Khadijatu Diallo v. Capital One NA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: November 6, 2025
• Docket: 25-2258
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-2258 ___________

KHADIJATU AMIE DIALLO, Appellant

v.

CAPITAL ONE NA ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01532) District Judge: Honorable John M. Younge ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on November 4, 2025

Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 6, 2025) ____________________________________ ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

Khadijatu Amie Diallo appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying her

motion for reconsideration. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

In April 2023, Diallo filed a pro se complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylva-

nia against Capital One. The complaint arises from a contract she signed with the com-

pany in 2021 to finance her purchase of a car. She alleges violations of the Truth in Lend-

ing Act (TILA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

The District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice on April 27, 2023,

after screening it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), explaining that Diallo failed to

state a claim. In particular, the District Court concluded that she “has not clearly articu-

lated the factual underpinnings for the [TILA] claim” and “failed to allege facts that

clearly demonstrate that Capital One has violated any provision of the FDCPA in at-

tempting to collect a debt.” ECF No. 4 at 5, 6-7. It gave her 30 days to amend her com-

plaint. Diallo never filed anything in response, and on June 20, 2023, the District Court

dismissed the case with prejudice.

Over two years later, in July 2025, Diallo filed a motion for reconsideration under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The motion asserts that she did not intend to stand

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 on her original complaint and attaches an amended complaint. The District Court denied

the motion as untimely. Construing it as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

60(b), the District Court determined that it was not only still untimely, the motion also

failed to “articulate[] any plausible basis for granting relief under” the rule, and, “[i]n any

event, the proposed amended complaint would not cure the defects in the original plead-

ing.” ECF No. 9 at 1 n.1. Diallo timely appealed.1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review in this case is limited to

the District Court’s July 2, 2025 order denying Diallo’s motion for reconsideration. We

generally review the denial of motions made under Rule 59(e) and 60(b) for abuse of dis-

cretion. See Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673

(3d Cir. 1999); Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s order. Motions for recon-

sideration must be filed “no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment,” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 59(e), and motions under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3) must be filed “no more than a year af-

ter the entry of the judgment or order[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). All other 60(b) motions

must be filed “within a reasonable time.” Id. Diallo did not file her motion until over two

years after the District Court’s order dismissing the case with prejudice. In the motion,

she acknowledges that “this is an unreasonable delay,” but nevertheless asks for the time

requirements “to be waived and extended.” ECF No. 7 at 4. Denial of this request was not

1 When Diallo filed the 59(e) motion, she also filed a motion for relief from judgment un- der Rule 60(b). On August 18, 2025, after she filed this appeal, the District Court entered an order denying that motion. She has not appealed from that order. 3 an abuse of discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (prohibiting a district court from ex-

tending the time to file motions under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)). In her brief, she argues that

the District Court “overlooked critical new evidence of identity theft and inconsistences

in Capital One’s transaction records.” CA No. 7 at 2. But it was not an abuse of discretion

for the District Court to deny the motion as untimely after determining that the motion

was not filed within a reasonable time as required, nor was it an abuse of discretion to

deny the motion because the proposed amended complaint would not cure the defects it

identified in the original pleading. Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir.

2002).

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2

2 We deny Diallo’s motion to supplement the record with “new evidence that arose after the District Court entered its judgment.” CA No. 8 at 1; see also Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 435 (3d Cir. 2013) (indicating that a party may supplement the record on appeal in only “exceptional circumstances”). 4