Khartchina v. Rothman

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Khartchina v. Rothman

139 A.D.3d 809, 29 N.Y.S.3d 813

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 11, 2016

Docket2014-09875

StatusPublished

This text of 139 A.D.3d 809 (Khartchina v. Rothman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Khartchina v. Rothman, 139 A.D.3d 809, 29 N.Y.S.3d 813 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2016).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff Mykhaylo Khartchina appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Taylor, J.), entered July 22, 2014, as granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by him on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Mykhaylo Khartchina is denied.

*810 The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the appellant did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the cervical region of the appellant’s spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, the appellant raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the cervical region of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the appellant.

Leventhal, J.P., Dickerson, Cohen and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff Mykhaylo Khartchina appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Taylor, J.), entered July 22, 2014, as granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by him on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Mykhaylo Khartchina is denied.

*810 The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the appellant did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the cervical region of the appellant’s spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, the appellant raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the cervical region of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the appellant.

Leventhal, J.P., Dickerson, Cohen and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

139 A.D.3d 809, 29 N.Y.S.3d 813, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/khartchina-v-rothman-nyappdiv-2016.

Opinion

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