RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2904-24
K.G.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
F.A.,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Argued May 5, 2026 – Decided July 13, 2026
Before Judges Rose and Torregrossa-O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, Docket No. FV-11-1856-24.
Michael H. Nieschmidt argued the cause for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
1 We use initials to protect the identities of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). Defendant F.A. appeals from an April 4, 2025 final restraining order
(FRO) entered against him and in favor of plaintiff K.G. under the Prevention
of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Defendant argues
the trial court erroneously found plaintiff established a predicate act of stalking,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, and the need for future restraints under Silver v. Silver, 387
N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). He also asks this court to "revisit"
our previous order denying his motion to strike as untimely under Rule 2:5-1(d)
the trial court's amplified statement of reasons.2 Following a review of the
record and the applicable legal principles, we affirm.
2 We preliminarily reject defendant's invitation to review and effectively reverse our September 5, 2025 order, denying his motion to strike the court's amplification as untimely pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(d), before filing his merits brief. K.G. v. F.A., No. A-2904-24 (App. Div. Sept. 15, 2025). In the same order, we granted defendant's request for an extension to file his merits brief. Ibid. Defendant did not move for reconsideration of the September 5, 2025 order.
Not only is defendant's claim improperly raised as a point in his merits brief, it lacks sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only that we are satisfied no prejudice resulted from our order, which simultaneously extended defendant's time for filing his brief for one month, affording defendant a full opportunity to address the court's amplified findings. A-2904-24 2 I.
On May 22, 2024, then-eighteen-year-old plaintiff obtained a temporary
restraining order (TRO) against defendant, forty-five years plaintiff's senior.
Plaintiff's family rented space in defendant's two-bedroom apartment, where he
also lived with his son. Plaintiff alleged predicate acts of stalking and
harassment, stating on March 25, she "was taking a shower," when she noticed
"a light from a camera that was placed in a basket where the household members
place the shampoo, body wash, and other things." She reported that two days
later she saw the camera again, this time removing it and calling the police, who
advised her to wait to seek the TRO until they could confirm who was recording
her. Plaintiff indicated "the camera recorded [her] showering." According to
plaintiff, one week later, defendant approached her car, told her he had gone to
her workplace to look for her, and asked to speak to her alone. Plaintiff
expressed fear of defendant arising from the circumstances and his longstanding
relationship with her family.
The FRO hearing took place over four separate days, beginning on June
27, 2024 and concluding with the court's oral decision on April 4, 2025. Plaintiff
testified and presented testimony from Hightstown Police Detective Jerry
A-2904-24 3 Mecca, and provided photos of the shower area, and excerpts of the videos
retrieved from the camera.
Plaintiff offered the following testimony. Plaintiff's family rented living
space in defendant's two-bedroom home for roughly thirteen years. She shared
one bedroom with her mother, father, and younger sister, while defendant and
his son occupied the second bedroom. Common areas, including the kitchen,
dining room, and single bathroom, were shared with defendant and his son.
Plaintiff identified photos of the shower stall in the bathroom, which depicted a
vertical stack of black corner baskets attached to a center pole. Each basket had
holes for drainage, and plaintiff indicated several holes had been "made bigger
and there were extra holes that did not belong there." The photographs reflected
the enlarged and added holes as plaintiff described them.
Plaintiff first noticed the camera when in the bathroom to take a shower
on March 25, 2024. The camera was located inside one of the baskets she
described as "cubbies." She saw a blue flashing light coming from the camera.
"[F]reaked out," plaintiff went to her room, where she heard defendant—"the
only other person in the house at the time"—"go into the bathroom." After
twenty minutes, plaintiff returned to the bathroom but the camera was missing.
She described feeling "very scared," "shocked," and unsure "what to do."
A-2904-24 4 Two days later, plaintiff entered the bathroom and ran the water to "make
noise" while she looked for the camera, which she found on the left side of the
same "cubby." The camera was covered by a dark cloth, but she believed it was
recording "because the lights were also still on." This time she took the camera,
left the house, showed it to her mother, and they called the police. She turned
the camera over to the police who commenced a criminal investigation. Plaintiff
noted hearing defendant leave the house when she took the camera from the
bathroom.
