Keybank N.A. v. Malloya, Unpublished Decision (2-14-2005)
This text of 2005 Ohio 632 (Keybank N.A. v. Malloya, Unpublished Decision (2-14-2005)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
{¶ 3} Dennis Malloy defaulted in payment on the KeyBank account, and KeyBank filed a complaint in foreclosure on July 3, 2003. U.S. Bank filed an answer and cross-claim on August 25, 2003. KeyBank then filed a motion for default judgment against the borrower.
{¶ 4} On December 15, 2003, KeyBank's counsel faxed counsel for U.S. Bank a consent entry. U.S. Bank's counsel then indicated she could not sign the consent entry because a title claim was pending. She suggested KeyBank's counsel simply write the word "submitted" over her name and submit the entry without her signature. Accordingly, counsel for KeyBank wrote "submitted" on the area provided for U.S. Bank's counsel's signature, and filed the consent order with the trial court.
{¶ 5} On December 17, 2003, U.S. Bank's present counsel faxed KeyBank's counsel and the trial court a letter asking opposing counsel to modify the entry to request the issue of lien priority be held in abeyance and indicating a motion to vacate would be filed if the entry was not so modified. However, the trial court filed the consent order on December 17, 2003, and found KeyBank held a first and best lien and U.S. Bank held an inferior lien.
{¶ 6} U.S. Bank did not directly appeal the trial court's December 17, 2003 entry. Rather, it filed a Civ. R. 60(B) motion to vacate as to lien priorities on February 25, 2004. On April 12, 2003, via Judgment Entry, the trial court denied the motion to vacate.
{¶ 7} Appellant now appeals the April 12, 2004 Judgment Entry, assigning as error:
{¶ 8} "I. The trial court committed reversible error when it denied appellant's February 25, 2004 rule 60(b) motion to vacate judgment as to lien properties regarding an erroneous `consent order' filed on 12-17-03 as a result of plaintiff's motion for default judgment against the borrower, to which consent order counsel for appellant had objection, and where the issue of lien priority had never been litigated on the merits, and where appellant had shown that it had viable, meritorious defenses to plaintiff's priority claim, which defenses have been accepted by this same court in a different case and on a different motion to vacate in nearly identical circumstances, and where that motion and the subsequent motion for summary judgment were granted."
{¶ 10} As noted supra, U.S. Bank did not directly appeal the trial court's December 17, 2003 entry finding KeyBank possessed the first and best lien priority, and further finding there was not just cause for delay. Rather, on February 25, 2004, U.S. Bank filed a motion to vacate pursuant to Civil Rule 60(B).
{¶ 11} A Civil Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment is not a substitute for a timely appeal. Doe v. Trumbull County Children ServicesBoard (1986),
{¶ 12} Therefore, U.S. Bank's appeal is dismissed as untimely, and the April 12, 2004 Judgment Entry of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas denying U.S. Bank's motion to vacate the December 17, 2003 Judgment Entry is affirmed.
Hoffman, J. Boggins, P.J. and Farmer, J. concur.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2005 Ohio 632, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keybank-na-v-malloya-unpublished-decision-2-14-2005-ohioctapp-2005.