Keyes v. School District No. 1

576 F. Supp. 1503, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10281
CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedDecember 30, 1983
DocketCiv. A. C-1499
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 576 F. Supp. 1503 (Keyes v. School District No. 1) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10281 (D. Colo. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON LANGUAGE ISSUES

MATSCH, District Judge.

The delay in dealing with the particular issues discussed in this memorandum opinion is a result of the difficulties involved in using the adversary process to assess the efforts made by a public school district to obey a mandate to replace a segregated dual school system with a unitary system in which race and ethnicity are not limitations on access to the educational benefits provided. Among those difficulties are: (1) the polarization of positions through pleadings and proof, (2) the necessity to make a retrospective inquiry into a very fluid problem focusing on a static set of operative facts, (3) the limitations in the Rules of Evidence, (4) the tension between minority objectives and majoritarian values in the political process, (5) the time constraints imposed by the volume of other litigation, and (6) the inertia inherent in the bureaucratic structure of public education. While the following discourse is directed toward the problems of children with language barriers, it must be recognized that the analysis is made in the context of a desegregation case which has been in this court for more than a decade.

Stated in the most comprehensive form, the plaintiff-intervenors' contention is that within the pupil population of the Denver Public Schools, those children who have limited-English language proficiency (“LEP”) are being denied equal access to educational opportunity because the school system has failed to take appropriate action to address their special needs. Accordingly, it is claimed'that such children are denied the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; that the school district has violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; and that the school district has violated the *1505 mandate of Section 1703(f) of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

These are ancillary issues in this litigation which began in 1969. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2699, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973), the Supreme Court ordered trial of the factual question of whether the Denver School Board’s policy of deliberate segregation in the Park Hill Schools constituted the entire school system a dual system. Judge William E. Doyle’s findings that a dual system did exist required further proceedings to ensure that the school board discharged its “affirmative duty to desegregate the entire system ‘root and branch’.” Id. That process is still continuing under this court’s supervision.

The Congress of Hispanic Educators (“CHE”) and thirteen individually named Mexican-American parents of minor children attending the Denver Public Schools filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs to participate in the remedy phase hearings. Those plaintiff-intervenors were represented by attorneys from the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF). Plaintiff-intervenors’ motion to intervene was granted by Judge Doyle at a hearing on January 11,1974. The only record of that order is in the handwritten minutes of the deputy clerk, which note, “Motion of Mexican American Legal Defense Fund to Intervene, Ordered-Motion to Intervene is Granted.” The defendants never filed an answer or any other pleading in response to the complaint in intervention.

In that original complaint, the intervenors asserted claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (42 U.S.C. § 2000d). Paragraph 9 of the complaint alleged that the action was brought as a Rule 23(b)(1) and .(3) class action, with the class defined as follows:

(a) All Chicano school children, who by virtue of the actions of the Board complained of in the First Cause of Action, Section III of the plaintiff’s complaint, are attending segregated schools and who are forced to .receive unequal educational opportunity including inter alia, the absence of Chicano teachers and bilingual-bicultural programs;
(b) All those Chicano school children, who by virtue of the actions or omissions of the Board complained of in the Second Cause of Action, Section IV of the plaintiff’s complaint, are attending segregated schools, and who will be and have been receiving an unequal educational opportunity;
(e) All those Chicano teachers, staff, and administrators who have been the victims of defendant’s discriminatory hiring, promotion, recruitment, assignment, and selection practices and whose victimization has additionally caused educational injury to Chicano students in that Chicano teachers, staff, and administrators are either nonexistent or underemployed. Additionally, the class is composed of present and future teachers, staff, and administrators who may be affected by . this court’s impending relief in such a manner as to detrimentally affect Chicano children within said district.

There is no record of any order by Judge Doyle certifying such a class. MALDEF lawyers actively participated in the hearings on the desegregation plans submitted by the plaintiff class and the defendant. There was no challenge to the standing of the parties they were representing.'

On April 17, 1974, Judge Doyle ordered implementation of a desegregation plan based on the work of Dr. Finger, a court-appointed expert witness. Parts of that plan addressed the special interests and needs of Chicano children as urged by another expert witness, Dr. Jose Cardenas. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that those special requirements went beyond Judge Doyle’s findings. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir.1975). The Court of Appeals ruled, in relevant part:

The [district] court made no finding, on remand, that either the School District’s curricular offerings or its methods of educating minority students constituted *1506 illegal segregative conduct or resulted from such conduct. Rather, the court determined that ... a meaningful desegregation plan must provide for the transition of Spanish-speaking children to the English language. But the court’s adoption of the Cardenas Plan, in our view, goes well beyond helping Hispano school children to reach the proficiency in English necessary to learn other basic subjects. Instead of merely removing obstacles to effective desegregation, the court’s order would impose upon school authorities a pervasive and detailed system for the education of minority children. We believe this goes too far.
Other considerations lead us to the same conclusion. Direct local control over decisions vitally affecting the education of children ‘has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to the quality of the educational process.’ ...

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
576 F. Supp. 1503, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10281, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keyes-v-school-district-no-1-cod-1983.