RENDERED: OCTOBER 10, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1313-MR
KHALIL COLEMAN APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-00265
GREEN RIVER CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, L. JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: Khalil Coleman (“Coleman”), pro se, appeals the Franklin
Circuit Court’s order denying his motion for default judgment and granting
Appellee’s motion for summary judgment challenging a disciplinary proceeding
held at Green River Correctional Complex (“GRCC”), which resulted in a finding
that he violated institution rules. Finding no error, we affirm. FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 2, 2023, GRCC surveillance camera footage captured a
physical altercation among multiple inmates in the prison gymnasium. Upon
review of the footage, GRCC corrections officers identified seven inmates
involved in the fight. Coleman was identified as one of the main participants and
described as entering the gymnasium followed by a group of inmates. As Coleman
and the group approached the doorway of the gymnasium bathroom, Coleman
approached another inmate and threw the first punch. Lieutenant Daniel Dukes
(“Lt. Dukes”) detailed the ensuing fight in his report, noting that a handful of
inmates remained standing at the bathroom doorway; eventually, a few tried to
break up the fight but were pushed or pulled out of the bathroom by others.
Moments after the initial altercation, Coleman got into another fistfight with a
second inmate, while the group of inmates stood at the bathroom doorway and
either watched or tried to break up the fight.
The GRCC Security Threat Group (“STG”) Coordinator reviewed the
surveillance footage and concluded that the fight qualified as an STG event.1 Lt.
1 Chapter 15.2 (Rule Violations and Penalties) of Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures defines Security Threat Group or STG as “a formal or informal ongoing group of inmates varying in organization and composition that: (A) Have common characteristics, interests, and goals distinguishing them from other offenders; (B) Have a common name or common identifying signs, colors, or symbols; (C) Individually or collectively engage in or have a pattern of continued criminal activity or departmental rule violations; and (D) Have the potential to act in concert to interrupt the safe, secure and orderly operations of a correctional institution or any other Department of Corrections facility, or pose a threat or potential threat to public safety.”
-2- Dukes interviewed Coleman and the other involved inmates. During his interview,
Coleman admitted to his involvement in the September 2 altercation but argued
that he only fought with two other inmates. Coleman denied walking into the
gymnasium as part of a group or having any other gang affiliation.
Lt. Dukes charged Coleman with violating Kentucky Corrections
Policy and Procedure (“CPP”) 15.2, Section II(C), Category VI(18) for “violence
toward another inmate that is STG related.”2 Coleman received a copy of the
disciplinary report on September 22, 2023, and an adjustment hearing was held
three days later on September 25.
At the adjustment hearing, Coleman was accompanied by an inmate
legal aide, testified on his own behalf, and did not call any other witnesses.
Coleman acknowledged 24-hour advanced notice of the hearing, timely receipt of
his disciplinary report, and sufficient time to meet with his legal aide. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the Adjustment Officer (“AO”) found Coleman guilty of
the charged offense, based on 1) Coleman’s admitted participation in the fight; 2)
evidence from the surveillance footage corroborating Coleman’s admission; and 3)
the STG Coordinator’s opinion that the fight constituted an STG-related event.
The AO sanctioned Coleman with disciplinary segregation for 30 days and the loss
2 Category VI(18) violation reads “STG related physical action or force against another inmate[.]”
-3- of 112 good-time days. Coleman appealed the hearing decision to the Warden of
GRCC who concurred with the AO’s findings and denied the appeal.
In January 2024, Coleman, pro se, petitioned the Franklin Circuit
Court, pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 418.040, for declaratory
judgment dismissing or amending the findings of the disciplinary hearing. GRCC
moved for summary judgment. Coleman responded with a motion for default
judgment. In its written order granting summary judgment and denying Coleman’s
motion, the circuit court held that Coleman received due process and that the AO’s
decision satisfied the “some evidence” standard of review. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Coleman presents two arguments under the broad assertion
that his conviction from the disciplinary hearing violated due process. First, he
argues that the AO’s decision of guilt on the Category VI(18) violation is not
sufficiently supported by the evidence. Second, he argues that the STG provisions
in CPP 15.2 were improperly codified in Kentucky Administrative Regulations,
and therefore, illegitimate.
“The general formula Kentucky courts at all levels employ to
determine whether summary judgment is proper is to ask whether there are genuine
issues of material fact, and, if not, whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Smith v. O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Ky. App. 1997); see
-4- Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03. When reasonable, “ambiguities
in the record must be construed in favor of the non-moving party.” Smith, 939
S.W.2d at 355 (citing CR 56; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991)). However, this Court has noted that “[w]here, as here,
principles of administrative law and appellate procedure bear upon the court’s
decision, the usual summary judgment analysis must be qualified.” Id. at 356.
