Khairy Aref v. Roderick Hickman

Ninth Circuit

Khairy Aref v. Roderick Hickman

404 F. App'x 205

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 22, 2010

Docket09-56664

StatusUnpublished

This text of 404 F. App'x 205 (Khairy Aref v. Roderick Hickman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Khairy Aref v. Roderick Hickman, 404 F. App'x 205 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Khairy Aref appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his employment action for failure to comply with a prior court order to post a security bond. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion, Montserrat Overseas Holdings, S.A v. Larsen, 709 F.2d 22, 24 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

*206 The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Aref to post a security bond after finding that he consumed unreasonable court and defendant resources by filing numerous prolix and unnecessary documents. See Montserrat Overseas Holdings, S.A., 709 F.2d at 24 (district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering litigant to post security bond under local rules); C.D. Cal. R. 83-8.8 (district court may order a litigant to give security in such amount as it determines to be appropriate based on a finding that the litigant “has abused the Court’s process and is likely to continue such abuse, unless protective measures are taken”); see also Aref v. Marder, 15 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.1994) (unpublished mem.) (affirming dis trict court order declaring Aref a vexatious litigant).

However, it appears that the district court applied the wrong standard in arriving at the $250,000 security amount— to deter Arefs vexatious litigation practices, rather than to “secure the payment of any costs, sanctions or other amounts which may be awarded against a vexatious litigant.” C.D. Cal. R. 83-8.2. We therefore remand for the limited purpose of the district court either explaining how it arrived at the $250,000 security amount or reducing the amount as appropriate.

We do not consider Arefs contentions not supported by argument. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir.1992).

Arefs remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

We deny Arefs request for judicial notice.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Khairy Aref appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his employment action for failure to comply with a prior court order to post a security bond. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion, Montserrat Overseas Holdings, S.A v. Larsen, 709 F.2d 22, 24 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

*206 The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Aref to post a security bond after finding that he consumed unreasonable court and defendant resources by filing numerous prolix and unnecessary documents. See Montserrat Overseas Holdings, S.A., 709 F.2d at 24 (district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering litigant to post security bond under local rules); C.D. Cal. R. 83-8.8 (district court may order a litigant to give security in such amount as it determines to be appropriate based on a finding that the litigant “has abused the Court’s process and is likely to continue such abuse, unless protective measures are taken”); see also Aref v. Marder, 15 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.1994) (unpublished mem.) (affirming dis trict court order declaring Aref a vexatious litigant).

However, it appears that the district court applied the wrong standard in arriving at the $250,000 security amount— to deter Arefs vexatious litigation practices, rather than to “secure the payment of any costs, sanctions or other amounts which may be awarded against a vexatious litigant.” C.D. Cal. R. 83-8.2. We therefore remand for the limited purpose of the district court either explaining how it arrived at the $250,000 security amount or reducing the amount as appropriate.

We do not consider Arefs contentions not supported by argument. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir.1992).

Arefs remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

We deny Arefs request for judicial notice.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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