On April 4, plaintiff returned to the apartment from work. Defendant
"parked right next to [her] in the parking lot" of the apartment, "knocked on the
window," and "kept insisting [they] needed to talk," but she did not know why.
Defendant told her he had attempted to find her at her workplace. Plaintiff
refused to engage because she "was just scared" and had known defendant since
she was very young and "saw him as a father figure because [she's] not that close
with [her] father." Plaintiff's parents were in the throes of a divorce, and
plaintiff, her mother, and her sister moved out of defendant's home with the
entry of the TRO at the end of May 2024.
Plaintiff had not seen defendant since that time and was uncertain whether
her father still lived there. Plaintiff explained she feared defendant because he
A-2904-24 5 knew so much about her, including places she frequented, where her family
lived, where she attended college, and where she worked. She expressed
concern because he went to her workplace on April 4 to try to find her, they all
lived in a "small town" and, at the time of trial, she was living only "five minutes
by car" from his apartment.
Mecca testified that he inspected the camera and retrieved its memory card
pursuant to a search warrant issued in the related criminal investigation. The
detective reviewed the data, which included relevant videos from March 25 and
27, 2024, including one depicting an individual identified as defendant holding
a cellular phone and placing the camera in the shower area. The corresponding
video excerpts were played and admitted into evidence. Mecca testified he
reviewed other relevant footage, including videos depicting plaintiff, and
described the camera's Wi-Fi or Bluetooth capabilities allowing it to connect to
a mobile device to watch a live video feed.
Mecca also recounted his subsequent custodial interrogation of defendant
in the criminal matter. In his statement, defendant admitted he purchased the
camera and placed it in the shower, specifically desiring a picture of plaintiff.
The detective testified defendant told him the camera connected to "live feed."
A-2904-24 6 On April 4, 2025, the trial court entered the FRO against defendant,
finding plaintiff, although not proving harassment, had established the predicate
act of stalking and the need for permanent restraints. The court found plaintiff's
testimony "very credible," with no motivation to falsely implicate defendant.
The court described plaintiff as appearing "obviously physically and honestly
shaken up and tearful and crying about what happened to her." The court
similarly credited Mecca as "credible and knowledgeable," noting he confirmed
a Bluetooth connection on the camera "and that as a result concluded there was
a live feed on defendant's phone" based on defendant's admission.
After determining the record had not established harassment, and citing
the applicable law related to stalking, the court determined defendant engaged
in a purposeful and knowing course of conduct directed at plaintiff that caused
her to experience emotional distress. The court reasoned on March 25 and
March 27, 2024, defendant placed the camera in the "shared bathroom shower
that was connected to his phone, so that he could view the plaintiff while
showering and in a state of undress." The court noted the camera contained
recordings of plaintiff, and defendant admitted "the device was his and he
wanted to obtain images of plaintiff."
A-2904-24 7 According to the court, defendant engaged in a course of conduct that
would cause a reasonable person to either "fear for his or her safety" or "suffer
emotional distress." Noting plaintiff was "a young woman" who "grew up
thinking of defendant as a surrogate father who she trusted," the court found
plaintiff
very clearly distressed to the core that she has suffered deep emotional distress arising out of the fact defendant broke her trust, targeted her in an attempt, without her knowledge, to take those videos of her while she was in the safety of their long-shared home behind closed doors in the bathroom without her knowledge, taking lewd pictures of her or attempting to view her naked in the shower.
Turning to the need for future protection, the court recognized the PDVA
"is to be liberally construed to provide maximum protection that individuals who
suffer domestic violence can get under the law," the court addressed the statutory
factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)3 and found "an FRO [wa]s necessary to
3 These factors include, but are not limited to:
(1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse;
(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property;
A-2904-24 8 protect plaintiff's best interest." The court found plaintiff remained
"emotionally distraught" and "devastated," and lived in close proximity to
defendant who knew details concerning her and her family's lives, particularly
as plaintiff's father continued to live with defendant. Therefore, the court
determined "the best interest analysis . . . weigh[ed] very, very, very, heavily in
favor of plaintiff."
