Khan v. Barela

District Court, D. New Mexico·Decided July 19, 2021·No. 2:15-cv-01151·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

ERIK KHAN,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 15-cv-1151 MV/SMV

CHRIS BARELA, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY, ARAMARK CORPORATION, BILL STICKLES, and DAVID BEAM,

Defendants.1

ORDER TO SUBMIT MARTINEZ REPORT

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Directing Preparation of Martinez Report [Doc. 128], docketed on October 13, 2020. Defendants2 filed no response, and the time for doing so has passed. Plaintiff sued Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary damages. See generally [Doc. 100]. Plaintiff complains that the policies, practices, or customs of Defendants directly caused multiple violations of his constitutional rights while he was detained at the Doña Ana County Detention Center (“DACDC”) over the course of four years as a pretrial detainee. See id. Having considered the Motion, the record, and the relevant law, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court will grant the Motion in part as described herein.

1 This caption reflects the Defendants listed in the Third Amended Complaint, except that Plaintiff substituted Defendant David Beam for the John Doe Defendant on June 24, 2020. [Docs. 100, 109]. Moreover, Defendants Bill Stickles and David Beam were dismissed as parties on November 6, 2020. [Doc. 133]. Finally, in its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Aramark states that its proper name is “Aramark Correctional Services, LLC.” [Doc. 123]. 2 Claims remain pending against three Defendants: Chris Barela (“Barela”), Board of County Commissioners of Doña Ana County (“Board”), and Aramark Correctional Services, LLC (“Aramark”). Order for the Martinez Report In order to develop a record sufficient to ascertain whether there are any factual or legal bases for Plaintiff’s claims,3 Defendants are ORDERED to submit materials that will help the Court resolve Plaintiff’s claims, in the form of a Martinez report, as explained herein. In a suit brought by a pro se prisoner, the court may order the defendants to investigate the incidents underlying the suit and to submit a report of the investigation, known as a “Martinez report.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991); see Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 319–20 (10th Cir. 1978) (affirming the propriety and necessity of such reports). The Martinez report assists the court in determining whether there is a factual and legal basis for the prisoner’s claims. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1109. The court may use the Martinez report in a variety of procedural

situations, including when deciding whether to grant summary judgment, either on motion or sua sponte. Id. at 1109–11; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (noting that district courts have the power to enter summary judgment sua sponte, as long as the opposing party was on notice). However, the prisoner must be given an opportunity to present evidence to controvert the facts set out in the report. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1109. In this case, there are claims against multiple defendants and groups of defendants who are separately represented by counsel. Not all of the claims pertain to every defendant. Accordingly, the Court will order the separately represented defendants and groups of defendants to submit separate Martinez reports addressing only the allegations made against them. Defendants’

3 Plaintiff alleges that he was detained at DACDC between May 9, 2012, and June 29, 2016, and all of his claims arise from events during those four years. [Doc. 100] at 2, ¶ 5. Therefore, all materials submitted by Defendants must address the claims over the course of those four years. Martinez report must address the allegations against them as well as any defenses raised in their answer that they wish to pursue. Aramark Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his right to receive information because the policies, practices, or customs of Aramark (together with other Defendants) prevented him from accessing hardcover books, newspapers, and newspaper clippings. Id. at 7–9, 19–21. Plaintiff claims Defendants’ complete prohibition was without a legitimate penological justification and no reasonable alternatives were available. Id. at 19. Aramark must file a Martinez report addressing these allegations. This is the only claim Aramark’s report must address. Barela and the Board

Plaintiff makes the same allegations regarding his right to receive information against Barela and the Board. It is not clear whether the policies and procedures described by Plaintiff are policies and procedures of Barela and the Board or of Aramark. Barela and the Board must also file a Martinez report addressing these allegations. Second, Plaintiff alleges that he was unreasonably strip searched—including body-cavity visual inspections—on multiple occasions in 2016 after returning from the courthouse and medical trips because of Defendants’ policies, practices, or customs. Id. at 9–13, 21–22. Plaintiff asserts that not all inmates4 were strip searched before entering the general population after outside contact. Id. at 13. Rather, he alleges that he was strip searched as a punishment, pursuant to Defendants’ policies, for exercising his rights to access the courts and medical care. Id.

4 Although Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time, the Court uses the term “inmate(s)” throughout this Order for simplicity and consistency. Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ policies, practices, or customs violated his right to exercise his religion. Id. at 23. Plaintiff complains that Defendants’ policies prevented him from receiving a clock, prayer schedule, Muslim calendar, and a diet accommodation during Ramadan. Id. at 14, 23. Moreover, when Defendants updated their meal accommodation policy to allow for Ramadan accommodations, Plaintiff was served ham. Id. at 14–15. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ policies placed a substantial burden on his right to freely exercise his religion, without a rational basis, with the intent to punish him, and that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his free exercise rights. Id. at 23. Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants established Christianity as the religion of DACDC, in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 19. Plaintiff complains that Defendants

officially promoted Christianity through “movie presentations, group sermons, free Bible studies, access to Christian literature, and/or free Bibles.” Id. at 24. For example, Plaintiff alleges that DACDC employees officially introduced Christian ministers and compelled inmates to be respectful and listen to their sermons. Id. at 17–18, 24. He further alleges that one DACDC employee himself preached multiple sermons to inmates. Id. at 18. Plaintiff also asserts that Christian volunteers5 and inmates were routinely permitted to disregard security protocols, such as when volunteers freely entered housing units without officer escorts and when officers allowed Christian prayers circles despite mandatory lockdowns. Id. at 16–18. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ policies did not have a secular purpose, had a primary effect of advancing Christianity, and fostered government entanglement with religion. Id. at 25.

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