The problem is to reconcile the requirement under the general summary judgment standard to view as favorably to the non-moving party as is reasonably possible the facts and any inferences drawn therefrom, with a reviewing court’s duty to acknowledge an agency’s discretionary authority, its expertise, and its superior access to evidence. In these circumstances we believe summary judgment for the Corrections Department is proper if and only if the inmate’s petition and any supporting materials, construed in light of the entire agency record . . . , does not raise specific, genuine issues of material fact sufficient to overcome the presumption of agency propriety, and the Department is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id.
In the context of prison disciplinary proceedings where loss of a
protected liberty interest is at stake, an inmate is entitled to due process, “but the
process due is no more than notice of the charges, a reasonable opportunity to be
heard, and a brief written finding suitable for judicial review.” Smith, 939 S.W.2d
at 357 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). In this case, Coleman
received adequate due process. He had received advanced notice of the charges
-5- against him and his hearing date, the opportunity to call witnesses and present
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
RENDERED: OCTOBER 10, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1313-MR
KHALIL COLEMAN APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-00265
GREEN RIVER CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, L. JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: Khalil Coleman (“Coleman”), pro se, appeals the Franklin
Circuit Court’s order denying his motion for default judgment and granting
Appellee’s motion for summary judgment challenging a disciplinary proceeding
held at Green River Correctional Complex (“GRCC”), which resulted in a finding
that he violated institution rules. Finding no error, we affirm. FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 2, 2023, GRCC surveillance camera footage captured a
physical altercation among multiple inmates in the prison gymnasium. Upon
review of the footage, GRCC corrections officers identified seven inmates
involved in the fight. Coleman was identified as one of the main participants and
described as entering the gymnasium followed by a group of inmates. As Coleman
and the group approached the doorway of the gymnasium bathroom, Coleman
approached another inmate and threw the first punch. Lieutenant Daniel Dukes
(“Lt. Dukes”) detailed the ensuing fight in his report, noting that a handful of
inmates remained standing at the bathroom doorway; eventually, a few tried to
break up the fight but were pushed or pulled out of the bathroom by others.
Moments after the initial altercation, Coleman got into another fistfight with a
second inmate, while the group of inmates stood at the bathroom doorway and
either watched or tried to break up the fight.
The GRCC Security Threat Group (“STG”) Coordinator reviewed the
surveillance footage and concluded that the fight qualified as an STG event.1 Lt.
1 Chapter 15.2 (Rule Violations and Penalties) of Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures defines Security Threat Group or STG as “a formal or informal ongoing group of inmates varying in organization and composition that: (A) Have common characteristics, interests, and goals distinguishing them from other offenders; (B) Have a common name or common identifying signs, colors, or symbols; (C) Individually or collectively engage in or have a pattern of continued criminal activity or departmental rule violations; and (D) Have the potential to act in concert to interrupt the safe, secure and orderly operations of a correctional institution or any other Department of Corrections facility, or pose a threat or potential threat to public safety.”
-2- Dukes interviewed Coleman and the other involved inmates. During his interview,
Coleman admitted to his involvement in the September 2 altercation but argued
that he only fought with two other inmates. Coleman denied walking into the
gymnasium as part of a group or having any other gang affiliation.
Lt. Dukes charged Coleman with violating Kentucky Corrections
Policy and Procedure (“CPP”) 15.2, Section II(C), Category VI(18) for “violence
toward another inmate that is STG related.”2 Coleman received a copy of the
disciplinary report on September 22, 2023, and an adjustment hearing was held
three days later on September 25.
At the adjustment hearing, Coleman was accompanied by an inmate
legal aide, testified on his own behalf, and did not call any other witnesses.
Coleman acknowledged 24-hour advanced notice of the hearing, timely receipt of
his disciplinary report, and sufficient time to meet with his legal aide. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the Adjustment Officer (“AO”) found Coleman guilty of
the charged offense, based on 1) Coleman’s admitted participation in the fight; 2)
evidence from the surveillance footage corroborating Coleman’s admission; and 3)
the STG Coordinator’s opinion that the fight constituted an STG-related event.
The AO sanctioned Coleman with disciplinary segregation for 30 days and the loss
2 Category VI(18) violation reads “STG related physical action or force against another inmate[.]”
-3- of 112 good-time days. Coleman appealed the hearing decision to the Warden of
GRCC who concurred with the AO’s findings and denied the appeal.