Dispelling defendant's argument that an FRO was "not necessary because
the parties no longer live[d] together," the court emphasized the PDVA's
(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant;
(4) The best interests of the victim and any child;
(5) In determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim's safety;
(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction; and
(7) Any pattern of coercive control against a person that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with, threatens, or exploits a person's liberty, freedom, bodily integrity or human rights with the court specifically considering evidence of the need for protection from immediate danger or the prevention of further abuse. . . .
[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).] A-2904-24 9 recognition "the compulsions of stalkers may turn more dangerous, and it is
broadly intended to protect victims before the plaintiff is put further
in . . . danger." The court held an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff,
especially considering defendant "as an adult who enjoyed a father-like
relationship with plaintiff, could not stop himself from trying to obtain images
of her naked and in intimate situations in the bathroom." Noting the parties'
continued close proximity at the time of trial, the court concluded an FRO was
necessary to prevent defendant "from starting to surveil [plaintiff] again."
Following issuance of the April 4, 2025 FRO, this appeal followed.
On August 19, 2025, the trial court issued a nine-page amplification,
which reiterated and expanded on the earlier oral findings. The court
emphasized defendant's admissions he "owned the camera," wanted to capture
images of plaintiff with it, and that he placed the camera in the shower. Thus,
the court clarified, regardless of whether defendant viewed the recordings of
plaintiff, the acts of installing the camera in the bathroom on two separate
occasions constituted a course of conduct because defendant "indirectly placed
himself in visual proximity to plaintiff" with the assistance of technology. The
court also found the record supported a finding defendant's phone was connected
to the camera allowing him to watch a live feed.
A-2904-24 10 Regarding the need for an FRO, the court expanded upon the purposes
behind the PDVA and anti-stalking statute. The court noted defendant's
"impulsive, covert, and invasive behavior despite the parties' family -like
relationship, his reliance on technology to advance his compulsion, and the
parties' physical proximity," demonstrated an FRO was necessary to protect
plaintiff.
II.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in finding plaintiff
established the predicate act of stalking, claiming the record did not show:
defendant was the individual depicted in the videos setting up the camera;
defendant received live feed on his phone; the camera captured footage of
plaintiff; or plaintiff was the target of the recordings. Citing no caselaw for the
proposition, defendant further argues "attempts" to stalk do not constitute
separate acts under the stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a)(1). He also
contends the trial court erroneously found plaintiff proved an FRO was needed
for her future protection.
An appellate court's review of an FRO determination is generally limited.
See C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). "We accord
substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic
A-2904-24 11 violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference between
domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between couples.'"
Ibid. (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)); see also S.K. v. J.H.,
426 N.J. Super. 230, 238 (App. Div. 2012). The appellate court may review the
FRO record to determine whether the record as a whole supports issuance of the
FRO. See J.D., 207 N.J. at 488. Findings by a court "are binding on appeal
when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." T.M.S. v. W.C.P.,
450 N.J. Super. 499, 502 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.
394, 411 (1998)). Our review of legal conclusions is de novo. See C.C., 463
N.J. Super. at 428-29.
When determining whether to issue an FRO pursuant to the PDVA, trial
courts must engage in a two-step analysis. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-
27. The court "must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a
preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts
set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. Upon a finding of
a predicate act of domestic violence, the court must then determine whether an
FRO is required to protect the party seeking restraints from future acts or threats
of violence. Id. at 126-27. "[T]here [must] be a finding that 'relief is necessary
to prevent further abuse.'" J.D., 207 N.J. at 476 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)).
A-2904-24 12 We first address defendant's challenge to the court's finding defendant
committed the predicate act of stalking. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b) provides "[a]
person is guilty of stalking . . . if he [or she] purposefully or knowingly engages
in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable
person to fear for his [or her] safety or the safety of a third person or suffer
emotional distress." The statute defines "course of conduct" as
repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means, following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating to or about, a person, or interfering with a person's property; repeatedly committing harassment against a person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed by any other means of communication or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a)(1).]
Notably, "the [stalking] statute's course-of-conduct focus[es] . . . on the
accused's conduct and what that conduct would cause a reasonable victim to
feel, not on what the accused intended." State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 170
(2010). The statute further defines "[r]epeatedly" as "on two or more
occasions"; "[e]motional distress" as "significant mental suffering or distress";
and "[c]ause a reasonable person to fear" as "to cause fear in which a reasonable
A-2904-24 13 victim, similarly situated, would have under the circumstances." N.J.S.A.
