Khatija Khan v. Thomas Lillard, Warden

S.D. Illinois

Khatija Khan v. Thomas Lillard, Warden

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided April 20, 2026·No. 3:25-cv-00339·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KHATIJA KHAN, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) vs. ) Civil No. 3:25-cv-00339-GCS ) THOMAS LILLARD, Warden, ) ) Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND On March 11, 2025, Petitioner Khatija Khan, a federal prisoner previously incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp at FCI Greenville, Illinois (“FCI Greenville”), filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the application of time credits under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3632. (Doc. 1). Specifically, Khan argues she is entitled to 44 days of FSA time credit (1 day of FSA credit while in administrative detention and 43 days of FSA credit while on a federal writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum). (Doc. 1, p. 15). She asks the Court to direct the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to determine she is entitled to FSA credits without regard to where she was housed or her writ status as described in 28 C.F.R. § 523.41(c)(4)(i-iv). (Doc. 1, p. 8). On July 11, 2025, the Court ordered Respondent to

Page 1 of 6 respond to the petition.1 The Respondent opposes the petition. (Doc. 10). Based on the reasons delineated below, the Court DENIES the petition.

On September 1, 2022, Khan was sentenced to 60-months, for conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. She also received three years of supervised release. See generally United States v. Khan, Case No, 3:19-CR-00314-SRU-2 (D. Conn.). Petitioner arrived at the BOP to serve

her sentence on April 14, 2023. (Doc. 10-2, p. 2). At the time she filed her petition, Khan was housed at FCI Greenville. The record reflects Khan transferred from FCI Greenville to a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”) on July 22, 2025. Id. A visit to the BOP website reveals Khan is currently at New York RRM with a release date of July 16, 2026. See BOP, Find an Inmate, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last visited March 30, 2026).

DISCUSSION A federal prisoner may seek a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the execution of his or her sentence. See, e.g., Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d

693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a motion seeking relief concerning the execution of a sentence, but not the validity of a conviction, falls under § 2241). The Attorney General, acting through the BOP, calculates a defendant’s sentence “as an administrative

1 On August 25, 2025, after full consent of the parties, this matter was assigned to the undersigned for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Doc. 15).

Page 2 of 6 matter when imprisoning the defendant.” United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). To obtain a writ of habeas corpus, a prisoner must show that he or she is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Before seeking relief in federal court, however, a prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies. See, e.g., Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 2004) (observing that the “common-law exhaustion rule applies to § 2241 actions”); Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (noting that courts may “review a claim concerning the computation of sentence only after administrative remedies have been exhausted”).

First, Petitioner argues she has exhausted all available remedies, (Doc. 1, p. 10), but then she argues if she did not exhaust, such failure may be excused where either the remedies would be futile or unable to afford the petitioner the proper relief. Id. at p. 12. Here, the Court need not resolve whether Petitioner may be excused from the exhaustion requirement as her claim fails on the merits.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4), eligible prisoners who successfully complete evidence-based recidivism reduction (“EBRR”) programming or productive activities (“PA”) shall earn time credits at a rate of 10 days for every 30 days of successful participation in EBRR programming or productive activities. However, a prisoner may not earn time credits for an evidence-based recidivism reduction program completed

during official detention prior to the date that the prisoner's sentence commences under

Page 3 of 6 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(B)(ii). Further, a prisoner may not earn time credits while in designation status outside the institution. See 28 C.F.R. § 523.419(c)(4)(iii).

Several courts have found that the BOP’s policy conflicts with the statute. See, e.g., Borker v. Bowers, Civil No. 24-10045-LTS, 2024 WL 2186742, at *2 (D. Mass. May 15, 2024) (finding that the regulation is at odds with the plain language of the statute); Wong v. Warden, No. 4:24-CV-04117-CBK, 2024 WL 4027918, at *2 (D. S.D. Sept. 3, 2024) (stating that “in this case the BOP’s final rule for the start date that an inmate may earn FSA Time Credits is contrary to Congress's directive that the BOP is required to ‘provide all

prisoners with the opportunity to actively participate in [EBRR] programs . . . throughout their entire term of incarceration.’ 18 U.S.C. § 2621(h)(6).”); Patel v. Barron, Case No. C23- 937-KKE, 2023 WL 6311281, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 28, 2023) (finding that 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(a) directly conflicts with an unambiguous statute and that BOP was not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

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