KHALIQ ABDUL AS SALAAM, No. 2:25-cv-2919-DC-CKD (PS) Plaintiff, v. ORDER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff proceeds without counsel1 and seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the request to proceed in forma pauperis makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and is granted. However, the complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. I. Screening Requirement Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 1 Because plaintiff proceeds without counsel, this action is referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302(c)(21) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. (2000). In performing this screening, the court liberally construes a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). II. Plaintiff’s Allegations On August 25, 2005, in Sacramento, California, FBI agents seized plaintiff’s personal property including a laptop, camera, electronics, and personal documents. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff was convicted in 2013, but the conviction was overturned in 2016. (Id.) Despite reversal of the conviction, the FBI retained plaintiff’s property until a letter dated September 3, 2025 gave him 30 days to retrieve the property or face forfeiture. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an administrative claim for damages which was denied. (Id. at 2, 4.) Defendants are the United States of America, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and unknown FBI agents. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges unlawful seizure and continued detention of his property and seeks damages and return of property. (Id. at 3.) He seeks to proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id. at 2.) III. Discussion The United States and FBI are immune from suit except where the United States has expressly waived its right to sovereign immunity. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). “The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for claims against the federal government arising from torts committed by federal employees.” Foster v. United States, 522 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). Under the FTCA, the United States shall be liable “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). There is an exception to the FTCA for claims arising out of “detention of goods[.]” See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). Thus, the United States does not waive sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any law enforcement officer, unless the property was seized solely for the purpose of forfeiture and four specified criteria are satisfied. See Foster, 522 F.3d at 1075. The “detention of goods” exception is interpreted broadly, id. at 1074, and applies to claims based on intentional conduct as well as arising out of negligent handling or storage of detained property, Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 854 (1984). Here, plaintiff’s FTCA claim arises from the detention of his property which was not alleged to have been seized solely for the purpose of forfeiture. Plaintiff’s FTCA claim falls within the “detention of goods” exception. Thus, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The complaint also fails to state a Bivens claim. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971). Plaintiff makes no specific allegations about the conduct of any federal individual actors. The Supreme Court has declined to extend the right of action implied in Bivens to permit a claim against a federal agency or entity for damages arising from violation of an individual’s constitutional rights. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994). As to the unknown FBI agents, the complaint does not state a claim because it lacks individualized allegations about the conduct of these defendants. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). That leaves plaintiff’s claim for equitable relief under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is presented both in the complaint and a separately filed motion. Under Rule 41(g),2 a “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return.” Fed. Crim. P. 41(g). Such a claim is treated as a civil equitable proceeding even when brought as a motion. Goodman v. United States, 369 F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1966); see also Ordonez v. United States, 680 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting the rule provides only for the return of property and not money damages). Civil equitable relief under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is not available where the claimant could have pursued the return of property in the context of a judicial or administrative forfeiture proceeding of which the claimant received adequate notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003) (“where a claimant has received adequate 2 Fed R. Crim. P. Rule 41(g) was formerly Rule 41(e). See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2004)
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KHALIQ ABDUL AS SALAAM, No. 2:25-cv-2919-DC-CKD (PS) Plaintiff, v. ORDER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff proceeds without counsel1 and seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the request to proceed in forma pauperis makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and is granted. However, the complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. I. Screening Requirement Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 1 Because plaintiff proceeds without counsel, this action is referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302(c)(21) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. (2000). In performing this screening, the court liberally construes a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). II. Plaintiff’s Allegations On August 25, 2005, in Sacramento, California, FBI agents seized plaintiff’s personal property including a laptop, camera, electronics, and personal documents. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff was convicted in 2013, but the conviction was overturned in 2016. (Id.) Despite reversal of the conviction, the FBI retained plaintiff’s property until a letter dated September 3, 2025 gave him 30 days to retrieve the property or face forfeiture. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an administrative claim for damages which was denied. (Id. at 2, 4.) Defendants are the United States of America, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and unknown FBI agents. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges unlawful seizure and continued detention of his property and seeks damages and return of property. (Id. at 3.) He seeks to proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id. at 2.) III. Discussion The United States and FBI are immune from suit except where the United States has expressly waived its right to sovereign immunity. