Keystone Bank v. Donnelly

196 F. 832, 21 Pa. D. 621, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1595
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 28, 1912
DocketNo. 685
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 196 F. 832 (Keystone Bank v. Donnelly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keystone Bank v. Donnelly, 196 F. 832, 21 Pa. D. 621, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1595 (E.D. Pa. 1912).

Opinion

J. B. McPHERSON, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff recovered a judgment at law in this court against the Safety Banking & Trust Company, and by a regularly conducted proceeding under the Pennsylvania act of 1870 (P. L,. 58) levied upon the company’s franchises and rights, and bought them at the marshal’s sale. The defendants, or some of them, had been carrying on the business of the company before the sale, and they have continued to carry it on without interruption or material change, asserting that the company was only a partnership, and had no franchises or rights that were subject to execution. The proceeding, it is said, was an idle formality, by which nothing was acquired. It appeared that the Safety Banking & Trust Company was organized under the state law of 1899 (P. I,. 261). If (as I believe) it became a corporation thereby, its franchises and rights might he sold under the act of 1870, and the plaintiff is now entitled to equitable relief. If I am right, it need not be decided whether the act of 1870 may properly be applied, not only to corporations strictly so called, but also to similar associations.

It is hardly necessary to say that, in determining whether the act of 1899 empowers the creation of corporations or of partnerships, the name used by the statute is not decisive. If the association is really a corporation' — that is, if it receives the distinctive rights and privileges of a corporation — it cannot be a partnership, no matter what label the Legislature may choose to affix. The Pennsylvania Constitution lias gone far to settle controversy on this subject. It declares in section 13 of article 16 — this article makes numerous provisions concerning “private corporations” --that:

“The term ‘corporation’ as used in this article shall he considered to include all .-joint-stock companies or associations having any of the powers or privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships."

And this I think may fairly be quoted as the constitutional definition of a corporation, which should be applied unless context or subject-matter should forbid.

Let us turn, therefore, to the act of 1899 and inquire what powers or privileges it gives to an association organized thereunder. That it calls the association a “partnership” is of some, but not of much, value. It certainly does not use the word in its ordinary sense, for nobody can suppose that such a statute would have been passed, except for the definite purpose of authorizing the formation of an extraordinary “partnership” — an association possessing special privileges, similar at least to those possessed by a corporation. An ordinary partnership for an ordinary purpose did not need legislative authority. But an unusual “partnership” did need such authority; and accordingly this rather remarkable statute begins at once to bestow unusual powers and privileges. Section 1 allows any two or more persons who may wish to conduct any kind or kinds of business, trade, or [834]*834occupation (with a few exceptions) “to associate themselves in partnership,” and to subscribe as much or as little capital as they please without being obliged to pay any of it in-before beginning business. In other words, the so-called capital may consist entirely of lawsuits. As they may thus do business purely on credit, without any cash in the treasury, there will naturally be debts. As the next step to protect the “partners,” they may limit their liability “for the debts of the partnership to the amount of capital subscribed by such partner or partners respectively”; and the act proceeds to specify how this limitation may be accomplished. The process is simple. The “partners” need only declare that they so desire. They may also fix the “duration” of the association, no maximum being established; and, indeed, it appears clearly from section 8 that no term whatever need be fixed. The duration, therefore, may be perpetual. Or, if a term should be originally fixed, this may be extended indefinitely (section 8), “by articles specifying the fact of such renewal, and the length of time fixed for the duration of the renewed partnership.”

Section 3 states again in unambiguous words that the liability of the members is to be limited:

“No member of any such partnership thus formed, recorded, and published, whose liability is stated as intended to be limited in the manner here-inbef ore set forth, shall be liable for its debts under any circumstances, saving to the extent of the amount of his or her subscription, with interest on unpaid subscriptions from the date or dates at which the same became actually due and payable. Payment of the amount of the subscription of such member of ffie partnership, with interest as aforesaid, shall exonerate such partner from all further liability.”

And the association is so distinct from the partners that:

“A partner or partners whose liability is thus limited shall not be precluded from transacting business with or for the partnership.”

By section 4 “a majority of the number in (and?) interest of the partners” may make by-laws and may alter them from time to time. Such by-laws may do what corporation by-laws usually do, namely, may constitute “official positions for the transaction of the business of the partnership,” and fix “the powers and duties of the respective officers prescribed therein.”' Either in such by-laws or in some other unspecified way, the partners may approach even more closely to the distinctively corporate method of doing business; for at their option they

“may provide that certain only of the members shall have active charge of the business and be authorized to enter into1 contracts, undertakings, or engagements whereby the partnership shall be held liable, and may change the same as they see fit.”

But they need not state this provision in the original articles, unless they so desire, and there is no penalty for failing to make it public. They may also at their .option “adopt and use a common seal.”

By section 7:

“Interest in such partnership shall be personal estate, and may be transferred, given, bequeathed, distributed, sold, or assigned under such rules and regulations as may from time to time be prescribed by a vote of the majority in number and interest of the partners.”

[835]*835In the unlikely contingency that no rules and regulations on this subject shall be adopted, the transferee shall not be entitled to participate in the subsequent business of the partnership, unless elected by a majority in number and interest of the remaining partners. It 'is further provided that:

“The transfer of any interest, however accruing, shall not dissolve the partnership, nor shall said partnership bo dissolved by reason of the death of one or more of the partners unless the articles of association shall prescribe to the contrary. In case of a change in the members of the partnership by reason of death, transfer or otherwise, it shall not be necessary .to make any publication of the fact thereof.”

This section inevitably suggests shares of corporate stock and their transfer.

Section 10 allows the articles of association to go so far as to provide that the partnership is not to be dissolved, even by a vote of

“the majority in number and interest of those who at such time shall constitute the partnership.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
196 F. 832, 21 Pa. D. 621, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1595, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keystone-bank-v-donnelly-paed-1912.