Key Title Co. v. Real Estate Division
This text of 602 P.2d 663 (Key Title Co. v. Real Estate Division) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Petitioner seeks judicial review of Oregon Administrative Rule (OAR) 863-50-0601 pursuant to amended ORS 183.400.2 Petitioner contends that the rule ex[180]*180ceeds respondent Real Estate Commissioner’s statutory authority and violates the privilege and immunity provision of Art I,§ 20 of the Oregon Constitution.3 Petitioner also seeks a declaratory ruling that funds deposited in interest bearing accounts afterthe closing of an escrow are not subject to the rule.
ORS 696.508(1) vests the Commissioner with the duty to "protect the public” by "uniform and equitable regulation of all escrow agents”. ORS 696.541(1) authorizes the the Commissioner to "adopt such rules as reasonably necessary for the enforcement of ORS 696.505 to 696.585”. Petitioner contends that OAR 863-50-060 is "an arbitrary economic restriction not reasonably related to the enforcement of any of the provisions of the Law, or for the protection of any interest of the public”. No contention is made that the statutorily required procedures were not observed in adopting the rule.
Arguably, if an escrow agent were receiving interest income from escrow funds during the course of the escrow, there would be an incentive based on self interest to prolong the term of the escrow. Thus, the [181]*181ule is within the Commissioner’s statutory "authority a protect the public.” ORS 696.508(1).
Petitioner next contends that the rule violates its onstitutional rights because ORS 696.241(6)4 permits . real estate broker to retain interest earned on trust fnds whereas escrow agents are proscribed from dong so. Again, arguably, protection against self inter-st is essential in escrow transactions as distinguished rom permissible exercise of self interest by real estate rokers. We find nothing palpably arbitrary in the istinction that exists. Cf. Plummer v. Donald M. Drake Co., 212 Or 430, 437, 320 P2d 245 (1958) and Mallatt v. Luihn, 206 Or 678, 702, 294 P2d 871 (1956). There was no violation of Art I, § 20 of the Oregon Constitution.
Finally, petitioner seeks a declaratory ruling con-eming the Commissioner’s interpretation of OAR 63-50-060 by a letter dated February 16, 1979, retarding interest bearing accounts after closure of the scrow. No request was made to the Commissioner for declaratory ruling concerning that interpretation as ermitted by ORS 183.410,5 which provides that an [182]*182agency may "issue a declaratory ruling with respect to the applicability” of "any rule or statute enforceable by it” and that such rulings are "subject to review in this court” in the manner provided for the review of orders in contested cases. Since no declaration was sought under ORS 183.410 and the sole basis of our jurisdiction here is ORS 183.400, we do not reach the interpretation issue.
Rule upheld.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
602 P.2d 663, 43 Or. App. 177, 1979 Ore. App. LEXIS 3371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/key-title-co-v-real-estate-division-orctapp-1979.