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). “The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for claims against the federal government arising from torts committed by federal employees.” Foster v. United States, 522 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). Under the FTCA, the United States shall be liable “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). There is an exception to the FTCA for claims arising out of “detention of goods[.]” See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). Thus, the United States does not waive sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any law enforcement officer, unless the property was seized solely for the purpose of forfeiture and four specified criteria are satisfied. See Foster, 522 F.3d at 1075. The “detention of goods” exception is interpreted broadly, id. at 1074, and applies to claims based on intentional conduct as well as arising out of negligent handling or storage of detained property, Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 854 (1984). Here, plaintiff’s FTCA claim arises from the detention of his property which was not alleged to have been seized solely for the purpose of forfeiture. Plaintiff’s FTCA claim falls within the “detention of goods” exception. Thus, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The complaint also fails to state a Bivens claim. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971). Plaintiff makes no specific allegations about the conduct of any federal individual actors. The Supreme Court has declined to extend the right of action implied in Bivens to permit a claim against a federal agency or entity for damages arising from violation of an individual’s constitutional rights. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994). As to the unknown FBI agents, the complaint does not state a claim because it lacks individualized allegations about the conduct of these defendants. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). That leaves plaintiff’s claim for equitable relief under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is presented both in the complaint and a separately filed motion. Under Rule 41(g),2 a “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return.” Fed. Crim. P. 41(g). Such a claim is treated as a civil equitable proceeding even when brought as a motion. Goodman v. United States, 369 F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1966); see also Ordonez v. United States, 680 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting the rule provides only for the return of property and not money damages). Civil equitable relief under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is not available where the claimant could have pursued the return of property in the context of a judicial or administrative forfeiture proceeding of which the claimant received adequate notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003) (“where a claimant has received adequate 2 Fed R. Crim. P. Rule 41(g) was formerly Rule 41(e). See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1229 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2004). notice of an earlier administrative forfeiture proceeding, and thus has had an adequate remedy at law, the district court should deny a subsequent Rule 41(e) motion”); Ivy v. Fresno Police Dep’t, No. 1:23-CV-01072-ADA-SAB, 2023 WL 7130659, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Ivy v. Fresno Police Dep’t Officers, No. 1:23-CV-01072- KES-SAB, 2025 WL 1680177 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2025) (rejecting 41(g) claim where the plaintiff was apparently notified of adequate legal remedy in the form of forfeiture proceedings). Here, the complaint alleges plaintiff received a letter giving him 30 days to retrieve the property or face forfeiture. A Rule 41(g) proceeding is unavailable because plaintiff either has or had an adequate legal remedy. See United States v. Clagett, 3 F.3d 1355, 1356 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1993) (“if notice was adequate the forfeiture proceeding provided an adequate legal remedy and [claimant] will not be entitled to equitable relief.”); United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding a Rule 41(g) motion cannot be used to collaterally attack an administrative forfeiture proceeding; if the government has initiated an administrative forfeiture proceeding then a district court lacks jurisdiction over a Rule 41(g) claim); United States v. U.S. Currency $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal where civil forfeiture action was initiated the day after the motion for return of property was filed). Liberally construing plaintiff’s Rule 41(g) motion, plaintiff appears to allege a lack of adequate notice for the forfeiture proceeding because it imposed “an unreasonable 30-day deadline to retrieve property retained for over 20 years.” (ECF No. 3 at 2.) Because plaintiff could pursue return of his property in the context of that proceeding, however, the exercise of equitable jurisdiction in this case would be inappropriate. See United States v. Woodard, 185 F. App’x 629, 630 (9th Cir. 2006) (“As Woodard conceded that he received actual notice of the impending forfeiture of the disputed money, the forfeiture proceedings constituted an adequate legal remedy.”);3 United States v. Ibrahim, No. CR-00-0852 CAS, 2007 WL 9753294, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (notice of a forfeiture proceeding which was sufficiently detailed to allow movant to protect his interests by making a claim precluded Rule 41(g) motion for return of property). 3 United States v. Woodard, 185 F. App’x 629, is cited for persuasive rather than precedential value. IV. Order The complaint must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Although it appears plaintiff will be unable to state a claim for relief based on the underlying facts, plaintiff □□ granted leave to amend. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (‘A pro se litigant must be given, leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” (citation omitted)). If plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be titled “First Amended Complaint” and must be complete by itself without reference to any prior pleading. See Local Rule 220. Plaintiff is not obligated to file a further amended complaint. In accordance with the above, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiff's motion for return of property (ECF No. 3) is DENIED. 3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 4. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice within 30 days from the date of service of this order. 5. Failure to respond to this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. Dated: December 29, 2025 / ae / a /y Ze
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Bassal2sev2919.sem