Khalil v. Department of Corrections

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: July 7, 2023
• Docket: 23-30026
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Case: 23-30026 Document: 00516813659 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/07/2023

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 23-30026 Summary Calendar FILED ____________ July 7, 2023 Lyle W. Cayce Ashraf Khalil, Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Department of Corrections; Dustin Bickham; Patricia Williams,

Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:21-CV-466 ______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Ashraf Khalil, former Louisiana prisoner # 729221, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Khalil contends that the district court erred by sua sponte dismissing his complaint because it relied on information elicited by the form _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 23-30026 Document: 00516813659 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/07/2023

No. 23-30026

§ 1983 complaint in determining that he failed to exhaust his claims. He also argues that the district court erred by failing to consider his allegation that he could not exhaust administrative remedies regarding the instant claims due to the inadequacies in the prison administrative review process. This court reviews a district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies de novo. Coleman v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 763 (5th Cir. 2014). Although it appears that Khalil is no longer in custody, his appeal is not moot to the extent his suit seeks monetary damages. See Cruz v. Estelle, 497 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1974). As the district court concluded, Khalil was required under § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007). However, in Jones, 549 U.S. at 216, the Supreme Court held that an inmate’s failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA and that “inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Furthermore, “a district court cannot by local rule sidestep Jones by requiring prisoners to affirmatively plead exhaustion.” Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2007). We have interpreted Jones and Carbe to prohibit using form complaints to elicit exhaustion information from prisoners. See Coleman, 745 F.3d at 763 n.5 (citing cases); see also Torns v. Miss. Dep’t of Corrs., 301 F. App’x 386, 389 (5th Cir. 2008). While the district court acknowledged the holding in Jones, the district court nonetheless relied upon Khalil’s responses to the form complaint’s questions to determine that his claims were unexhausted. The district court therefore erred by sua sponte dismissing Khalil’s complaint for failure to exhaust.

2 Case: 23-30026 Document: 00516813659 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/07/2023

We therefore VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.