme,” meritorious, or not burdensome (id. at 3). While the court recognizes it has in the past denied requests to narrow or limit discovery, this matter is now at a different procedural posture. Specifically, Relator, on November 29, 2023,

represented to the court that absent additional and different 30(b)(6) testimony from CMS, he “will almost certainly lose this case” (ECF 196 at 2). In that same hearing, Relator also noted that if CMS is presented with information on prolonged distractions and still indicate it would pay any claim, “then it’s an entirely different case.” (ECF 163:53:3-5).

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Khoury v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., (D. Utah 2024).

Khoury v. Intermountain Health Care Inc. (Khoury v. Intermountain Health Care Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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