Khalil, S. v. Mary Jane Home Enrichment

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 9, 2024
• Docket: 2002 EDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A14035-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

SANDRA KHALIL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : MARY JANE HOME ENRICHMENT : No. 2002 EDA 2023 CENTER INC., MARY JANE : CANDIDOS LOUNGE, EDNA : WILLIAMS, JOE WILLIAMS AND JOHN : WILLIAMS

Appeal from the Order Entered June 2, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 180101881

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MCLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 9, 2024

Sandra Khalil (“Khalil”) appeals pro se from the interlocutory order

denying her motion for reconsideration of the order granting her pro bono

counsel leave to withdraw from representation. For the reasons that follow,

we quash the appeal.

Given our disposition, a detailed factual recitation is unnecessary.

Briefly, in 2018, Khalil initiated the underlying action by filing a pro se

complaint in relation to a lease dispute. Thereafter, three attorneys from

Dilworth Paxson LLP (“Dilworth”) entered their appearances on her behalf to

represent her on a pro bono basis. One of the Dilworth attorneys later

withdrew his appearance, but was replaced by another Dilworth attorney, also

on a pro bono basis. The action proceeded to arbitration in 2019, resulting in J-A14035-24

an arbitration panel award against Khalil. Following the arbitration ruling, the

Dilworth attorneys advised Khalil that they would no longer represent her on

a pro bono basis, and that they would not pursue any appeal on her behalf

based on their belief that an appeal of the arbitration award would be futile.

Khalil then filed a pro se notice of appeal of the arbitration award, pursued the

appeal on a pro se basis, and filed several successful pro se motions.

Meanwhile, the Dilworth attorneys filed a praecipe to withdraw their

appearance. The trial court struck the praecipe to withdraw for lack of court

permission and lack of a concurrent entry of appearance by replacement

counsel. The Dilworth attorneys then filed a motion for leave of court to

withdraw their appearance. On April 18, 2023, the trial court conducted a

hearing on the motion to withdraw before entering an order granting the

motion. Khalil filed a motion for reconsideration of the order. On June 2,

2023, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration.

On June 9, 2023, Khalil filed a pro se notice of appeal, and specified therein

that she was appealing from the June 2, 2023 order.

Preliminarily, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to

address the appeal. The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide

that an appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order certified as a

final order (see Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order as of right (see

Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (see Pa.R.A.P. 312,

1311, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (see Pa.R.A.P. 313(b)).

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Additionally, because the timeliness of an appeal implicates our

jurisdiction, we may not address the merits of the underlying issue raised by

an appellant before determining whether the appeal was timely filed. See

Krankowski v. O’Neil, 928 A.2d 284, 285 (Pa. Super. 2007). Pertinent to

this issue, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 903(a) provides:

“[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal . . . shall

be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is

taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 105(b), this Court may not

enlarge time for filing a notice of appeal. Accordingly, this Court may quash

the appeal if it is untimely filed beyond the thirty-day time limitation

proscribed by Rule 903(a). See Costlow v. Costlow, 914 A.2d 440, 442 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (quashing an appeal filed beyond thirty-day time limitation).

Here, Khalil contends that the trial court’s April 18, 2023 order granting

the motion to withdraw from representation qualifies as a collateral order

pursuant to Rule 313(b). However, she did not file a notice of appeal within

thirty days of the entry of that order. Instead, Khalil filed her pro se notice of

appeal on June 9, 2023, fifty-two days after the entry of the April 18, 2023

order.

Moreover, Khalil specified in her pro se notice of appeal that she was

appealing from the June 2, 2023 order denying her pro se motion for

reconsideration. Importantly, an order denying a motion for reconsideration

is not appealable. Cheathem v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 743 A.2d 518, 521

(Pa. Super. 1999) (holding that denial of reconsideration is not subject to

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appellate review); see also Erie Ins. Exch. v. Larrimore, 987 A.2d 732,

743 (Pa. Super. 2009) (reiterating that an appeal lies from the original order,

not from denial of reconsideration); Valentine v. Wroten, 580 A.2d 757, 758

(Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that, because an order denying reconsideration is

not appealable, an appeal from such an order is regarded as “improper and

untimely”).

Notably, the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the time

period for taking an appeal. See Gardner v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 A.3d

280, 283 (Pa. Super. 2014). Thus, Khalil was required to simultaneously file

of a notice of appeal to preserve her appellate rights if the trial court failed to

either deny or expressly grant her motion for reconsideration within thirty

days. See Cheathem, 743 A.2d at 521; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3)(i),

(ii).

Consequently, because Khalil did not timely appeal from the April 18,

2023 order granting the motion to withdraw from representation, and the June

2, 2023 order denying her motion for reconsideration is non-appealable, this

Court is without jurisdiction and we must quash the appeal.

Appeal quashed.

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Date: 9/9/2024

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