2C:12-10(a)(2)-(4).
H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309 (2003), is instructive here. There, the
defendant hid a camera and microphone in his wife's bedroom and monitored
her for an unknown period of time. Id. at 317. Our Supreme Court held the
defendant's conduct could constitute stalking because it was "reasonable to infer
that [the] defendant [wa]s responsible for installing the surveillance equipment
and that he acted 'purposefully or knowingly' against a 'specific person,' his
wife." Id. at 329. Additionally, the Court stated the defendant's behavior could
"constitute a 'course of conduct' because he repeatedly . . . maintain[ed] a
visual . . . proximity to" the plaintiff. Id. at 329-30 (second omission in original)
(quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a)(1) and (2)).
We perceive no misuse of discretion in the court's finding defendant
engaged in stalking, given the ample evidence in the record. After making
detailed credibility findings, the trial court reasonably concluded defendant
purposefully and knowingly engaged in a course of conduct directed at "a
specific person"—plaintiff—which "would cause a reasonable person to fear for
his or her safety . . . or suffer other emotional distress."
A-2904-24 14 Although the bathroom was a common area utilized by all residents in the
dwelling, the record amply supports the court's finding that defendant, who
admitted he purchased and placed the camera in the bathroom and wished to film
or photograph plaintiff, hid the camera repeatedly with purpose to monitor and
view an unwitting plaintiff. Plaintiff's testimony concerning defendant's
location in the home on March 25 and 27, 2024, and the secretive placement of
the camera in the basket with strategically enlarged holes, together with Mecca's
testimony about defendant's admissions and the data retrieved from defendant's
phone, including the videos extracted from it, sufficiently anchored the court's
conclusion defendant engaged in a course of conduct targeting plaintiff .
We are similarly convinced the trial court did not err in finding defendant
purposely set up his camera to provide live feed to his phone. Mecca testified
the camera had Bluetooth capabilities, and the videos showed defendant
"manipulating his phone near his stashed camera to ensure it was connected."
According to Mecca, defendant told him the camera had "live feed," and the
detective found images of plaintiff on the device. The trial court also credited
plaintiff's testimony defendant "quickly fled the home," when she seized the
camera, suggesting to the court defendant was viewing plaintiff as she retrieved
the camera, which displayed a flashing light. Regardless of whether defendant
A-2904-24 15 succeeded in viewing the livestream on March 27 when plaintiff thwarted his
surveillance, we are satisfied the record supported a finding defendant
"monitored" and "surveilled" plaintiff within the meaning of the stalking statute.
His setting up his camera to prepare for plaintiff's use of the bathroom that day
constituted the requisite "proximity" to and "monitoring" of plaintiff under the
law.
That plaintiff suffered emotional distress is readily evident in her
testimony and the circumstances involving defendant's profound breach of
plaintiff's trust and invasion of her privacy. We are likewise satisfied
defendant's actions in surveilling a barely eighteen-year-old girl who resided in
his home would evoke fear in a reasonable person and caused plaintiff emotional
distress. Accordingly, the court properly concluded plaintiff established the
predicate act of stalking.
We are also unpersuaded the trial court erred in finding permanent
restraints were necessary for plaintiff's protection. The record amply supports
the trial court's entry of future restraints to prevent future harm. Defendant, a
trusted lifelong "father figure," went to great lengths to surreptitiously monitor
plaintiff while in the bathroom, vulnerable, exposed, and showering. Defendant
A-2904-24 16 engaged in this alarming conduct even though his son and plaintiff's family lived
in the home.
At the time of trial, plaintiff resided near defendant, causing her to
reasonably fear defendant would contact her. In particular, defendant appeared
at her workplace and then confronted her at home attempting to meet her alone,
presumably understanding she uncovered his surveillance activity and seized his
camera. Plaintiff expressed reasonable concern defendant knew her
whereabouts and places she and her family frequented. Defendant's refraining
from contacting plaintiff from the entry of the TRO and during the pending
police investigation does not, as he suggests, undermine a reasonable concern
of future risk to plaintiff. Thus, we are satisfied the trial court correctly found
plaintiff's interests and need for protection necessitated the FRO.
Affirmed.
A-2904-24 17