In January 2024, Coleman, pro se, petitioned the Franklin Circuit
Court, pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 418.040, for declaratory
judgment dismissing or amending the findings of the disciplinary hearing. GRCC
moved for summary judgment. Coleman responded with a motion for default
judgment. In its written order granting summary judgment and denying Coleman’s
motion, the circuit court held that Coleman received due process and that the AO’s
decision satisfied the “some evidence” standard of review. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Coleman presents two arguments under the broad assertion
that his conviction from the disciplinary hearing violated due process. First, he
argues that the AO’s decision of guilt on the Category VI(18) violation is not
sufficiently supported by the evidence. Second, he argues that the STG provisions
in CPP 15.2 were improperly codified in Kentucky Administrative Regulations,
and therefore, illegitimate.
“The general formula Kentucky courts at all levels employ to
determine whether summary judgment is proper is to ask whether there are genuine
issues of material fact, and, if not, whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Smith v. O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Ky. App. 1997); see
-4- Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03. When reasonable, “ambiguities
in the record must be construed in favor of the non-moving party.” Smith, 939
S.W.2d at 355 (citing CR 56; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991)). However, this Court has noted that “[w]here, as here,
principles of administrative law and appellate procedure bear upon the court’s
decision, the usual summary judgment analysis must be qualified.” Id. at 356.
The problem is to reconcile the requirement under the general summary judgment standard to view as favorably to the non-moving party as is reasonably possible the facts and any inferences drawn therefrom, with a reviewing court’s duty to acknowledge an agency’s discretionary authority, its expertise, and its superior access to evidence. In these circumstances we believe summary judgment for the Corrections Department is proper if and only if the inmate’s petition and any supporting materials, construed in light of the entire agency record . . . , does not raise specific, genuine issues of material fact sufficient to overcome the presumption of agency propriety, and the Department is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id.
In the context of prison disciplinary proceedings where loss of a
protected liberty interest is at stake, an inmate is entitled to due process, “but the
process due is no more than notice of the charges, a reasonable opportunity to be
heard, and a brief written finding suitable for judicial review.” Smith, 939 S.W.2d
at 357 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). In this case, Coleman
received adequate due process. He had received advanced notice of the charges
-5- against him and his hearing date, the opportunity to call witnesses and present
evidence in his defense, and a written statement from the factfinder stating the
evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions.
As to the sufficiency of the evidence, courts utilize the “some
evidence” standard for reviewing a prison disciplinary board’s decision.
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985);
Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 357-58 (adopting the federal standard of review in Walpole).
The “some evidence” standard is met if “there is any evidence in the record that
could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Walpole, 472
U.S. at 455-56; see also Ramirez v. Nietzel, 424 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Ky. 2014)
(citation omitted) (“Even ‘meager’ evidence will suffice.”). Once the “some
evidence” standard is satisfied, “the fear of arbitrary government action is removed
and no due-process violation is found.” Ramirez, 424 S.W.3d at 917.
Considering this lesser standard, we likewise agree with the circuit
court that there is “some evidence” in the record supporting the AO’s finding of
guilt. Coleman admitted to his participation in the fight on September 2, which
was corroborated by video surveillance footage. The AO considered this evidence
in addition to the conclusions from the STG investigation. The only evidence
rebutting the SGT categorization was Coleman’s own self-serving statements.
-6- We do not address Coleman’s second contention regarding the
codification of the SGT provisions in CPP 15.2 as this argument is not properly
preserved. “It is a matter of fundamental law that the trial court should be given an
opportunity to consider an issue, so an appellate court will not review an issue not
previously raised in the trial court.” Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 753
(Ky. App. 2003). Moreover, “an issue not properly raised in an intermediate
appellate court may not be raised on appeal to the next higher court.” Id. (quoting
Pers. Bd. v. Heck, 725 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Ky. App. 1986)).
Given the lowered “procedural and evidentiary standards that satisfy
due process” in the prison disciplinary context, Wilson v. Haney, 430 S.W.3d 254,
257 (Ky. App. 2014), and the “judicial deference to the judgments of prison
disciplinary committees and administrators,” Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 358, we agree
with the circuit court’s ruling. Coleman has not “raise[d] [any] specific, genuine
issues of material fact sufficient to overcome the presumption of agency propriety,
and [GRCC] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 356.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the Franklin
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
-7- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Khalil Coleman, pro se Crystal L. Thompson Eddyville, Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky
-8-