Keytron W. Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 20, 2015
• Docket: 02A05-1408-CR-370
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Feb 20 2015, 10:03 am

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Keytron W. Johnson Gregory F. Zoeller Bunker Hill, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Jesse R. Drum Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Keytron W. Johnson, February 20, 2015

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No. 02A05-1408-CR-370 v. Appeal from the Allen Superior Court Cause No. 02D04-0004-CF-232 State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. The Honorable Frances C. Gull Judge

Barnes, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1408-CR-370 | February 20, 2015 Page 1 of 5 Case Summary [1] Keytron Johnson appeals the denial of his request for educational credit time.

We reverse and remand.

Issue [2] Johnson raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly

denied his motion without a hearing.

Facts [3] In 2001, Johnson pled guilty to Class A felony burglary and was sentenced to

thirty-five years. On July 11, 2014, Johnson filed a pro se petition seeking

credit time for his completion of various education programs. The petition

alleged that he had completed the programs and that the Department of

Correction (“DOC”) failed to award him credit time for such. In his

memorandum of law in support of his petition, Johnson claimed the DOC did

not respond to his written requests for credit time or his appeals. On July 29,

2014, before the State responded, the trial court denied the motion without a

hearing. Johnson now appeals.

Analysis [4] Johnson argues that the trial court improperly denied his petition for

educational credit time. In response, the State contends that, because Johnson

failed to show what administrative remedies were available, “it is impossible for

[Johnson] to prove that he exhausted his available remedies.” Appellee’s Br. p.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1408-CR-370 | February 20, 2015 Page 2 of 5 6. The State goes on to argue, “since the DOC did not respond to [Johnson’s]

applications or appeals, it is unlikely that he actually exhausted his available

remedies. Accordingly, the [trial court] court did not have jurisdiction, and this

appeal should be dismissed.” Id.

[5] The State relies on Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),

trans. denied, in which a panel of this court dismissed an appeal challenging the

failure to award educational credit time reasoning that the petitioner’s failure to

exhaust administrative remedies deprived the post-conviction court of subject

matter jurisdiction. In Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1256 (Ind. 2008), our

supreme court clarified “that post-conviction proceedings are the appropriate

procedure for considering properly presented claims for educational credit

time.” Further, to properly present a claim, the petitioner must follow the

Indiana Post-Conviction Relief Rules and, if the petition is not the first petition

for post-conviction relief, the rules for filing successive petitions must be

followed. Young, 888 N.E.2d at 1256-57. Without clearly addressing the issue

of subject matter jurisdiction, the Young court cited Members for the proposition

that, to prevail on a claim presented via post-conviction procedures, a petitioner

must establish to the post-conviction court that he or she exhausted his

administrative remedies. Id. 1257.

[6] Thus, based on Young, Johnson’s petition for educational credit time should be

treated as a post-conviction relief petition, not as a free-standing challenge to his

sentence. Nevertheless, dismissal is not appropriate because we do not believe

that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies implicates the subject matter

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1408-CR-370 | February 20, 2015 Page 3 of 5 jurisdiction of post-conviction courts. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 19

N.E.3d 757, 760 (Ind. 2014) (explaining “that the exhaustion of administrative

remedies under AOPA is a procedural error and does not implicate the trial

court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”); K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind.

2006) (observing that the question of subject matter jurisdiction involves a

determination of whether a court has jurisdiction over the general class of

actions to which a particular case belongs and that “characterizing other sorts of

procedural defects as ‘jurisdictional’ misapprehends the concepts.”). The State

makes no claim that post-conviction courts generally lack the authority to

determine educational credit time claims, and we decline to dismiss the appeal

on that basis.

[7] As for the State’s claim that Johnson did not establish he exhausted his

administrative remedies, the State offers no authority for the proposition that

exhaustion of administrative remedies must be proven in a petition. It may

very well be that Johnson has not exhausted his administrative remedies.

However, Johnson should be afforded the opportunity to establish such, and the

State should have the opportunity to respond before the post-conviction court

rules on the petition. See Wilson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App.

2003) (remanding with instructions to allow the State the opportunity to

respond to a request for educational credit pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction

Relief Rule 1(4)(a)). Thus, the trial court’s denial of Johnson’s petition was

premature and contrary to the procedure set forth in the post-conviction rules.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1408-CR-370 | February 20, 2015 Page 4 of 5 Conclusion [8] Johnson’s petition for educational credit time should be treated as a post-

conviction relief petition. As such, the trial court’s denial of his claim was

premature, and it should be addressed in accordance with the post-conviction

rules. We reverse and remand.

[9] Reversed and remanded.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1408-CR-370 | February 20, 2015 Page 5 of 5